

The Human Connection

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OVERVIEW¹

Movements of people are every bit as controversial and important as flows of corporate bonds, auto parts, prescription medications, or arms negotiators. Indeed, some of the most contentious political battles of the last few years have been about how to deal with various kinds of human movement. In 2005, youth from immigrant families rioted in the suburbs of Paris to challenge their long-standing social and political exclusion. Millions of Latino immigrants marched through U.S. cities in 2006 to demand a path toward citizenship for the estimated 12 million irregular immigrants in the United States. Meanwhile, Ukraine put in place new laws to curb an alarming trend of human trafficking of its women. Germany debated the failure of a guest worker program designed to bring in highly skilled labor to support its growing information technology sector.

Whether we are talking about the global circulation of unskilled migrant laborers, technology industry professionals, political refugees, tourists, terrorists, or nongovernmental organization activists, new patterns of human flows have been both a central feature and an important effect of globalization. These changing forms of human movement can have important consequences for how states, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and local communities perceive and negotiate their relationship to people inside and beyond national borders.

Consequently, new and different forms of human connection challenge and raise questions about some of the basic precepts of international political economy. For example, why do people increasingly define their identities, communities, livelihoods, politics, and leisure activities in terms other than those related to the nation-state? And what effects do these movements have on the four structures of IPE (security, production and trade, knowledge and technology, and money and finance)? Through a focus on two particularly salient forms of human movement—migration and tourism—this chapter explores the changing nature of local and global connections and their implications for IPE.



International political economy (IPE) is not just about state and markets. If anything, issues that focus specifically on various societies and their cultures and values have not received the attention they deserve in the IPE literature, which is dominated by issues surrounding the relationship of states to markets. As noted in Chapter 1, society is one of the basic elements of IPE. States represent one type of social group—the national society—whereas markets reflect and influence what various societies need and produce. This chapter focuses more directly on people and their connections to one another, which result in what some experts refer to as a social network, system, or structure. Regardless of the label, each of these sets of human connections shapes the behavior of international and national actors, IPE structures, and the outcome of a variety of policy issues and problems.

The analysis of human connections is one of the important new directions of IPE as it broadens its scope to account for global change. In this chapter we cover two important networks of human connection: migration and tourism. One theme of the chapter is that IPE theories can help explain a variety of developments in these networks. The United Nations estimates that about 191 million people, or almost 3 percent of the world's population, are migrants living away from their native country.² The United States is home to the largest number of those migrants, who make up 12 percent of the U.S. population. In many cases, migrant flows are related to the collapse of governments; efforts to gain "guest worker" privileges in another country; efforts to escape war, poverty, or natural disaster; or simply the search for freedom and prosperity.

Tourism accounts for the movement of individuals from one location to another. Unlike migrants, tourists travel for reasons related to leisure and recreation.³ To many people, travel is an escape from the routines of everyday life, but tourism should receive serious academic and policy consideration. Patterns and trends in the global travel and tourism industry closely mirror several features of the world system.

In this chapter we will also consider the major roles played by many different international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) alongside nation-states in managing migration and tourism issues. As noted in previous chapters, not only have the numbers of IOs and NGOs proliferated greatly since World War II, so have their efforts intensified to solve a variety of international and global problems. This has been especially true in the case of human connections: In many cases, civil society or nonstate actors are challenging nation-states in dealing effectively with interdependencies or new issues generated by globalization.⁴

THE IPE OF MIGRATION

Redefining Migration

In its simplest sense, **migration** refers to movement from one place to another—to a nearby city, another region, or another country entirely. Migration may be temporary or permanent; there is nothing about the notion of migration itself that guarantees either the length of residence or the strength of the commitment to the migratory destination. The reasons for migration are diverse: People may not have permanent work or sufficient resources to sustain themselves in their home environment. They may wish to pursue advanced educational or professional opportunities. They may not be able to express their ideas or practice their religion in the way that they choose. They may face environmental devastation or political turmoil. They may be separated from family members.

Migration has long been an integral force in shaping both individual nation-states and their relationships to one another within the global landscape. Nonetheless, over the last few decades we have seen human movement occur on a scale and intensity that was unheard of in the past. Breakthroughs in technology and travel have allowed a broad array of people to move across borders and time zones as part of (or to ensure) their daily lives. Both men and women have blazed

new migration trails and contributed to the construction of vibrant multicultural communities that extend across the globe. By 2005, the UN estimated that more than 191 million people were residing in a country other than where they were born. In forty-one countries, migrants constituted as much as 20 percent of the total population.⁵

The increased frequency of migration in the world has also been accompanied by new patterns of movement. Whereas previous travel routes were characterized by journeys east and west, or colonial forays south, current migration is characterized by more south–north or even south–south migration. This pattern is reflected in the fact that one-third of international migrants moved from developing to developed countries (often from former colonies), while another third moved from developing to other developing countries. Nearly six of every ten international migrants now live in high-income countries that include developing countries such as Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, and Saudi Arabia.⁶ Furthermore, whereas people were once presumed to migrate in order to take up permanent residence in their destinations, their movement is now often temporary and circular.

Despite the diverse reasons why people move, when we talk about migration we tend to focus mostly on the temporary movement of labor. In general, labor migrants relocate on a short-term basis to take advantage of employment opportunities. This kind of movement can take the form of **internal migration**—for example, movement from the country to the city, or from one area of the country to another. Internal migration, and rural–urban migration in particular, has been a central feature of IPE theories of development (see Chapter 15). In these theories, migration within the nation has often been seen as a crucial component of national efforts toward urbanization, industrialization, and modernization. As the case of China illustrates, however, internal migration can also have complex unintended consequences for state development efforts. See the box, “Mapping Modernization: China’s Internal Migration.”

MAPPING MODERNIZATION: CHINA’S INTERNAL MIGRATION

The relationship between internal migration and national development is the subject of much debate in contemporary China. Over the past two decades, massive national economic growth has caused a steady flow of rural peasants to China’s booming cities. The rural–urban flow was estimated to have reached 140 million in 2003, representing a doubling in volume since 1993.^a This migration reflects China’s explosive modernization, but contemporary rural–urban migration has also caused some serious social and political dilemmas.

In China, all people must register in their place of birth in order to receive citizenship and government services there. In the past, the Chinese state relied on this system of registration (*hukou*) to separate urban and rural populations and thus ensure a sufficient rural population to provide agricultural production for the nation. However, just as in the Western industrialized countries, the introduction of the market economy, the modernization and mechanization of rural agriculture, and the shift from collective to household production systems in China have made many rural farmers “surplus” labor. In an effort to take advantage of growing economic opportunities in the cities, many have taken part in a large-scale exodus from agriculture toward urban economic enterprises. These mobile peasants are known as a “floating population” because they have become part of a nonregistered community without permission to reside permanently in the cities.

Some of these migrants work in seasonal occupations, sending money back to their rural communities until they return at harvest time to complete the agricultural cycle.^b Other migrants set up informal businesses—as reflected in the growing garment industry in Beijing. In both cases, however, migrants face serious discrimination from urban natives, who often see them as dirty, crafty delinquents who are responsible for urban disorder and crime.^c Furthermore, they must confront discriminatory labor and business licensing practices put in place by the state to dissuade them from settling permanently in the cities. China argues that it must control migration to avoid producing urban slums in and around its large cities, as we see in India or

São Paulo. Nonetheless, the Chinese state has also resorted to issuing new identification cards that travel with the individual, rather than being tied to place (as *hukou* is), as a means of regulating this increasingly mobile population. Ironically, then, part of China’s development strategy involves looking for new incentives to keep people in the rural areas.

References

- ^a See China News, “China’s Floating Population Exceeded 10% of Total,” January 16, 2005, www.chinanews.cn, accessed June 16, 2006; and Li Zhang, *Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power and Social Networks Within China’s Floating Population* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).
- ^b See “The Floating People,” *U.S. News & World Report*, June 20, 2005, www.usnews.com, accessed August 7, 2006.
- ^c Dorothy Solinger, *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

Transnational Migration

An important trend in today’s migration is the increasing tendency of people to move not simply to nearby cities, but to different countries altogether. Whether we are talking about unskilled labor or highly educated professionals, **transnational migration** describes the now-frequent process by which people cross state borders in search of temporary work or for other reasons. This more global migration trajectory is compounded by a tendency toward **circular migration**, by which migrants follow a shifting pattern of movement back and forth between home and work communities in response to different economic opportunities, employment conditions, and family needs or responsibilities.

For example, every September, thousands of young men from Mali and Niger travel to the Cote D’Ivoire and other West African countries to seek wage-labor opportunities along the coast. They remain in these jobs until the spring, when they return home to attend to their crops.⁷ This migration pattern, and the income it provides, is essential to sustaining a rural agricultural lifestyle, even though it requires the men to spend half of each year abroad. As another example, women from the Philippines and mainland China migrate to Hong Kong to labor as domestic workers for middle- and upper-class professional families. The Filipina maids’ residence in Hong Kong is limited by the term of their employment contract, such that many return home after completing a few years of service.⁸ Once home, however, they often solicit a new employment contract and return to Hong Kong for another cycle of labor.

Circular transnational migration is an essential part of changing economic conditions and political relations associated with globalization. As global capitalist production becomes more mobile, migrant workers tend to move to labor markets where there is high demand and low domestic supply. For this reason, migrants often fill jobs at both ends of the labor market. Engineers and scientists take highly specialized professional positions within the technology or aerospace industries. Unskilled workers fill labor and service jobs that few native workers will do—for example, in the food service and garment industries, meat packing, domestic labor, or agriculture. Furthermore, declining population growth in countries such as Germany and Japan has increased the need for workers in general, thus making them a prime destination for foreign labor migrants.⁹ From Saudi Arabia to Spain to the United States, changing economic and demographic conditions have required most developed countries to make some accommodations for migrant labor within their borders.

States with high demand for foreign workers, such as Singapore, Kuwait, or Germany, have developed temporary foreign worker, or **guest worker**, programs that regulate the provisional admission, residence, and employment of a specific class of migrant labor. These migration policies usually do not allow whole families to enter the country or provide for the possibility of long-term residence or eventual citizenship. Instead, guest worker programs are aimed at utilizing cheap labor and then keeping migrants moving.

