“You Cannot Photograph Something- Only Its Results”¹: The Crises of Witnessing, Meaning, and Authorship in Holocaust Studies

In 1945, the American generals Eisenhower and Patton found the first of many Nazi concentration camps. Eisenhower wrote,

In one room, where they [there] were piled up twenty or thirty naked men, killed by starvation, George Patton would not even enter. He said he would get sick if he did so. I made the visit deliberately, in order to be in position to give first-hand evidence of these things if ever, in the future, there develops a tendency to charge these allegations merely to ‘propaganda’.²

Grim as these sights must have been, Eisenhower’s efforts have been incredibly helpful to Holocaust historians. His emphasis on documentation provided the core primary sources for our contemporary Holocaust studies. In the historical record of the Holocaust, the films recorded by the American military comprise the entirety of known Holocaust footage. These depict the ghastly afterlife of the Nazi regime and the American disposal of its corpse. They have become exceedingly useful because there are relatively few photographs of these concentration camps before their liberation. While this is the most notable gap of documentation in recording the Holocaust, scholars have argued that it is only one of many.³ There is a stark absence of information recorded by imprisoned Jews during the early years of the camps, an absence which has been filled by a variety of autobiographical narratives. These narratives, written by survivors of the Holocaust, are the closest that we can come to knowing the conditions of the camps. The Nazi regime ensured that the camps were kept hidden from the eyes of German citizens, and

¹ Mavis Tate, *German Atrocities*. Youtube Video, 4:35, 13 April 2014. Web. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e5mY6rbGpss](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e5mY6rbGpss) Originally aired on BBC (1945).
their censorship can be felt in this absence of documentation.\(^4\) Starting in the 1950’s, scholars of the Holocaust have paid close attention to the individual testimonies (autobiographical writings) of Holocaust victims in writing the history of the Holocaust.\(^5\) The genre exploded in the 1960’s, when numerous individuals published their testimonies.\(^6\) As a result, there exists an abundance of memoirs and autobiographies from those who lived through the Nazi reign, Jewish and otherwise.

Holocaust historians are overwhelmingly grateful for this uprising of authorship and have paid their respects in kind. Dan Michman, author of *Holocaust Historiography: A Jewish Perspective*, writes that “the Yad Vashem library receives more than 4,000 titles each year.”\(^7\) Holocaust literature is lucrative-- a popular subject amongst academics and lay people alike. The addition of newly found primary sources rejuvenates the academic discourse which has yet to cease. In fact, Holocaust memoirs are so lucrative that that numerous individuals have forged them.\(^8\) For example, Misha Defonesca was forced to return $22.5 million to her publisher once the truth of her account was disputed in a court of law.\(^9\) To date, there is an overwhelming amount of material written about the Holocaust, written by both historians and historical individuals.

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\(^6\) Ibid., 338

\(^7\) Dan Michman, *Holocaust Historiography: A Jewish Perspective*, 349.


Yet amidst this flurry of authors and scholars, people disagree on what seems like a consensus-- the relationship between the Holocaust and its “meaning.” In 2000, The International Forum of the Holocaust in Stockholm declared that,

the Holocaust (Shoah) fundamentally challenged the foundations of civilization. The unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold universal meaning. After half a century, it remains an event close enough in time that survivors can still bear witness to the horrors that engulfed the Jewish people.\(^{10}\)

However, historians like Dan Stone and Saul Freidlander claim that, “an opaqueness remains at the very core of our historical understanding and interpretation of what happened.”\(^{11}\) While either groups ascribe meaning to the Holocaust, they remain split over whether or not it is possible derive a coherent and objective meaning from it. However, they both note that the Holocaust has deeply impacted our understandings of meaning.

In line with the latter school of thought which calls attention to the inaccessibility of meaning in Holocaust studies, Felman and Laub, in their book, *Testimony: Crisis of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History*, argue that the Holocaust created a, “a crisis of witnessing,” that is, “as an historical event, it either eliminated its witnesses physically, or through its unspeakability, incomprehensibility, and dehumanizing effects survivors are or were kept silent through personal and communal denial, cultural reticence, or cultural canonization.”\(^{12}\) For Felman and Laub, the absence of these perspectives (a phrase which seems contradictory given the wealth of perspectives existent) creates a crisis of witnessing because it created a

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statistical absence of published perspectives amongst demographics of persecuted individuals. This dichotomy of represented perspective, comprised of both plenty and scarcity, lives at the core of Holocaust studies.