A prime example of this kind of program was the U.S. Bracero Program. Between 1942 and 1964, the initiative permitted the entry of temporary workers from Mexico to fill U.S. wartime labor shortages in the agricultural sector. By the 1950s, however, the United States sought to deter the permanent settling of Bracero workers and the entry of new Mexican migrants, to prevent the expansion of immigrant labor into nonagricultural sectors and to curb the rising levels of unemployment among domestic laborers. The United States thus launched the unfortunately named initiative, Operation Wetback, to locate and deport "illegal" migrants.¹⁰

The circumscribed residency status of temporary workers is exacerbated by their limited labor rights and potential subjection to discrimination and abuse. In a recent study of Jordanian garment factories, Bangladeshi workers who were interviewed reported that their employers had confiscated their passports, forced them to work 48-hour periods, provided insufficient sleeping accommodations, and refused to pay mandated overtime pay.¹¹ The situation for undocumented workers can be just as bad or worse, as these workers often have no recourse in filing complaints against employers who abuse or fail to pay them.

National programs are therefore complemented by international treaties such as the UN's 1990 International Convention on the Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers, which clarified migrant worker categories and reiterated the receiving states' responsibility to protect migrants' rights. These treaties acknowledge the need for global standards to regulate human flows and protect individual rights as people increasingly live their lives in places outside their place of birth.

One reason that temporary labor migration is attractive to both migrants and sending states is because of the possibility for **remittances**—income earned abroad that is sent back to the home country. Global remittances have doubled over the last decade, reaching \$232 billion by 2005.¹² To give a sense of the relative effect of these payments, the more than 1 million Guatemalans estimated to be living in the United States in 2005 remitted over \$3 billion to families and communities in Guatemala; this amount exceeded the income from exports and tourism for the country as a whole!¹³ Most remittances are used to supplement individual household incomes, but they are also important for offsetting the cost of education and health care. Furthermore, in some cases, hometown associations—formed by migrants from a single community—have consolidated their remittances to finance infrastructure and development projects in their home communities.¹⁴ Migrants are thus a vital element in the development of their home countries.

Migrant trajectories are shaped not only by economic incentives but also by political and social factors. As an example, Thai migrants have a long history of moving back and forth across the Malaysian border to perform temporary work; however, because of the ease of movement, they tend not to settle permanently in Malaysia. Indonesian migrants, on the other hand, encounter much stricter controls on their entry into Malaysia, and therefore tend to stay once they arrive.¹⁵ Circular migration to and from the United States has declined over the last few decades as border security has increased. Ironically, then, because undocumented migrants from Mexico have found it more and more difficult to return home, border security has actually accelerated the rate of growth of the undocumented population.¹⁶ As these cases demonstrate, factors such as official entry requirements often influence the type and permanence of migration.

The degree and frequency of temporary labor migration is also encouraged by the growing presence of transnational social networks of kin and neighbors on whom migrants can depend to find a place of residence and work. This pattern of **chain migration** promotes the concentration of migrant communities in enclaves or gateway cities, which are oriented around immigrant culture and practical needs. In these enclaves, it is possible for a migrant to speak his or her native language, buy "home-style" food, make quick wire transfers to people back home, and practice local customs.

For example, Roger Rouse studied the large numbers of Mexicans who moved between Aguililla, Michoacan, and Redwood City, California.¹⁷ The concentration of migrants moving between one small town in Michoacan and Redwood City had become so marked by the mid-1990s that many people began referring to parts of Redwood City itself as Aguililla. Indeed, most men in

the community spent a portion of their lives moving back and forth across the border between what were, in essence, the two communities of Aguililla. Consequently, community members were able to draw on a deeply embedded transnational network to facilitate ongoing transfers of people, money, and resources.

Though it is widespread, the current global pattern of transnational migration has created some serious problems for both sending and receiving states. At the most basic level, temporary migration patterns have complicated efforts to determine national populations. After all, states govern according to the size and characteristics of their national population. So how do we count population when a significant segment of that population may be working or residing abroad? Although this may not seem like a big problem for some states, you can get a sense of the problem when you look at countries such as the Philippines, which has an estimated 8.1 million residents (that is, 10 percent of the population) living and working abroad.¹⁸

In receiving states, new migration patterns have created another kind of demographic predicament, one with similarly important political implications. In the United States and Great Britain, the combination of increasing immigration rates and higher population growth rates among immigrant families has meant that the immigrant population is growing faster than the native-born population. This has led some nativist constituencies to worry about becoming a minority in their own country.¹⁹ It has also fueled concerns about the potential effect that the growing immigrant population will have on electoral politics—a point to which we will return later.

Irregular Migrants

Many states are also struggling with a high incidence of **irregular migrants**—undocumented or illegal migrants—flowing into their countries. Rather than getting the necessary work permits before entering the country, these migrants are entering the country without visas or staying on after their work visas have expired. In Spain, North African migrants from Senegal have been streaming into the country in large numbers over the past few years by using the Canary Islands (a Spanish territory just off West Africa) or Malta as the first step on their route. In 2006, their large numbers caused a humanitarian crisis in the Canary Islands and also protest from native Spanish residents, who saw them as a threat to economic stability and national security.²⁰ In Brunei, because of the high level of temporary migrant labor from India and the Philippines, a special task force was set up to "apprehend" workers who had stayed in the country beyond the stipulated term of their work visa.²¹ These cases raise the question of how to regulate temporary labor flows so as to complement domestic needs while also maintaining control over one's borders.

The European Union (EU) has grappled with this issue as it has extended membership to post-Soviet states and now contemplates Turkey's admission. Many of the original EU members imposed migration limits to mitigate the prospective flood of migrants that they feared would emerge with the inclusion of poorer Eastern European members in 2004. Even though this flood never occurred, and studies show that states that maintained labor limits suffered "undesirable economic side effects" compared to countries that maintained open borders, one of the main points of opposition to Turkey's inclusion has been the ongoing fear of waves of cheap labor from Asia and the Middle East.²² These fears grow out of the fact that Turkey, like Spain, is no longer defined by out-migration of its citizens but rather by immigration—in this case, of migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, and Iran, as well as former Soviet states. These irregular migrants often move to **transit states** such as Turkey, as a first step toward greater economic opportunities in more affluent countries of the EU. In the context of increasing regional migration, the migration policies of individual EU member states thus come to matter greatly.

Brain Drain

Temporary labor migration includes not only flows of unskilled labor but also the movement of highly educated professionals. Thus, increasing levels of global migration also pose another kind

of problem for developing states. These nations often lament the **brain drain** that occurs as the most educated members of their societies migrate to more developed nations where there are higher salaries and more employment opportunities. Through brain drain, developing states not only lose important human resources necessary for their own development, they also complain that they are essentially subsidizing the development of human capital for the richer nations. For this reason, developing countries often create incentives and/or sanctions to either keep their professionals at home or to ensure their return from education abroad as a crucial means of repatriating knowledge and technology.

A contentious example of this phenomenon can be seen today in the U.S. nursing industry. In the context of negotiating immigration reform, U.S. lawmakers decided *not* to place limits on the number of visas allotted for foreign nurses. This move was in response to a grave shortage of domestic nurses. The move, however, has caused great controversy in developing nations such as the Philippines and Fiji, which anticipate grave consequences as the United States woos some of their most valuable health care resources, leaving them without the personnel to deal with serious public health issues.²³ Meanwhile, U.S. nurses are frustrated at the thought of solving the shortage by importing foreign labor rather than promoting more training programs and incentives in the United States.

Citizenship

The complex economic, political, and social implications of new forms of human movement are intensified when we consider what happens when immigrants stop moving. Whereas migration simply signals movement from one place to another, **immigration** refers to migration to a new country for the purpose of settling and becoming a resident of the destination country. In many ways, we might think of the distinction between a migrant and an immigrant as the difference between a round-trip traveler whose affiliations remain rooted in his home community and a traveler with a one-way ticket who has an interest in making a new life in his destination community. However, though these differences appear clear on paper, their distinction in real life is much fuzzier. Indeed, the saying, "Nothing is as permanent as a temporary migrant" rings all too true for many a state. So, why is the distinction between migrant and immigrant important? In many ways, this question reaches to the heart of current immigration debates, highlighting the importance of changing formulations of national identity, political security, and global economics.

One of the chief functions of the modern state is to control its borders and protect its citizens' rights. *Citizenship* is a legal category that entitles a person to full and equal rights within a given state, perhaps most importantly including the right to vote. However, states have various means of assigning that status. Citizenship may be granted based on birth, ethnicity, or naturalization. Anyone born on U.S. soil is eligible to apply for citizenship. Furthermore, once immigrants to the United States obtain a "green card," they can eventually earn the chance to be naturalized as citizens. Because they provide immigrants the opportunity to become permanent residents, countries such as the United States or Australia are known as **settler states**. By contrast, people born on German soil do not necessarily receive citizenship. Instead, German citizenship is granted through one's parents: One must have a German mother or father, or a parent with established permanent residence, to become a German national. Restrictive migration policies in countries such as Japan and Saudi Arabia make it even harder for migrants to become citizens of those countries.

Another way that people can make a claim for permanent residence in a country that is not their own is through refugee status or asylum. Indeed, refugees currently account for 23 percent of all international migrants in the least developed countries.²⁴ **Refugees** are displaced people who are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin because of fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. A Sudanese victim of factional violence who has moved to a temporary camp in Chad could be considered a refugee. Often the UN High Commission on Refugees may be responsible for negotiating a permanent resettlement destination—either in Chad or in another country—for this Sudanese refugee.

People who seek **asylum** are also permanently displaced people who face persecution in their home countries. These immigrants, however, often make their claims for protection to a court within the nation in which they hope to reside, usually from within that nation's territory. Between 1994 and 2004, 6.1 million asylum applications were filed globally, 79 percent in Europe, 20 percent in North America, and the rest in Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.²⁵ A Bosnian Muslim suffering from political persecution in the former Yugoslavia might petition the Canadian government for asylum once she was on Canadian soil or in a Canadian port of entry. If her asylum claim were granted, she would be given refugee status and permitted to stay in Canada with social and economic rights.

Currently, the countries responsible for generating the most asylum seekers worldwide are China, Russia, and Serbia. In 2004, over 20,000 people from China applied for asylum in other countries. The top countries for receiving asylum claims are Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

Citizenship and asylum are much more than just legal categories, however. In practice, these two terms are highly contested designations with important political and cultural significance for society, states, and the international system in general. The rules for defining refugee status can often be a highly politicized matter of geopolitics, such as the U.S.'s opposition to communism. For example, a recent study shows that the U.S. government has granted political asylum to 80 percent of Cuban asylum applicants. This high rate might be read as a reflection of the assumption that all Cubans are political refugees fleeing an authoritarian, communist regime. In contrast, the same study showed that the United States granted asylum to only 10 percent of Haitian applicants. Even though these immigrants come from a neighboring island wracked by violence and political instability, Haitians tend to be seen as economic migrants rather than refugees.²⁶

Even when foreigners acquire legal residence or citizenship in their adopted countries, another problem remains: how to integrate them into the social fabric of their new homes. Despite their legal status, immigrants may still feel like second-class citizens in their day-to-day encounters with community members and local institutions, being denied everyday privileges afforded to native residents. Often this marginalization coincides with perceived differences in language, customs, and cultural values. Instead of following a process of **assimilation**—whereby an immigrant takes on the values and customs of the new prevailing culture—immigrant communities are frequently marked by their difference. However, immigrant disenfranchisement also correlates with structural inequalities such as differences in education, class, and race. In other words, even when immigrants assume local language, values, and orientations, they sometimes remain subject to discrimination. Consequently, immigrant struggles for social recognition and political inclusion have fueled some of the major social and political conflicts in recent years. The term **cultural citizenship** effectively describes immigrants' demands within these conflicts—that is, they seek a sense of social belonging that is not contingent on assimilation, but rather is built on a respect for diversity.²⁷

Two weeks of rioting by youth in Paris suburbs during 2005 represent a case in point. The clashes between youth and the French police were attributed largely to the extreme social marginalization and impoverishment experienced by North African immigrants and their descendants, despite their official French citizenship. This contradiction prompted a *New York Times* article to raise the important question, "What makes someone French?"²⁸ Because the French have always insisted on a secular national identity, they have glossed over racial and cultural distinctions rather than try and address their social and political effects. The French government's 2004 ban on the wearing of head scarves or other religious paraphernalia in public schools illustrates just such an attempt to suppress the visibility of cultural differences.²⁹ Now, however, the French and many of their European counterparts are trying to find a way to recognize diversity, both to create a more multicultural society and also to defuse the move by disenfranchised immigrant youth toward radical or fundamentalist organizations.³⁰

As the French case makes clear, the increasingly multicultural societies created by immigration require new ways of thinking about what makes someone an authentic citizen of the nation

and thus brings into focus contradictions in the definition of the nation itself. Porous state borders and fluid patterns of human movement challenge the assumption that the modern nation is defined not only by a sovereign state but also by a singular, common history and culture. This challenge is true in the United States, as well, despite the fact that immigration is a central feature of U.S. national identity. For example, in 2006 a musical collaboration produced the first Spanish-language version of the U.S. national anthem ("The Star Spangled Banner"). "Nuestro Himno," as the track is called, emerged at a moment of intense national debate over the immigration question. It called attention to what many view as the increasingly diverse and politicized reality of U.S. national culture. However, it also perturbed many pundits who saw the song as an attack not only on the United States's primary language—English—but also on the Anglo values and identity that they claimed defined U.S. history.³¹

Both the French and the U.S. immigration debates highlight the importance not simply of cultural values, but also of race, in defining the terms of national identity and citizenship. To explain the marginalization of immigrant groups, many scholars of U.S. immigration history have compared the experience of early twentieth-century immigrants from Europe with the experience of post-1965 immigrants from Asia and Latin America. Although earlier immigrants were originally identified as distinct races—Irish, Italian, Jewish—a sense of their racial difference largely disappeared as they assimilated to Anglo values and became upwardly mobile. Consequently, these European immigrants have increasingly been seen as "white." In contrast, later immigrants who are marked by darker skin or other phenotypical differences have been unable to shed their racial identities even when they assume "American" values, speak English, and acquire middle-class status.³² In these cases, it is the perceived racial difference, as much as or more than cultural difference, that explains specific groups' lack of cultural citizenship.

The continued importance of race in conversations about citizenship indicates some of the contradictions inherent in the new forms of human movement and connections emerging through globalization. We frequently hear stories about how our new globalized world has allowed mobile, enterprising migrants to access resources and opportunities unimaginable in their home country. This perspective chalks up immigrant success or failure, belonging or marginalization, to individual actions and values that are sometimes extended to an entire ethnic or national group. A closer look, however, demonstrates how racial, gender, class, and national differences (among others) continue to exert a strong influence over individual and group mobility and the outcome of that movement. For example, what forces govern who migrates, how, and to where? How is the immigration experience shaped by whether one is white or black, male or female, urban and educated or a rural peasant? Furthermore, how do certain patterns of migration reproduce inequalities between regions and groups rather than transcend them? In other words, does the fact that Dominicans emigrate in high numbers and remit large amounts of money to the Dominican Republic evidence growing individual freedom and a globalized form of national development or ongoing dependency and underdevelopment? Although increased global migration seems to point to expanding opportunities for individual autonomy and mobility, immigrants' experiences also ask us to reconsider the ongoing structural inequalities that condition their movement and ultimate migration outcomes.

Political and Economic Effects

Clearly, then, new global migration patterns present many complex trade-offs. Politicians, policy analysts, academics, and community members often debate these trade-offs in terms that invoke IPE theories. For example, those adhering to an economic liberal perspective argue that migrant labor is a natural part of the free-market system and therefore should be allowed to flow freely. From this view, foreign labor supports economic growth in industries in which domestic labor is too expensive or unavailable. Therefore, even if immigrant labor displaces small numbers of native labor, depresses wages, or requires benefits, neoliberal perspectives highlight these facts as economic trade-offs that are outweighed by the lower prices enjoyed by consumers, the higher profits enjoyed by employers,

and the generalized levels of economic growth that result from immigrant labor. Supporting this view, a recent study estimated that legalizing the more than 12 million irregular migrants in the United States would cost approximately \$54 billion in benefits between 2007 and 2016; however, those costs would be offset by \$66 billion of new revenue that immigrant workers would add to the Treasury through income and payroll taxes, Social Security withholding, and fines and fees required by law.³³

Political liberals also tend to support migration on the basis of their belief in the individual's right to freedom of movement as part of a bundle of basic human rights. This view is especially prevalent in cases of migrants fleeing repression or violence in their home country because, according to liberal political philosophy, our obligations as humans extend beyond national borders. What many political liberals call for, then, is simply more effective ways of regulating the flow of immigrants across borders.

Some of the most strident opposition to migration these days comes from those who claim that migrants pose a threat to domestic labor markets, stealing jobs and lowering wages, especially for low-skilled native workers. Many of these critics claim that immigrants place a heavy toll on health care, schools, and other state services.³⁴ An extreme manifestation of this ideology in 1994 prompted California's Proposition 187, which attempted to deny social services to immigrants who could not prove legal residency. This perspective has also fueled vigilante groups such as the Minutemen, who claim that their efforts to patrol and actively deter immigration along the U.S.–Mexico border are born of a sense of patriotism and defense of U.S. sovereignty.³⁵ Similarly in Europe, conservative politicians in Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Britain have made nativist politics and opposition to immigration a central feature of recent elections.³⁶ We might identify this perspective as mercantilist because of its economic nationalist sentiment and use of comparative advantage to justify limits on the mobility of labor. In its current ideological manifestation, mercantilist positions also tend to equate domestic political security with economic security, worrying that migrants represent serious breaches to both.

Those adhering to a structuralist view may also oppose some dimensions of migration, but for radically different reasons than their mercantilist counterparts. Structuralists see increasing migration is a result of the underdevelopment produced by global inequality. From this standpoint, the global division of labor is responsible for creating impoverished nations whose citizens have no choice but to migrate in order to support their families. Free-trade zones flood local markets with foreign goods, destroying local production and local enterprises so that workers must migrate to find new labor opportunities. Furthermore, structuralists often criticize the exploitation of these unskilled migrants within the richer countries as further evidence of the need to restructure the terms of global capitalist production and trade.

Multiculturalism and citizenship also figure into the political and economic debates on immigration. North American society has struggled to assimilate its large numbers of Latino and Asian immigrants—a task that some claim has been made easier by the shared faith between immigrants and natives, as well as the active role that churches play in integrating new arrivals.³⁷ However, many conservative politicians worry about the growing ranks of what they see as historically liberal constituencies. In Europe, large numbers of Muslim immigrants from Northern Africa and the Middle East have made cultural assimilation more difficult and, in a post-9/11 world, the stakes higher. In both places, states and citizens are grappling with how to reconcile democracy's values with changing demographics and cultural politics.³⁸ Some argue that the prospect of achieving social and political integration is further complicated by efforts to restrict migration through "temporary worker" programs. For example, critics have slammed efforts to create a contract labor program in the United States on the basis that it would institutionalize an already disenfranchised workforce with no voting rights, weakening U.S. democracy.³⁹

From these examples, we can see that moral and ideological considerations are just as important as economic calculations in deciding what is at stake in new patterns of global migration. The complex human dimensions of globalization force us to question the role of the nation-state in

defining identity and political action in the world today. If people increasingly live their lives across borders, what new kinds of communities are important for defining identities and politics?

Diaspora

Diaspora is a term that has historically been used to describe communities that were displaced and dispersed across a number of communities worldwide. The Jews' expulsion from Babylon in the fifth century B.C. produced one of the first examples of diaspora, with subsequent generations proliferating Jewish communities across the globe. The trade of African slaves throughout South and North America, as well as the United Kingdom, created what is now known as the African diaspora. In both of these cases, the forcible displacement of people from their homeland resulted in transnational communities that identify with a common history and ethnic identity even though they might speak different languages and be citizens of other states.

Today, the concept of diaspora has expanded to refer to a much broader array of transnational communities. We can talk of the Indian, Iranian, Filipino, Chinese, or Haitian diasporas as communities created through an intense process of migration and global dispersion. Diasporic communities may be linked to a specific nation-state—such as the case of the Irish diaspora—or may be a stateless nation—such as the Kurds. Regardless of type, diasporas are increasingly significant both for the new kinds of social, political, and economic organizations they represent and also for the effects they have had on political and economic processes in their home countries.