This creates a role for the historian, who becomes an author where there is no perspective. Felman and Laub state that the historian must engage in the “complementary processes of contextualizing the texts of the Holocaust and textualizing the content.” While this function provides us with further individual narratives, it also permits the creation of collective narratives, such as that of the SS WVHA (SS Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt or the SS Business Administration Main Office), which comprises Michael Thad Allen’s *The Business of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labor, and the Concentration Camps*. Allen’s book is the standard formula for historical scholarship; it chronicles the economic development of the concentration camp model by compiling and contextualizing the existing primary documents with information Allen deemed relevant to his understanding of the event. His results are synthesized into a book which takes the perspective of various organizations and individuals. Allen’s book received praise from Christopher Browning, author of *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 in Poland*, who said that, “The WVHA has been a huge gap in existing scholarship, and engineers have hitherto escaped the scrutiny that has fallen on many other professions in Nazi Germany. In one book Allen has filled both admirably.” Allen’s book, unlike an autobiography, is not limited to a single historical perspective. Rather, it manifests perspectives where they do not exist, creating falsified perspectives. A falsified perspective, however, is not a false perspective, like Misha Defonesca’s account. A falsified perspective requires the author to collate their perspective from

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already existing perspectives, rather than create their own ex nihilo. These falsified perspectives are highly useful, as they allow readers and scholars to approach the Holocaust from an ahistorical perspective in order to study historical events. From this perspective, they can observe history from which no person could possibly have existed, yet their ahistoricity consistently refers back to the historical perspectives it was collated from. While Allen’s book does not work to resolve Felman and Laub’s understanding of a “crisis of witnessing” in which historically unrepresented individuals are given representation, it does create a perspective where one did not previously exist. It creates a narrative from an impossible perspective—one that is inherently false and inorganic. These perspectives inform us in the absence of perspective—revealing and synthesizing information that no single testimony can give. This perspective is the perspective of the historian, an author who traffics in the past and produces a narrative from it.

Yet, historians, despite their authority in representing the past, are unable to capture the perspective of the individual who experienced it. Memoiric authors can testify to the past in a way that legitimizes their perspective. The genre of the autobiography and the memoir is predicated upon the authority of the individual to represent themselves. The perspective of the memoiric author, unlike the historian, is limited to their own experiences, a realm where they retain an autonomy and authority over its representation. However, despite the falsity of the historian's perspective, memoiric authors and historians fulfill the same purpose—to provide content, context, and meaning on the Holocaust where there is absence.

**Foucault, Authorship, and Ownership**

Authorship, or the absence of autobiographical authorship and the surge of non-autobiographical scholarship, is directly linked with our representation of the Holocaust. While the crisis of witnessing calls attention to the absence of individual narratives, it also frames the
way in which texts are discussed within the discipline of Holocaust studies. With memoirs reigning in the genre, the authorial individual becomes the most prominent historical source. Michel Foucault, in his essay, “What is an Author?” defines an author as such:

[Authorship is] the privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy, and the sciences. Even today, when we reconstruct the history of a concept, literary genre, or school of philosophy, such categories seem relatively weak, secondary, and superimposed scansions in comparison with the solid and fundamental unit of the author and the work.¹⁵

In discussing the role of the individual author, Foucault also notes the way in which the author’s work engages in a discourse (i.e. a collaborative, communicative relationship) with other authors. While Foucault privileges “great” literary authors,” such as Marx and Freud with the title, “Founders of Discursivity,” this privileging diminishes the effect that more minor or marginal authors have had their work received by future historians. For Foucault, founders of discursivity are authors who “have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts.” While Marx and Freud have certainly “established an endless possibility of discourse,” Foucault fails to explicitly recognize the possibility for any author to receive the same title of a "Founder of Discursivity." For Foucault, who is concerned about the possibilities of future discourse resulting from any author, his privileging of "great literary authors" is problematic because it fails to note that more disciplinary or "minor" authors, like the memoiric authors of the Holocaust whom historians have discussed, have founded their own discursive possibilities. Foucault approaches discursivity in its broadest ramifications, yet he does little to model his discursive systems on a smaller scale. Strictly speaking, when an author individualizes

another author through their writing, they are engaging in a discursive process. This discursive process is similar to the one undergone when the victim relates their experiences to an audience.