New information technology has played an important role in consolidating and supporting diasporic communities. Now, even when immigrants cannot easily or frequently travel between origin and adoptive countries, they can keep abreast of local news through online media, participate in virtual chatroom conversations with other diaspora members, and manage individual and group finances through Internet banking. Many local communities have begun creating Web pages to keep residents living abroad informed about local needs and goings-on, as well as to stimulate outside investment and participation in local events.⁴⁰ The global expansion of cellular phone service to rural areas, as well as Internet conferencing services, have facilitated real-time communication between immigrants and their kin in historically remote areas. All of these technologies allow people to maintain social connections across borders, preserving community language, identity, and politics at any distance.

In some cases, the formation of a diasporic or transnational community is self-consciously cultivated as a means of promoting national development in a home country. In these cases, rather than emigration and permanent residence in a foreign country signifying a shift in one's national identity, migration simply signals a shift in the place from which this happens. For instance, Haitian refugees in New York see their long-term residence and labors abroad as part of a concerted campaign to improve and support their homeland. Glick-Schiller and Fouron have called this phenomenon "long-distance nationalism" because of the way that residence abroad becomes simply another way of practicing a deeply felt nationalist identification with one's home country. In this formulation, the Haitian community is defined not by its residence on Haitian soil but rather by its common Haitian blood and obligation to the homeland.⁴¹ Migrant circuits, such as the Mexican Aguillan community discussed earlier, represent another case in point, using transnational community to promote development at home in Michoacan.

The connection between diaspora and development is also evident in the wake of the destruction wrought by the 2005 tsunami in Indonesia. Following the disaster, victims called on Indian, Sri Lankan, Indonesian, and Thai diasporic groups to aid their fellow countrymen in the recovery effort. Vishwa Hindu Parishad, an Indian organization in the United States, raised \$40,000 to help tsunami victims in India. A Tamil federation in South Africa launched a special fund to help Sri Lankans left homeless by the disaster. The Sri Lankan president demonstrated the Sri Lankan state's reliance on these important foreign resources by asking Sri Lankan doctors to bring their professional skills home to help.⁴²

However, diaspora's influence goes far beyond the power of remittances and emergency organizing; diasporic communities have also demonstrated themselves to be powerful political agents and advocates. For example, in 2005, Somalis living in Canada successfully lobbied the Canadian gov-

ernment to increase its aid to Somalia when international funding for the country waned.⁴³ Jewish and Cuban diaspora members have been a powerful constituency in U.S. national politics, intensely lobbying and effectively shaping U.S. foreign policy on issues pertaining to the Middle East and Cuba. As the examples in the following box illustrate, these transnational communities both reflect and reproduce the blurred boundaries between "local" and "global" political and cultural processes.

GLOBAL FOLKS: ANGELINA JOLIE AND BLUEGRASS MUSIC

What do Angelina Jolie and banjos have in common? On the one hand, the frantic Hollywood hype about Angelina and the rural folk traditions that define the banjo might seem to reflect opposite poles of a uniquely U.S. popular culture. On the other hand, celebrity activists and bluegrass music also exemplify the complex, fluid relationship between what we often distinguish as either local or global forces. A quick look at popular trends highlights this changing face of culture within the international political economy.

In 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan approached the podium at UN Headquarters and admitted to the assembled, "When I walked into this room, I wasn't sure I was in the right place. I wondered whether it was a combination of the Oscars, the Olympics, the Grammys or the Pulitzers."^a The reason for Annan's feigned confusion? Rather than the diplomats and heads of state that frequent the corridors of the UN Headquarters, Annan was instead standing before some of the world's most famous athletes, entertainers, and artists. These notables were the UN's Messengers of Peace and Goodwill Ambassadors, volunteer celebrity advocates promoting the UN's mission around the world. "Seriously," he continued, "it fills me with bewilderment and awe to enter a room filled with such talent and fame—and what is more, talent and fame that is being used for the betterment of mankind."^b With those flattering words, Kofi Annan opened the UN's second-ever conference and workshop on celebrity advocacy.

Increasingly, mass media outlets and national and international leaders are trumpeting the work and effects of celebrity activists on the international political economy. Supermarket glossies such as *Us Weekly*, television shows such as *Entertainment Tonight*, even major national newspapers such as *USA Today* highlight the philanthropy of stars from Angelina Jolie to Bono. What does celebrities' increased presence in politics tell us about the changing nature of our globalized world?

Although globalization is certainly nothing new, one of the characteristics of the current moment is a heightened appreciation for "global" issues. Poverty and disease, the environment, arms proliferation, human rights, energy crises—these are all areas in which we recognize how our own lives are intricately interlinked with people and events across the globe. Consequently, rather than acting as citizens of a particular nation-state, politics increasingly involves mobilizing people as citizens of a global community or *global civil society* (GCS).

New kinds of political actors, aided by new technologies, must work across borders to achieve this task. As a case in point, in 1997 a broad-based coalition of 350 humanitarian NGOs in twenty-three countries was able to coordinate efforts to ban the use of landmines, culminating in the ratification of an international treaty to that effect.^c Significantly, these groups were awarded a Nobel Prize for their efforts, but couldn't receive the honor on time because they were so dispersed that they did not have a physical address. Thus, in this context, global celebrities clearly have an important role to play.

Bono lobbied heads of state leading up to and during the Gleneagles G8 summit, where a substantive debt-relief package was signed. Jolie, through her extensive travels throughout Africa, has brought much attention to the plight of that continent's refugees. Although the overall effect of celebrity activism is debated, the lasting effect of these efforts might be better understood in terms of the visibility that celebrities bring to global issues and their ability to recruit the global community to act. When it comes to achieving global results, activism in our current context often means mobilizing a dispersed transnational constituency, one fan at a time.

Localization

Global fan clubs are not only evident in the changing dynamics of the international political activism; a look at the music scene might compel us to switch the activist adage "Think globally, act locally" to "Think locally, act globally." The appropriation of bluegrass music—a folk style native to Appalachia—by countries as geographically distant and culturally different as Japan, the Czech Republic, and Scotland provides a powerful example of how current international music trends often recombine local and global traditions.

Despite its humble rural origins, the international popularity of bluegrass music has been propagated through a burgeoning bluegrass music industry. Publications such as *Bluegrass Unlimited* and organizations such as the International Bluegrass Music Association have promoted the popularity of bluegrass festivals and local jam sessions worldwide. Despite this global marketing, in each of its new venues, bluegrass music is played as a way of expressing uniquely "local" feelings, experiences, and identities. Consequently, bluegrass represents not so much an example of Americanization of the world, but rather of the increasing tendency of people to use global forms to express and redefine local traditions.

In Japan, a small community of musicians has embraced bluegrass as a way to escape pop music and homogenized national culture. Although they perform their songs in English, these Japanese musicians regard bluegrass as their own form of musical expression. One musician states, "It was certainly an American tradition when it was born. However... it's not an American music anymore but an international music. I love bluegrass more than anybody but it's only a word. I have my own bluegrass inside me, and you have yours."^d Groups such as the Japanese Bluegrass Band promote Japanese culture through artwork on CD covers, but the majority of tradition is implemented in community jam sessions. In jam sessions in Tokyo, "Amazing Grace" transforms into a Japanese version based on improvisation. Thus, monthly "pickings" allow the bluegrass community to build a collective identity in which Japanese tradition and bluegrass rhythms converge into a new sound.

The band Druhá Tráva is just one of the 167 bluegrass groups in the Czech Republic's thriving club scene, and it has played an influential role in cultivating the unique sound of "Czechgrass." Although critics recognize that "Many Czech musicians so exalt the American identity of bluegrass that they meticulously attempt to recreate the exact sound of American Appalachia, Druhá Tráva rejects this approach."^e In 1999, Druhá Tráva and American musician Peter Rowan collaborated efforts on the album *New Freedom Bell* to create a "powerful meld of American and Czech sensibilities."^f The strength of this union is evidenced by the existence of the Bluegrass Association of the Czech Republic, which supports *Bluegrassové Listy* (a bi-monthly newsletter), gives annual awards, and organizes the oldest bluegrass festival in Europe—known as the Banjo Jamboree in Caslav—along with bluegrass workshops and CD releases of nonprofessional bluegrass bands.^g These outlets for Czechgrass prove the international role of bluegrass as an innovative form for articulating and expressing dynamic cultural traditions.

Scotland's current bluegrass scene is kept in rhythm by bands such as Goldrush and Redwing. These bands combine many interests including Scottish tradition and jazz with bluegrass, but the music remains traditional through the use of Scottish ballads. Banjo player Josh Sheldon organized the first Guildtown Bluegrass Festival in 1987, leading to the inauguration of this now-annual event and the creation of the Scottish Bluegrass Association. The festival is held "in the rural heartland of Scotland in a traditional farming community steeped in history and traditional music. People can see the connection with bluegrass and appreciate the enthusiasm it generates."^h The Scottish Bluegrass Association establishes the country's mission to recognize and celebrate its Celtic connection, thus promoting Scottish tradition within bluegrass music.

On the global music scene, Japan, the Czech Republic, and Scotland take part in the global exchange of banjo licks and fiddle tunes, appropriating this "American" art as a way to invent and express local musical traditions. On the global political scene, celebrity activists use their fame to mobilize people and institutions across borders to confront issues that affect us all as members of a global community. Clearly, in these cases, culture plays a powerful role in defining and transcending the borders of our international political economy.

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The political power of diaspora is a force with which European states have increasingly had to contend. In February 2006, when a Danish newspaper published a cartoon satirizing the Prophet Muhammad, a group of Denmark's fundamentalist Muslim clerics lobbied the embassies of eleven "mostly Muslim" countries to demand a meeting with Denmark's prime minister.⁴⁴ The Danish prime minister's refusal provoked a boycott of Danish goods across the Middle East, as well as violent protests against European offices, media, and tourists throughout the region. This example demonstrates how a transnational community can be mobilized not simply on the basis of a common national identity but also on the basis of a common religious identity. With Islam as Europe's fastest-growing religion,⁴⁵ the social and political implications of an increasingly active Muslim diaspora have become the source of much debate across the continent.

Diasporas, therefore, force us to question the assumption that national identity, politics, or even development is something that is rooted within the boundaries of the nation-state. With the help of new information technologies and a highly mobile population, national identity and politics may be practiced and coordinated across the globe. Furthermore, transnational communities formed around beliefs, identities, or politics that are not tied to a particular state reflect new kinds of human connections that thus raise new challenges for both the states that contain them and the international system in general.

INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL AND TOURISM

Like migration, tourism refers to the movement of individuals from one location to another. However, unlike temporary and permanent migrants, who move to another location to find employment or escape persecution at home, tourists—with the possible exception of business travelers—travel for reasons related to leisure and recreation.⁴⁶

Voluntary travel across international borders produces the single largest transnational flow of human beings in the world. The World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), a specialized agency of the UN that focuses on travel and tourism, estimates that in 2004 alone, 764 million tourists traveled from one country to another, spending at least one night in the destination country. This temporary movement of people across international borders is in addition to the enormous number of domestic tourists traveling within their national borders; domestic tourists are estimated to be four to ten times the number of international tourists.⁴⁷

Travel and tourism is the world's largest industry.⁴⁸ According to the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), a privately funded global organization that brings together representatives of 100 of the world's leading travel companies, international tourists spent over \$6 trillion in 2005, an increase of 5.7 percent over the previous year. The WTTC estimates that the strong growth of international travel and tourism will continue into the near future, forecasting an average annual growth rate of 4.2 percent from 2007 to 2016.⁴⁹

Because of its mental and physical association with pleasure, tourism is often considered a light-hearted subject. To many people, travel is indeed an escape from the routines of everyday life, but tourism should, in addition to providing pleasure, receive serious academic and policy consideration because of its widespread and growing global significance. Tourism is fundamentally an IPE issue, with political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental implications. Patterns and trends in the global travel and tourism industry closely mirror, and in some cases magnify, such features of the world system as global integration, inequality, and the clash between traditional and modern cultures.

Tourism and Economic Development

In the decades following World War II, the reconstruction of wartorn Europe, the growing prosperity of the U.S. middle class, and the implementation (especially among newly independent post-colonial states) of policies aimed at encouraging economic growth led to the rapid expansion of international tourism. Reflecting a liberal perspective, tourism advocates argued that countries

should use their comparative advantage in cultural traditions, historical sites, or attractive natural landscapes in order to attract tourists and the money that they bring. In these early days of the modern tourism boom, few questions were asked about the potential harmful consequences of tourism, particularly because the economic benefits of tourism promotion seemed so significant and lasting.

There is no doubt that tourism produces tangible economic benefits. The most obvious, and attractive to governments around the world, is the creation of direct revenues that flow from tourist spending both before and during the trip, as well as from tourist payments of taxes while traveling in the host country. International tourism receipts, defined by the World Trade Organization as all payments made by international tourists for goods and services (such as food, drink, accommodation, airfare, souvenirs, and entertainment), stood at \$623 billion worldwide in 2004.⁵⁰ As direct revenues circulate and are respent in the local and national economy, backward linkages to other sectors of the economy, such as transportation, construction, and agriculture, also take place as tourists stimulate demand for certain goods and services. The direct revenue created by the initial spending of tourists therefore multiplies as it percolates throughout the economy and creates linkages to industries that are not directly related to travel and tourism.

It is obvious that tourism is an important source, in absolute terms, of revenue for governments of tourist-receiving countries. Its importance is further illustrated when examining tourism's relative contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of popular tourist destinations. It is commonly accepted in the field of tourism studies that when tourism contributes 5 percent or more to a national economy, it is considered a highly significant component of the economy.⁵¹ Of 172 countries or dependencies for which such statistics are available, over one-third (sixty-one) feature economies in which tourism contributes 5 percent or more of the total value of the economy.⁵² For the following countries and dependencies in the Caribbean, the travel and tourism industry alone produces a large percentage of the economy's total value: Anguilla (25 percent of total GDP), Antigua and Barbuda (24 percent), Aruba (23 percent), British Virgin Islands (23 percent), Saint Lucia (19 percent), and Bahamas (17 percent).⁵³ For the world economy as a whole, the travel and tourism industry generates roughly 4 percent of total GDP.⁵⁴ When tourism's indirect effects on economic activities are included, this figure rises to 10 percent.

Many less developed countries (LDCs) that depend on just one or two primary commodities for the bulk of their export earnings turn to tourism as another source of national income, thereby diversifying the economy. Moreover, for economies heavily burdened by external debt, tourism provides a valuable source of foreign exchange by producing direct revenues for businesses and various levels of government. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) points out that tourism ranks as a top-three export for nineteen LDCs and is the single largest source of foreign exchange earnings in seven LDCs.⁵⁵ Further, the combined tourism export earnings of all LDCs account for over 15 percent of all nonoil export receipts. Overall, tourism accounts for over one-third of all export earnings in twenty-eight countries or dependencies, most (but not all) of which are LDCs.⁵⁶

The creation of employment is another economic benefit of tourism that attracts the attention of governments hoping to create sources of income for its citizens. It is estimated that roughly 77 million people work in the travel and tourism industry around the world and that 2.5 million new jobs would be created in 2006.⁵⁷ The travel and tourism industry accounts for roughly 3 percent of total world employment. Although most employment in the travel and tourism industry is concentrated in hotels, tour operators, airlines, and travel agencies, tourists also stimulate indirect employment in other sectors that meet the needs of tourists but that are not dependent on tourism alone. For instance, hotels require many goods and services, including marketing, security, and catering, so companies that offer these services are induced to hire workers, thereby creating more employment. The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that every job in the tourism industry induces roughly one-and-a-half additional jobs in the economy as a whole.⁵⁸ Even in highly diversified economies such as Spain's, direct employment in the tourism industry accounts for 8 percent of total employment.⁵⁹

As a result of both its association with fun and pleasure, and its association with the benefits discussed above, tourism is seen by the vast majority of governments, organizations, and tourists themselves as an economic panacea and "smokeless industry," providing income and employment without requiring the construction of polluting factories. This liberal view of tourism as a progressive force—in which communities and countries take advantage of their natural or cultural comparative advantage and contribute to a positive-sum game whereby tourism provides benefits for tourists and hosts alike—reflects what is known in the tourism literature as the **advocacy platform**.⁶⁰ The advocacy platform, or perspective, asserts that states should take a laissez-faire approach to tourism and allow the travel and tourism industry to develop naturally, because doing so will most likely maximize the inevitable economic benefits produced by participation in international tourism.

Though it was especially popular in the 1950s and 1960s, the advocacy platform is today still common in the marketing activities of travel and tourism businesses and government tourist boards, as well as in promotional organizations such as the World Tourism Organization and the World Travel and Tourism Council. Those who espouse a liberal advocacy perspective also support the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS), a World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement that establishes rules governing trade in services, including the "Tourism and Travel-Related Services" cluster. GATS requires that members of the WTO grant foreign-owned companies free access to domestic markets in services and avoid giving preferential treatment to domestic companies over foreign-owned services firms.⁶¹

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the advocacy platform faced serious questioning from some who took a critical perspective, known as the **cautionary platform**. This perspective on tourism questions the wisdom of unfettered markets and views tourism as a destructive force that promises many benefits but in practice creates more problems than it solves. Although some proponents of the cautionary platform are modern liberals (see Chapter 3) who wish to use government intervention to minimize some of the costs created by natural market activities in tourism, others are structuralists who believe that the exploitation and inequality inherent in capitalism and global economic relations poison tourism, particularly for developing countries.

Structuralists point out that the direct revenue so touted by boosters of tourism growth is offset not only by direct expenditures such as advertising but also by **revenue leakages**, which result in tourism receipts "leaking" out of an economy as repatriated profits to foreign-owned tourism multinational corporations, or in order to pay for imported goods and services required by the tourism industry (such as bathroom fixtures in hotels) or tourists themselves (such as luxury food items that are not grown locally). Most estimates of revenue leakages suggest that over half of all tourist-related spending leaks out of, or never even makes it to, destinations in the developing world.⁶² Further, the majority of economic benefits associated with tourism are concentrated in the hands of the economic and political elites who have the capital and political connections to utilize the opportunities afforded by investment by tourism multinational corporations.

It is true that tourism creates employment, structuralists argue, but the jobs made available by tourism are low-skilled, often dangerous, and carry little room for advancement because of poor pay and few benefits. Tourism is also a notoriously fickle industry. Small changes in tourist tastes, or more significant events within the destination itself such as political instability or natural disasters, can severely damage a country's tourism industry. Coupled with the seasonal, casual, and part-time nature of much tourism in most destinations, the vulnerability of tourism to changes in demand weakens the potential of tourism as a development strategy.

Structuralists, and many of those adhering to the cautionary platform, liken modern international tourism to neocolonialism, whereby formally independent states still suffer from unfair relationships associated with colonialism. Dependency theory links the development of the industrial, wealthy core countries of the world to the exploitation and underdevelopment of the poor, weak, and dependent former colonies in the periphery of the world system (see Chapter 4). Taking

a dependency approach, structuralists point out that tourism destinations in the developing world serve as the **pleasure periphery** for core countries.⁶³ For North American tourists looking for a cheap sunshine holiday, the islands of the Caribbean region serve the role of pleasure periphery. Similarly, Southeast Asia and the Mediterranean Basin (southern Europe and North Africa) provide pleasure peripheries for Japan/Australia and Northern Europe, respectively.

Statistical data on international tourism lend support to the structuralist view that tourism reflects the inequality in wealth and power between the core and periphery. Developing countries collectively accounted for 35 percent of all international tourist arrivals in 2004.⁶⁴ Though this is much higher than the 8 percent share of arrivals claimed by developing countries in 1960, it still remains small compared to the 66 percent share of arrivals held in 2004 by Europe and North America.⁶⁵ Similarly, receipts from international tourism remain concentrated in the wealthy countries of the world, with Europe and North America together receiving 68 percent of the \$623 billion in international tourism receipts in 2004.⁶⁶ Residents of just five wealthy, industrialized countries—Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and France—accounted for 42 percent of all international tourist spending in 2004.⁶⁷

Travel is linked directly to economic prosperity. In particular, affluence leads to higher levels of discretionary household income (money that is not spent on basic needs such as food, housing, and clothing). As the number of individuals with discretionary income grows, demand for travel services also grows. Thus, individuals in societies that are affluent, urban, economically productive, and industrial tend to participate much more in tourism activities—at first domestically and eventually internationally—than individuals in poor societies. It is no surprise then that the majority of international tourists are nationals of wealthy countries and regions: 55 percent of all international tourists in 2004 were European, while another 11 percent were North American.⁶⁸ Aside from technological innovations such as wide-bodied long-haul jet aircraft, computerized booking systems, and Internet access to information about destinations, the principal reason that there are thirty times more international tourist arrivals currently than there were in 1950 is rising material prosperity, particularly in industrialized countries.