For Felman and Laub, when an individual witnesses a traumatic event and shares their experience with an audience,

"By extension, the listener to trauma comes to be a participant and a co-owner of the traumatic event: through his very listening, he comes to partially experience trauma in himself. The relation of the victim to the event of the trauma, therefore, impacts on the relation of the listener to it, and the latter comes to feel the bewilderment, injury, confusion, dread and conflicts that the trauma victim feels... this is historical representation."\(^16\)

By sharing their perspective with an active listener, victims are able to share their experiences beyond themselves. The individuality of the listener is called into account, as they are simultaneously "a witness to the trauma witness and a witness to himself,"\(^17\) bearing in mind their distance from the event, their silence, and legitimizing the testimony of the trauma victim as a historical perspective. The audience of the trauma victim needs to know that the victim, "profoundly fears [their traumatic] knowledge... and on some level prefers silence so as to protect themselves from the source of their trauma."\(^18\) Felman and Laub say that the victim’s silence is "at once oppressive and repressive,"\(^19\) damaging the ability for meaning to be made from the Holocaust and stifling the victim in their discursive process of testifying. I call this process "discursive" because the audience actively participates in the relation of the trauma via their silence, while the victim retains the authority of representing their experiences. Since silence protects the victim from the source of their trauma, this requires a reversal of roles; the

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\(^{17}\) Ibid., 58.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 58.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 59.
victim grants their silence to the audience in exchange for their voice. Testimony would simply fail to exist if the victim was silent, replaced by a speaking audience. It is a discourse where only one party speaks, and the only contribution of the audience is their silence. Although the audience is a co-owner of the testimony, their ownership of the testimony is invested in them by the victim who speaks. This ownership has a genesis: the testifying victim who chooses speech over silence.

But this raises a crucial question: what are the limits of this co-ownership? What happens when the audience of a traumatized individual discusses the victim’s testimony, merging the audience’s perspective of the testimony with the testimony itself? Can the audience claim that their representation of the testimony is the testimony? Furthermore, can that audience represent the victim’s testimony in a discursive tradition while claiming to retain the victim's perspective?

By Felman and Laub's same logic, I say no-- the audience's co-ownership of the testimony is limited to their silence. Any perspective on the testimony that they contribute is confined to their own individualization of the victim and the victim’s testimony. The audience is inherently not the victim, despite their co-ownership of the testimony, and therefore any further representation of the victim's perspective is falsified by the audience's individuality. This is evidenced in their separation from the testified events that prompted the victim's testimony. If there were no separation between the victim and their audience, then there would only be silence between equal witnesses and no testimony would be necessary. By virtue of the victim’s individuality, it is impossible for two testimonies to be exactly alike—underscoring the falsity of any testimony given which is not delivered directly from the victim. Thus, any further representation of the victim's testimony is inherently falsified and created from a perspective
which is not the victim’s. Because it does not come from the victim, it cannot claim the same authority.

**Falsified Perspectives and the Crisis of Authorship**

Even so, falsified perspectives are highly useful to audiences interested in Holocaust studies. They permit a perspective into the Holocaust where one is absent, and there are many. Inevitably, the only new perspectives on the Holocaust will be falsified ones, as the victims who testify eventually become extinct. Falsified perspectives allow us to continue discourse on the Holocaust once the inevitable silence begins-- after its witnesses have passed on, providing a perspective where there is none. Falsified perspectives, like Allen's *The Business of Genocide*, provide narratives which are critical to, "bridging existing gaps in scholarship and provide a clarity to this opaqueness of meaning." 20 A falsified perspective does not inherently discredit the perspective, they simply have alternate witnessing styles. Nor does it mean that it is, strictly speaking, false. In Theresa Rogers' "Understanding in the Absence of Meaning: Coming of Age Narratives of the Holocaust," she discusses how, "Holocaust memoirs... are now being supplemented by more recent works that employ different narrative strategies and call for new forms of witnessing." 21 Amongst these new forms of witnessing, she calls attention to the position of, "this post-holocaust age, in which much witnessing will soon rely on symbolic memorial and on written testimonies, on texts that are sometimes fragmentary, textualized, and whose narrators are in many ways not completely reliable." 22