A clear indication of the connection between economic prosperity and travel is the recent explosion in domestic and international tourism in and from China. China's rapid economic growth since the 1980s has resulted in a dramatic growth in domestic tourism as well as a surge in outbound tourism. By 2020, China is projected to be the fourth-largest source of international tourists in the world.⁶⁹ Improved infrastructure, government policies that encourage openness to the outside world, and economic growth in neighboring countries have also made China a major tourism destination. By 2004, China had surpassed Italy as the fourth most popular tourism destination in the world (42 million international arrivals), surpassed only by France (75 million), Spain (54 million), and the United States (46 million).⁷⁰ China is set to become the world's number-one tourism destination in terms of arrivals by 2020.⁷¹ As other countries, such as India, continue to become more economically productive and prosperous, domestic and international travel will boom, thereby continuing the long-term postwar trend of virtually uninterrupted growth in travel and tourism.

The Politics of Tourism

Just as the uneven global distribution of wealth influences patterns of international tourism, differences in political systems and individual governments also play a key role in determining the shape of tourism in specific locations. At a fundamental level, domestic and international travel is premised on freedom of movement, which itself stems from broader political rights and freedoms. Because political freedom is a prerequisite for travel to occur in the first place, the global trend toward democracy and openness will, along with growing economic prosperity, contribute to a burgeoning global tourism industry.⁷²

States figure prominently in the supply of tourism. The supply side of tourism includes factors that “pull,” or attract, tourists to a destination. By contrast to destination-based circumstances

that shape supply, the demand side of tourism relates to forces generated within tourist-producing countries that “push” tourists to take vacations. States in destination countries certainly strive to influence tourist demand, but they are usually powerless to affect “push” factors in tourist-generating countries, such as technological innovation, rising life expectancy, urbanization, and rising discretionary income.⁷³ For this reason, virtually all states, regardless of their level of wealth or dominant political system, attempt to influence the supply-side factors that drive tourism. Public administration becomes crucial in this regard, because the drafting and implementation of government policies regarding tourism greatly affects the ability of a country to attract and service international tourists, as well as to curtail the negative consequences of tourism.

Though popular tourist destinations are usually positioned naturally to attract visitors because of unusual geographic landscapes or “exotic” cultural attributes, tourism destinations are in fact created, not born. In other words, it takes both states and markets—and specifically states acting to influence market forces—in order for a location to become attractive and accessible, let alone even known in the first place, to international tourists. In some cases, eager governments identify suitable locations for tourism and then proceed to create destinations from scratch by encouraging public and private investment in the form of subsidized infrastructure and facilities. One such case is Cancun, the famous sunspot destination located on the northeast coast of the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico. In 1967 the Mexican government identified Cancun as a **growth pole**, a deliberately chosen location meant to serve as an engine of economic growth in the surrounding region. This growth-pole strategy quickly transformed Cancun from a sparsely populated coconut plantation and site of small Mayan ruins into a globally renowned beach resort destination with almost half a million permanent residents, hundreds of hotels, and 4 million international tourist arrivals per year. As a result of Cancun's rapid growth as a tourist destination, Quintana Roo, the state in which Cancun is located, is now among the wealthiest states in Mexico and receives one-third of all foreign tourist expenditures in Mexico.⁷⁴

With few exceptions, governments around the world prefer policies that promote tourism growth, placing top priority on maximizing tourist arrivals and expenditures, despite the negative costs associated with hasty tourism development. States therefore either intervene directly in the economy to create financial, regulatory, and social environments conducive to tourism growth or, alternatively, take a laissez-faire approach to tourism, whereby a largely unfettered market determines the nature and direction of tourism. The exception to this pattern is the Himalayan mountain kingdom of Bhutan, which, unlike the overwhelming majority of other states, particularly those in the developing world, heavily restricts the growth of tourism through policies that exclude all but the wealthiest tourists. The Bhutanese government demands that every tourist pay daily tariffs, surcharges, and expenditures totaling a minimum of \$200 per night, and issues visas only to those on expensive organized group tours. By tailoring tourism toward a wealthier clientele, Bhutanese tourism authorities are able to generate greater per-tourist revenues while at the same time limiting the social, cultural, and environmental effects of tourism in Bhutan.

Aside from identifying strategic locations for deliberate tourism development, as in the case of Cancun, governments also use the power of incentives in the form of subsidies and tax breaks, and constraints in the form of regulations and prohibitions, to concentrate tourist activities in spatially circumscribed enclaves. For example, the Maldives, an island nation in the Indian Ocean, concentrates tourism development on a handful of uninhabited atolls. Similarly, the government of Indonesia in 1971 drew up a master plan for tourism on the island of Bali, a long-established international tourism destination. The master plan called for the construction of a new luxury resort enclave on the Bukit Peninsula on the southern tip of the island, and in general for the confinement of tourism development to the area surrounding the airport on or near the Bukit Peninsula.⁷⁵ As a result of the efforts of the Indonesian government, the southern tip of Bali absorbed the benefits, and costs, of international tourist arrivals, leaving the rest of the island sheltered from what was perceived to be the corrupting cultural influences of foreign tourists. State

planning and marketing also led to an explosion of international tourist arrivals, which grew from 6000 in 1960 to almost 1.5 million in 2004.⁷⁶

There is of course a risk in becoming too popular as a destination, and without state management and regulation of tourism growth, destinations tend to become "loved to death" by eager tourists. The very things that attract tourists in the first place, be it mountains, beaches, or rainforests, often become threatened as visitors quickly exceed the destination's carrying capacity. During the 1980s, governments, tourists, and tourism businesses responded to concerns about the negative effects of tourism by shifting toward forms of tourism that could provide alternatives to tourism experiences based on the standard "sun, sea, and sand" formula. The view, promoted by the advocacy platform, that mass tourism provides the best policy choice for host communities was thus challenged (but ultimately not displaced) by the **adaptancy platform** which called for small-scale, ecologically sustainable, and community-based tourism. The most popular example of this approach is **ecotourism**, defined by the International Ecotourism Society as "responsible travel to natural areas that conserves the environment and improves the well-being of local people."⁷⁷ In addition to drafting appropriate laws, and enforcing existing ones, to minimize the environment effects of tourism, states can promote ecotourism by restricting the number of tourists in sensitive areas. States can also create national parks and wildlife reserves that provide the locations for many ecotourism activities. Unfortunately, with rare exceptions, governments that have to choose between rising tourist arrivals, and therefore profits, and environmental protection almost always pick the former.

The liberal perspective on tourism is well represented by the travel industry and the governments of most tourist-receiving states. The structuralist perspective pervades criticisms of tourism. Though it is not as common, the mercantilist approach to tourism is nevertheless important when one considers the ways in which states limit access to travel within their borders. States determine which nationals are allowed entry and under which conditions (permissible length of stay, for example). Countries that enjoy a close relationship, usually reflected in high cross-border traffic among its citizens, allow each others' visitors to enter easily. Until recently, Canadians wishing to visit the United States required only a valid driver's license. On the other hand, some states forbid or heavily restrict the entry of the nationals of particular countries. Several countries—including Afghanistan, Algeria, Comoros, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia, among others—refuse to recognize passports from Israel, thereby precluding travel to those countries by Israeli citizens. On the whole, tourist access to other countries varies widely. Citizens of Finland, Denmark, and the United States can enter 130 countries and territories without needing a visa, but tourists from Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan enjoy this privilege in only fifteen or so countries.⁷⁸

Perhaps the most important role played by states insofar as tourism is concerned is the management of a country's international image. Changing tastes and preferences among international tourists makes it difficult for tourism planners to predict whether a destination will remain popular in the future. Tourist demand depends heavily on prevailing perceptions of a destination, however incorrect they may be. Thus, anything that alters perceptions in a negative manner carries enormous implications for the travel and tourism industry in host societies. Natural disasters, political stability, and terrorism are all examples of forces that can dramatically shift demand away from a destination. States therefore need to focus a great deal of energy and resources on counteracting the negative effects of such events.

Natural disasters make popular headlines in newspapers and television news reports. Despite how limited the effects may be, especially geographically, the average person with no detailed knowledge of (or specialized interest in) the affected country naturally forms a negative mental association of that country and becomes much less inclined to travel there. The damage unleashed by the natural disaster is then compounded by the loss of income created by a drop in tourist demand. The Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, which killed over 200,000 people, resulted in extensive damage to the infrastructure of several tourist-dependent economies, including the Maldives, Sri Lanka, southern Thailand, and India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Further, much of the

tsunami footage aired nonstop on television stations around the world featured shots of floating tourist corpses and waves crashing into tourist hotels. The immediate drop in tourism to these regions only made things worse, as tourism revenues rendered even more necessary by the tsunami dried up overnight.⁷⁹

States must address the challenges posed by damaging media coverage of natural disasters, but reports of political instability also strike fear in the hearts of potential tourists. Of course, states that foster political stability assist their tourism promotion efforts, but creating stability at the expense of human rights can also backfire, as the example of Burma (Myanmar) illustrates.

BURMA TOURISM BOYCOTT: SHOULD YOU STAY OR SHOULD YOU GO?

To most people, travel and tourism are innocent affairs, devoid of any political significance. However, a vacation—which to most tourists is merely an escape from the rigors and routines and everyday life—can be a matter of life or death to others. A prime example of the political significance of tourism, and the high personal stakes involved in a person's decision to travel, is provided by the case of international travel to Burma.⁸⁰ In 1988, demonstrations against the military regime of Burma ended with the massacre of thousands of students, monks, workers, and farmers. In 1990, Burma's ruling council, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC),⁸¹ allowed elections in which the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won over 80 percent of the parliamentary seats. However, the military rulers of Burma prevented the NLD from assuming power. Despite being given the opportunity to leave the country at any time, Aung San Suu Kyi has instead chosen to stay in Burma and fight for democracy. As a result, the military rulers of Burma have kept Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for all but six years in the seventeen-year period between 1989 and 2006.