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This emphasis on an unreliable narrator and “different witnessing strategies” seems like an about-face from standard Holocaust narratives. It challenges the notion of an authoritative memoir, and supplants the conventions which founded the genre. However, the claim that Holocaust narrators are inherently reliable and that Holocaust memories are inherently coherent is a fiction. Felman and Laub provide an instance in which witnessing naturally takes upon these fragmentary and unreliable conventions:

A woman . . . was relating her memories as an eyewitness of the Auschwitz uprising; a sudden intensity, passion and color were infused into the narrative. She was fully there. “All of a sudden,” she said, “we saw four chimneys going up in flames, exploding.” . . . A lively debate ensued. The testimony was not accurate, historians claimed. The number of chimneys was misrepresented. Historically, only one chimney was blown up, not all four. . . A psychoanalyst who had been one of the interviewers of the woman profoundly disagreed. “The woman was testifying, he insisted, not to the number of chimneys blown up, but to something else, more radical, more crucial: the reality of an unimaginable occurrence. The event itself was almost inconceivable. The woman testified to an event that broke the all compelling frame of Auschwitz, where Jewish armed revolts just did not happen, and had no place. She testified to the breakage of a framework. That was historical truth.  

While the historian raises a critical point regarding the necessity of accuracy, the psychoanalyst calls for a different kind of accuracy. The psychoanalyst sees the testimony as accurate to the victim’s perception of the events, rather than the objective accuracy of the event. By legitimizing the victim’s accuracy without discrediting the consensus narrative, we arrive at a complex and multi-faceted view of the Holocaust, in which individuals retain their authority in the midst of apparent fantasy. By

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23 Felman and Laub, “Bearing Witness or the Vicissitudes of Learning,” 60.
contextualizing her testimony with historical evidence, we can permit an individualization of historical truth that is counter-factual. This invests the authority within the victim, giving their testimony the ability to breach our understanding of reality.

This authority to deny reality via individualizing history, however, can only be given to victims. This differs from a falsified perspective because a falsified perspective requires a primary reference, whereas the testifying victim is the primary reference. Falsified perspectives are those given by individuals who did not experience the Holocaust, yet feel compelled to write about it. When an author individualizes history via a falsified perspective, their authority is derived from their relationship to the primary source material. Since they are inherently not the primary source material, any testimonies they provide are invalid. This, however, creates a new crisis.

As those who experienced the Holocaust fade, the potentiality for new testimony will fade. Much like the crisis of witnessing, this fading perspective creates a crisis of authorship. This crisis of authorship is the next stage of the crisis of witnessing, as it prohibits the audience from any receiving new and illuminating testimony with which to plumb the vacancy left by the Holocaust. The crisis of authorship is the prolonged result of the crisis of witnessing, once even those who provided their testimony are equal in silence with those who didn’t or couldn’t. In these crises, no new testimony can be produced. While new texts can be discovered, there will be an absence of new texts written by those who had experienced the Holocaust first-hand. Much ink has already been spilt about the encroaching era of "post-memory" in Holocaust Studies, but little attention has been given to how this will affect the production of new texts within the field. Rogers, concerned about the future of teaching children about the Holocaust, says that "given the
dilemmas of passing into a post-memory... Traditional narrative structures may need to be altered or even abandoned, as with other symbolic memorials of the Holocaust.24 In this effort to revive narratives of the Holocaust for a post-memory age, it becomes critical to recognize the existing relationship between "traditional" witnessing narratives and the role of authorship in witness testimonies.