In 1995, the military rulers of Burma announced plans to promote tourism heavily beginning in the following year, designated by the regime as "Visit Myanmar Year 1996." Soon after the regime announced these plans, several British NGOs, most notably The Burma Campaign UK and Tourism Concern, launched a campaign against tourism to Burma, arguing that guidebook publishers, tour operators, and tourists should avoid promoting tourism to, operating in, or traveling to Burma because of the ongoing human rights abuses there. Reports from human rights organizations confirm Burma's terrible human rights record. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, for example, report the use of forced labor, torture, extrajudicial execution, child labor, child soldiers, forced relocation of villages, and rape against dissidents, particularly non-Burman ethnic minorities such as the Karen. In 2006, Freedom House, an independent NGO that monitors political rights and civil liberties around the world, gave Burma its lowest possible rating (along with seven other countries) in its annual survey, *Freedom in the World*.⁸²

Supporters of the Burma tourism boycott campaign give many reasons to avoid travel to Burma. First, both Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma's government in exile—the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB)—support the boycott and have since 1995 repeatedly asked tourists not to visit Burma until its political situation has improved. Second, even for those using privately owned accommodation and transportation, it is difficult to travel to Burma without providing income for the military regime. Though Burma receives only approximately 240,000 tourists per year, the bulk of the tourism revenues that Burma receives (\$84 million in 2004) remains concentrated in the hands of its military rulers. Tourist spending and investment related to tourism infrastructure, such as roads, railways, airports, and hotels, contribute directly to sustaining a military junta that threatens and uses force to suppress its own people. Third, undemocratic governments facing a question of legitimacy at home can turn to participation in the international tourism industry as a means of bolstering their legitimacy and credibility. A visit to Burma, according to critics, serves as a stamp of approval of the political status quo. Third, evidence from several sources, including NGOs, journalists, and the U.S. State Department, indicates that human rights abuses in Burma are related directly to official efforts to attract or service international tourists. Whether forcing residents from their homes in order to build golf courses and hotels, or using forced labor to prepare ancient temple ruins for tourist arrivals, the Burmese government frequently violates human rights in the name of tourism development. Fourth, the number of ordinary Burmese who benefit from tourism, and are potentially harmed by a tourism boycott, is small compared to the number of people who suffer because of the continuing rule of military elites, most of whom are sustained

partly by tourism revenues. It is hoped that by cutting the economic lifeline of the regime through a tourism boycott, the campaign will foster political, economic, and social changes that will benefit the vast majority of Burmese.

Several travel companies and guidebook publishers, including Austrian Airlines, Carnival Corporation/P&O, Frommer's Guides, Intrepid Travel, Kuoni, and Rough Guides, have decided in recent years to support the boycott; the European Union and the United Kingdom have also both taken official stands in support of the boycott. Among the thirty-seven travel companies still on The Burma Campaign UK's "Dirty List" (as of mid-2006), the one most targeted by the campaign is Lonely Planet, the largest independent guidebook publisher in the world. In 2000, The Burma Campaign UK and Tourism Concern called for a boycott of all Lonely Planet guidebooks because of the company's promotion of tourism to Burma and its continued publication of a Burma guidebook. In spite of the bad publicity generated by the boycott of its products, Lonely Planet continues to publish its Burma guidebook, arguing that by providing a detailed discussion of both reasons to go and reasons to stay, the company "aims to provide independent travellers with balanced information so that they are able reach their own informed conclusions."^d Lonely Planet points out that tourism is among the few economic opportunities available to poor Burmese. Further, a careful traveler is able to divert spending into privately owned businesses that are not connected to the government. Most important, Lonely Planet believes that economic and political isolation serves only to bolster, rather than diminish, the power and authority of autocratic regimes.

Whether the choice is made to stay or to go, one cannot escape the political implications of the seemingly innocent act of choosing a holiday destination.

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^a Burma was renamed Myanmar by the country's military rulers in 1989. Several countries, including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, continue to use the name Burma in defiance of the current military regime.

^b SLORC was renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997.

^c See www.freedomhouse.org.

^d See www.lonelyplanet.com/help/faq_myanmar.htm.

Countries that experience civil war or internal political upheaval have a difficult time luring back international tourists when the violence subsides. In 1987, a series of military coups in Fiji, located in the South Pacific Ocean, led to a 72 percent drop in tourist arrivals between June 1986 and June 1987.⁸⁰ Elsewhere, the civil war in the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s resulted in overnight visits to Croatia plummeting from 5 million in 1990 to 1.3 million in 1995.⁸¹ It is indeed telling that immediately following the September 2006 military coup in Thailand, one of the first actions taken by the leaders of the coup was to reassure tourists that they were still welcome and safe in Thailand.

The means by which tourists are able to travel from one country to another are also employed by individuals intending to commit acts of terrorism. In addition to combating terrorist organizations that target their citizens, states must also counter the damage done by terrorism to their tourism industries. Terrorists favor tourists as targets for several reasons: Some tourists travel to remote, dangerous locations that serve as the base for terrorist groups; tourists are much "softer" targets than heavily defended military or political sites; the killing of tourists generates extensive international media coverage; and terrorism disrupts economies that depend on tourism revenues, thereby helping to cripple unpopular regimes.⁸² Since the late 1990s, tourists have become especially popular targets for terrorist organizations. In 1997, terrorists killed fifty-eight foreign tourists at Luxor in Egypt. In 1999, seventeen tourists visiting Uganda's Bwindi's National Park were kidnapped (and eight later killed) by Hutu extremists from Rwanda. In 2001, Abu Sayyaf, a militant Islamic group, took twenty local and foreign tourists hostage on the island of Palawan in the Philippines.

It is significant that the first people to die in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Centers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., were travelers aboard aircraft, and that

jet airplanes, the most important technological innovation in the growth of travel and tourism, were used by the hijackers as weapons. Most acts of terrorism are local or national in consequence, in that the resulting drop in tourist demand is usually confined to that destination alone, or at most to the broader region. By contrast, the 9/11 attacks had global effects. A study by the International Labor Organization (ILO) found that the 9/11 attacks spurred a prolonged downturn in global travel and the tourism industry that cost 6.7 million tourism workers their jobs and led to a 4 percent decline in international tourist demand.⁸³ By September 2006, a full five years after the attacks, the number of internal flights in the United States remained 8 percent lower than in September 2001.⁸⁴

States that experience terrorism within their borders usually react immediately to restore their international image and lure back tourists. The United States after 9/11 stands as an exception. Because the majority of the nineteen hijackers who carried out the attacks entered the United States on tourist visas, concerns were raised that freedoms given to tourists to visit the country were being abused by individuals who intended to participate in terrorist acts against Americans. As a result of domestic political pressure, the U.S. government implemented several measures aimed at better screening and monitoring of visitors to the United States. These measures include, since 2004, the requirement that all visitors with a visa entering the United States at air and sea ports have fingerprints and photographs taken. As a result of deteriorating global perceptions of the United States, and the more stringent entry requirements imposed by the U.S. government on visitors, 4.3 million fewer overseas tourists visited the United States in 2005 than in 2000; this represents a 16.5 percent decline.⁸⁵

Since September 11, 2001, terrorists have continued to carry out attacks against tourists. The deadliest of these attacks occurred in Bali in October 2002, when members of Jemaah Islamiyah, a Southeast Asian militant Islamic organization, detonated bombs outside two nightclubs popular with Western tourists. The explosions and resulting fires killed 202 tourists, eighty-nine of them Australians. The perpetrators of the attack targeted Bali specifically because of its association with tourist hedonism, and also because of Bali's economic importance to the Indonesian government, which Jemaah Islamiyah considers corrupt. Almost exactly three years later, another series of terrorist bombings in popular tourist spots in Bali killed five foreign tourists and injured another sixty-one.

Structuralists argue that tourism is a risky economic strategy because of the fickle nature of tourist demand. Tsunamis, outbreaks of "bird flu," and acts of terrorism can quickly wipe out a destination's tourism industry. Liberals are quick to point out, however, that fast action by businesses and government can reverse the initial losses associated with tragic events. The evidence seems to confirm this liberal view. Despite suffering a 23 percent drop in arrivals in the year following the 2002 bombings, Bali quickly returned to prebombing tourism levels; in 2004 it exceeded the number of international tourists in 2002 by 13 percent.⁸⁶ The persistent growth in global tourism praised by liberals is so assured, it seems, that even fears of death at the hands of terrorists is not enough to thwart our desire to travel.

Tourism as an Agent of Social and Cultural Change

The critical cautionary platform in tourism that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s called attention to the harmful consequences of tourism. Though many of these criticisms challenged the existing euphoria prevalent in studies of the economic effects of tourism, it was the social, cultural, and environmental side effects of rapid incorporation into global tourism networks that generated the most concern. Social status has long underpinned motivations for travel, from the 1840s, when Thomas Cook first took English industrial workers to seaside resort towns, to contemporary travelers, who seek out locations off the beaten track as markers of superior taste and style. Social class also determines who can afford to travel in the first place.

Culture is also a crucial component of travel to many destinations for two reasons. First, throughout history, tourists have been motivated to visit cultures perceived to be exotic and unfamiliar. A desire for cultural authenticity has long characterized tourism, and some scholars have even argued that modern tourism is premised on the search for authenticity. As the global proliferation of

Western material goods seemingly erases cultural differences, tourists strive to experience a level of cultural authenticity that lies beyond the superficial, and supposedly inauthentic, "front stage," where hosts perform mostly for tourist consumption. Second, despite the role played by cultural "otherness" in luring foreign tourists, the majority of international tourists visit countries with similar cultural traits, particularly in language or religion. Cultural affinity is the reason that the British are the second largest inbound tourist market in Australia, and why U.S. residents made over 15 million trips to Canada in 2004.⁸⁷ Every year, millions of people travel on religious pilgrimages, the most sizable consisting of Muslims fulfilling their obligation to make the *haji*, the pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia.

Tourist demand stimulates both the rejuvenation of cultural traditions and the rehabilitation of historical architectural monuments. Funds that are collected as entry fees and donations at historical sites can be put to use on the site itself, but more important, the interest shown in historical sites by tourists motivates governments to allocate resources to the rehabilitation and maintenance of such sites. Without the incentives created by tourism revenues, historical sites such as Angkor Wat in Cambodia, Macchu Pichu in Peru, and the ancient city of Timbuktu in Mali would likely have remained crumbling ruins, or at least would have received far less attention and funding. In many cases, governments that wish to restore a historical site for tourism or other purposes succeed in acquiring funds from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which maintains a World Heritage list of cultural and natural properties deemed essential components of global heritage.

On the other side of the debate about the social and cultural effects of tourism are supporters of the cautionary platform, who believe that the unregulated nature of global tourism, particularly in developing countries with weak or uninvolved governments, makes harmful change inevitable. The presence of highly conspicuous tourists in local communities has two negative social and cultural effects. First, tourism is accused by critics of increasing criminal activity, especially in destinations whose residents are much poorer than the tourists visiting them. Several factors make tourists good targets for criminal activity: Tourists are likely to mistakenly stray into unsafe areas or become lost; tourists are more likely than locals to be taken advantage of because of their lack of familiarity with local norms or procedures; a holiday mentality makes tourists more trustful and less alert; and tourists are apt to display objects of value such as money, jewelry, and cameras openly and without caution.⁸⁸

The second cost associated with the interaction of rich tourists and poor locals is the way in which tourism tends to have a demonstration effect, whereby some locals, especially youth, come to desire the material objects—and emulate the values, lifestyles, and behavior—of wealthier foreign tourists. As youth who interact with tourists adopt foreign, usually more modern, cultural values, social tension can occur between older members of the community who worry about the loss of traditional values and those who interact directly with tourists and wish to reject or modify traditional cultural practices. Aside from possibly fostering a sense of inferiority by creating a desire for, but inability to purchase, expensive material objects possessed by tourists, the demonstration effect is especially a concern when locals interact with tourists who exhibit sexual promiscuity or the open use of drugs and alcohol.

Tourist demand for cultural artifacts and traditions perceived to be exotic transforms certain aspects of host cultures into commodities to be bought and sold. The **commodification** of culture initiated by tourism ultimately strips the original meaning and purpose from cultural objects, customs, and festivals as locals respond to commercial pressures and incentives. Critics of tourism-induced cultural commodification decry the production of "airport art," bastardized versions of traditional arts and crafts sold as cheap tourist trinkets in airports and shopping malls. Rather than being allowed to evolve naturally, according to indigenous needs, cultural performances change in substance, timing, or length in response to the entertainment demands and short attention spans of most package tourists.

At a broader level, involvement in the tourism industry, and an overreliance on tourists as a source of economic livelihood, has the effect over time of encouraging locals to see themselves and their culture in terms dictated by the fantasy factory that tourism marketing represents. In Hawaii, for example, critics of tourism argue that decades of tourism marketing centered on Western notions of paradise has stripped Hawaiians of their cultural autonomy and has indoctrinated locals into internalizing notions of the friendly, exotic Hawaiian into their self-identity.⁸⁹ Similarly, Bali's long experience with receiving foreign tourists—dating back a century, to the implementation of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia—and efforts to preserve Bali as a "living museum" have shaped how the Balinese see themselves. As one author puts it, "the Balinese, enjoined to preserve and promote their cultural identity in reference to the outside world's view of them, have come to search for confirmation of their 'Balinese-ness' in the mirror held to them by the tourists."⁹⁰

Structuralists disagree with the rosy view that tourism promotes peace, security, and tolerance. The reason is not that tourism is inherently unable to promote cross-cultural understanding, but that the vast majority of tourists receive information from enormous multinational tourism companies that are concerned more with profit than accurate or balanced representations of host cultures. Though states can change perceptions abroad through their actions, governments are limited in their ability to change tourists' deep-seated cultural stereotypes, because these stereotypes are created or at least maintained by tour operators and travel agents who reduce complex cultures to a few recognizable, palatable nuggets for tourist consumption.

Liberals argue that, yes, tourists may have inaccurate or simplistic ideas about the cultures of their hosts, but don't the interactions between tourist and host that travel permits help to foster better cross-cultural understanding? Again, this may be possible under the right circumstances, but in practice, tourists and hosts are positioned unequally in wealth and power, especially when tourists from wealthy countries visit destinations in developing countries. Tourism is a service industry and thus demands a certain level of servility. Because tourism centers on pleasure and recreation, there is even greater pressure for tourism workers to ensure that the customer is satisfied. Moreover, tourists tend to travel in an "environmental bubble" in which encounters with locals outside the tourism industry are rare, fleeting, and predictable. Instead of challenging servile and demeaning views of their people, states and local tour operators often perpetuate the problem by reassuring tourists in brochures and other advertisements that locals will cater to their every whim.

Pictures of smiling, subservient locals serving tourists are ubiquitous in tourism marketing. At its extreme, the servility of tourism can lead to situations in which tourists swarm around indigenous people with unusual (to tourists) or colorful appearance and treat them as exhibits in a human zoo. For the Padaung, an ethnic group from Burma whose women are famous for wearing rows of brass rings on their seemingly elongated necks, political repression by the Burmese military and their status as refugees in Thailand has left them with few choices other than posing for ogling tourists in prefabricated villages run by Thai businessmen, and from which the Padaung are forbidden from leaving.

The most visible social cost of tourism in any destination is prostitution. Several factors make tourism both a target and a stimulant of prostitution. People on vacation tend to spend money much less cautiously than when at home, and they spend money on unusual items. A holiday frame of mind, characterized by inversions of normal routines and patterns of behavior, also makes tourists more inclined to engage in activities, including sexual, that are normally avoided at home.

These irregular patterns of spending and behavior, combined with their spatial concentration in conspicuous locations of consumption and hedonism, make tourists an easy and popular target for the local sex trade. It is therefore no surprise that in virtually all popular destinations, especially in poor countries, sexual services are easily available to tourists. Even in strictly controlled societies such as Cuba, the sex trade is supported partly by certain segments of tourists.

The most insidious side of the tourism-prostitution relationship is the sexual exploitation of children by tourists. Though some tourists who purchase the sexual services of locals may be unaware

of the young age of the sex worker, most tourists who engage in such activities with minors are fully aware of what they are doing. Desperation, a lack of alternative means of survival, sexual abuse, and the collusion of corrupt government officials and police officers helps to sustain this trade. One study conducted in 2001 by World Vision in Cambodia discovered that 70 percent of children surveyed around the Angkor Wat archeological site had been solicited for sex by tourists; the same study reported that almost half of all Cambodian travel agents had witnessed local tour guides providing tourists with children for sexual purposes.⁹¹ In response to the moral condemnation generated by images of tall male Western foreigners walking hand in hand with young Cambodian, Costa Rican, or South African girls (or boys), countries such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand have passed laws that allow them to prosecute citizens who travel abroad to purchase sex from minors. Though progress is slow, governments of sex tourism destinations are also starting to take greater action, the most notable example being the 2005 arrest and imprisonment in Vietnam of British rock star Gary Glitter on charges of committing obscene acts with children.

The political, economic, and social consequences of tourism are impossible to analyze in isolation, as discussions of tourism's benefits and costs necessarily lead one to consider all three areas of analysis. The growing transnational flow of people, embodied by the international travel and tourism industry, stems from the same technologies and institutional arrangements that have intensified the global flow of goods, ideas, and money. To a large degree, discrepancies in wealth and power between individuals and countries, and interactions between states and markets, determine the distribution of benefits and costs of tourism, not to mention the distribution of actual tourists. Liberals portray tourism as a path to development, political legitimacy, and peace, whereas structuralists see tourism as a bringer of all things evil. Mercantilists, meanwhile, eschew the moral debate and focus instead on how to promote national security while at the same time attracting more tourists and tourism revenues than other states. The truth, as economists like to point out, is that tourism involves unavoidable trade-offs. Tourism generates revenues, but it comes with a price. When faced with the choice of whether to participate in tourism, the majority of individuals, and all but the most isolationist states, in the world accept the trade-offs as a worthwhile price to pay. The flow of tourists crisscrossing the globe is therefore unlikely to subside any time soon.

CONCLUSION

Migration and tourism are two good examples of human connections in IPE. Each involves a pattern of human relations and flows of people who cross national borders for different reasons. In each network, people share many ideas, values, and beliefs, even if, as in tourism, they may be bound together for only a short time. One reason that economic liberals give in support of globalization is the benefit that many tourists have of more income to "enjoy life." Many structuralists, however, complain that globalization has forced migrants to seek a better life in another country where the economy is stronger than their own. In each case, we can appreciate the extent to which local economies are part of a global economy that benefits some more than others. These studies also allow us to appreciate that different cultural groups are part of a much bigger international society.

Focusing on these two areas also helps us to appreciate the interconnections among various IPE structures. Both migration and tourism involve finance or money, currency, and quite often the exchange of goods and services. For tourists, those goods may be simple mementos, whereas migrants are often the "goods" who provide others a service. Both cases involve a certain amount of technology and information. And both share concerns about security. Depending on the location, some tourists may fear for their personal safety in an environment that most people take for granted will be safe. On the other hand, in many places migrants themselves might be viewed as a security threat.

Finally, in studying both issues in some detail, we come to appreciate that much of the connection between these structures is human. Ultimately, IPE is about people who are rooted in different cultures and places, but who in today's globalizing society have also become quite mobile

and routinely interact with one another. Broadening the focus of IPE to account for human relations, then, helps us appreciate that, when all is said and done, IPE is ultimately about human relationships.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Compare the situation of a female Cambodian refugee living in Wisconsin with that of a male irregular migrant from the Dominican Republic living in New York City. What similarities and differences might characterize their (a) reasons for coming to the United States, (b) their economic opportunities within the United States, and (c) their experience of cultural citizenship within the United States?
2. Draw a historical timeline on the blackboard. Each student should take a turn noting on the timeline the name and date of her first family member to migrate to this country. When all students' information is listed, each student should describe why her family member originally migrated and how (by boat, plane, land, etc.). Use this information to compile an analysis of historical patterns in migration flows, countries of origin, and reasons for migration. How does this information compare with representations about current immigration patterns and populations?
3. What makes tourism an attractive option for the state? How does tourism create risks for the state?
4. Why is it necessary to be concerned about "sustainable" tourism? Explain.
5. What are the rewards and risks of tourism according to liberals, mercantilists, and structuralists?
6. What are the trade-offs associated with tourism?

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KEY TERMS

Migration

migration
 internal migration
 transnational migration
 circular migration
 guest worker
 remittances
 chain migration
 irregular migrants

transit states
 brain drain
 immigration
 settler states
 refugee
 asylum
 assimilation
 cultural citizenship
 diaspora

Tourism

advocacy platform
 cautionary platform
 revenue leakages
 pleasure periphery
 growth pole
 adaptancy platform
 ecotourism
 commodification

NOTES

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 67. UNWTO, *Tourism Highlights 2005*, p. 10.
 68. UNWTO, *Tourism Highlights 2005*, p. 2.
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