In an autobiography, a single individual stands actor and author for themselves, allowing us to simultaneously witness their perspective and their own actions. This is especially jarring in Holocaust memoirs because in writing their narratives, victimized authors retain agency writing their own narrative, yet they distinctly lack agency over themselves within the narrative. The experiential qualities of these accounts establish them within the realm of primary source material, and this dichotomy of the author’s agency, omnipresent and revoked, legitimizes it. However, like Eisenhower’s films, these memoirs were constructed in the aftermath of their experiences, and are inevitably tempered with the author’s post-concentration camp perspective. We tend to forgive the victimized author's gap between experience and authorship through the presence of trauma within the authorial self. This authorial self manifests as a physical persona which threads consistency through time, claiming the titles of both victim and author. However, the gap between experience and authorship still exists, though, because every past experience is written from the victim’s future perspective as an author.

In this post-memory age, the gap between actor and author is widening to the point in which the testifying author is absent. This development is very similar to the larval stages of Holocaust studies. During the initial surge of Holocaust literature, Non-victimized scholars of the Holocaust co-existed with the victimized scholars who did not experience the Holocaust. These

scholars occupied a privileged position within the field. Dan Michman, author of *Holocaust Historiography: A Jewish Perspective*, states that,

in [1940-50's] 'scholarly' studies on the topic... researchers did not feel that [testimonial] sources were as important as the 'hard' official documents, and consequently, they did not use or integrate them into their research. Instead, this kind of source material found its way into memorial ceremonies and martyrlogy literature.25

This martyrlogy literature, in which such renowned testimonies as Primo Levi's *Survival in Auschwitz* and Elie Wiesel's *Night* exist, were not seen as co-mingling with "the first postwar scholars [who] were primarily occupied with the desire to understand, 'how it happened.' i.e., how the wholesale murder of Jews came about."26

**Teaching the Holocaust with Falsified Perspectives: Recreating the Crisis of Meaning**

Our representation of "how it happened," is still intrinsically linked with its ontological meaning. Felman, Laub, and Rogers highlight the difficulty in teaching the Holocaust, in explaining how and why it happened to students who lack the understanding of both 'how it happened' and 'why it happened.' The initial crisis of meaning experienced by these students seems to mirror the "historical awareness. . . of politicians, scholars, and lay people alike that World War II and the Holocaust constituted a watershed in history."27 Felman and Laub claim that their students experienced:

a sort of panic that consisted in both emotional and intellectual disorientation, loss of direction. One person told me that he literally “lost the whole class,” that the emotion of the first videotape was so overwhelming, that everything he thought

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26 Ibid., 336

27 Ibid., 337.
he had acquired in the previous classes got somehow disconnected. On the other hand, a number of people said that they suddenly realized this class counted for them... the videotape viewing was described as a “shattering experience”; it was felt that the last session was not just painful, but very powerful.28

Felman and Laub, in fact, claim that their entire book is a "testimony to the class, which echoed their reactions, returning to them the expressions of their shock, their trauma, their disarray."29 Yet this crisis of meaning which Felman and Laub discusses is markedly different from the crisis of witnessing and the crisis of authorship. This crisis of meaning is a replication of the crisis of meaning experienced by those who did not experience the Holocaust, but were forced to rationalize it within their understanding of "meaning" and "existence." While this seems like broad and abstract terminology, it mirrors the ontological doubt of those who have experienced this crisis of meaning, both contemporaneous with the Holocaust and amongst our contemporaries for whom Felman and Laub's book testifies.

In resolving the crisis of meaning surrounding the Holocaust-- the 'how' and 'why'-- we can see the value in cultivating a falsified perspective in order to present the narrative from a distance in authorship and time. Such a perspective would theoretically provide an answer to these questions, much like the early Jewish understanding of their genocide, in which, rather than provide an explicit answer to these questions, Rogers cites James Young, author of *At Memory's Edge: After Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture*, who calls for a “[literary] aesthetics that devotes itself to the dilemmas of [Holocaust] representation, 'an anti-redemptory history of the Holocaust that resists closure, sustains uncertainty, and allows us to

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29 Ibid., 54
live without full understanding." This technique, of presenting the Holocaust’s meaning as an unanswered question, can be seen in Felman and Laub's teaching methods. Because their authorial instruction relies upon a perspective which is falsified— in which their instruction is individualized along with the subject material of the Holocaust, they can arrive at a meaning which insists that students are taught a narrative of the Holocaust which appears inconclusive.

This is the goal of falsified perspectives: to arrive at a conclusion which refers to the testimony of survivors without speaking for them. These falsified perspectives cannot, no matter how reliable the author is, resolve the crisis of witnessing. Rather than contribute to the number of testimonial accounts, they serve as testimonies of testimonies. They are accounts of post-Holocaust individuals reconciling themselves with a crisis of meaning which has outlived them and will continue to outlive them. They produce a meaning which resolves, within them, the crisis of meaning, but fails to perform this for others. While these accounts multiply the number of perspectives on the Holocaust, they demonstrate a crisis of authorship and can only produce secondhand perspectives. They demonstrate a blending of individualizations within history in which authors author the narratives of others. Despite the proliferation of secondhand perspectives on the Holocaust, the crisis of witnessing remains preserved, as the spectre of absence rests in absent narratives and absent books.

These new crises which I've detailed in this essay: the crises of meaning and authorship are all predicated upon the crisis of witnessing. The crisis of authorship is the encroaching latter stage of this crisis of witnessing in which no new testimonial authorship can take place. It will require new narratives of the Holocaust to be authored, ones in which individualization becomes abstracted and authority is passed onto historians. In this transition, it’s critical to recreate the

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crisis experienced by those who did not experience the Holocaust, the crisis of meaning. While the crisis of meaning exists to this day, it is necessary to preserve the crisis in these new, falsified perspectives. By preserving our memory of the Holocaust as an "anti-redemptory history," we recreate the contemporaneity of the Holocaust in moving into an age defined by a crisis of authorship. It forces those who witness falsified perspectives, like Felman and Laub's class, to rationalize the Holocaust through their own perspective. This creates a degree of contemporaneity between those who witnessed the Holocaust second-hand, transcending time through the presence of absence. The perspectives of those who witnessed the Holocaust: those who witnessed the crisis of witnessing, are dwindling in number and are soon to be extinct. While we cannot create new perspectives to fill their absence, we can recreate the situation in which they were received, perpetuating the moment in which we discovered the Holocaust throughout history.

Conclusion

Moving into the post-memory age, it is critical to understand the problems we’ll be facing. These aren’t just limited to the crisis of witnessing, but extend farther. The crisis of authorship is the endgame result of the crisis of witnessing, in which no new testimony can be produced. This will require new strategies of approaching the Holocaust and its narrative. It will require us to consider the historian as an author—as an individual who discourses with past narratives in order to produce a perspective separate from it. We will need to recognize the perspectives attached to the name of the historian, the individual in history who lacks a claim over the primary source material. We will need to accept artificial perspectives, provided that they do not attempt to replace the perspectives of the deceased. But in pursuit of this goal, we must approach fragmentary and unreliable primary sources with a new goal in mind—that of
accepting a perspective which retains its own authority by virtue of experience. It will require us
to contextualize a testimony with an analysis that moves freely between objectivity and
subjectivity, yet retains its locus on the victims who are testifying for their experiences. By
retaining the victim as the subject of Holocaust discourse, we enable a dynamic relationship
between the ever-fading past and the encroaching future—a future in which the victim remains
absent, yet revered.

To do this, we need to approach falsified narratives of the Holocaust with an “anti-
redemptory” conclusion, one which refers to the testimony of the victim without speaking for
them. An anti-redemptory conclusion will aim to replicate the crisis of meaning experienced by
non-victims of the Holocaust who were contemporary with its victims. By re-creating the crisis
of meaning in new present-day audiences, we can make them contemporaneous with the non-
victims who also experienced their crisis of meaning. The Holocaust is often talked about as a
watershed in history, and recreating that experience is tantamount to preserving the Holocaust’s
legacy for future readers and future writers.

Yet, in doing so, we need to remember that Holocaust is over. Genocide is no longer the
exception in world affairs; it has become the norm. Genocide is common. Genocide is frequent.
In recreating this crisis of meaning, we should be aware that we are trafficking with an
anachronism. Yet, when the history of the Holocaust is told from by the victims and their
testimonies, it is a contemporary anachronism. It invokes a humanity within us that makes us
contemporary with the past, if only for a moment. And with it, this passing moment will deliver
to us to the ghosts of its victims, living and dead, so that they may touch us with their words; the
same words which they will repeat throughout eternity for any who will listen.
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