Globalization, Modernization, and the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria

The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front) emerged on Algeria’s political scene shortly after the country’s October 1988 riots, in which scores, if not hundreds, of youths were killed by the army. President Chadli Benjedid revised the constitution and legalized the party in 1989, allowing it to emerge as the main opposition to the ruling Front de Libération Nationale (FLN, National Liberation Front). In the June 1990 local elections, the FIS won 55 percent of the seats in communes and, in December 1991, won 188 of 231 seats in the first round of parliamentary elections. Following the January 1992 coup d’état, the FIS was banned by the military regime. Since then it has struggled to reestablish a dominant position within Algeria’s political opposition.

An Islamist movement like the FIS can be interpreted as a product of global changes that have profoundly reshaped the country’s socioeconomic environment. This chapter examines the responses of the FIS to problems of economic deterioration, social disintegration, and interrupted democratization. What is striking is the discontinuity and plasticity in FIS responses to domestic ramifications of international processes. The variability of FIS policies suggests that pressures from the global political economy can produce a number of possible responses, contingent on the local constraints and opportunities facing political actors in a given country.

The FIS is composed primarily of political entrepreneurs who seek to gain political power. These entrepreneurs are embedded in a social, political, and economic environment that shapes their responses to global imperatives and sets the parameters for what is politically rational and possible. Like the leaders of other fundamentalist movements in Muslim countries, these entrepreneurs have adopted a mobilizing discourse that makes frequent references to religious texts and religious imagery. Although Islamic history and principles provide a basis upon which many FIS elites articulate their goals, Islamist ideology is neither predetermined nor unchanging. Religiously inspired social movements do not operate in a vacuum. Subject to contradictory pressures from the government, rivals, and followers, FIS
leaders have necessarily adapted their discourse and actions to the contingencies of the political moment. As Hugh Roberts (1994b) has stressed, political opportunism is a fundamental characteristic of the FIS, evident in the fact that its leaders repeatedly compromise their formal doctrine for the sake of political expediency. This chapter interprets the FIS as a political movement that has evolved in response to structural constraints at the global level and opportunities within its local environment. It is an articulation of pushes and pulls from both the international and domestic contexts. It is precisely the interaction of endogenous and exogenous factors that gives the FIS its specific political characteristics.

Conceptualizing the FIS in Its Global-Local Context

In order to interpret the Islamic Salvation Front, one must first conceptualize the international and domestic context in which it is inscribed. The FIS did not emerge ex nihilo. Its discourse and actions are a reflection of constantly changing social, economic, and political conditions in Algeria. It is shaped by these conditions while it simultaneously seeks to modify them. Broadly speaking, there are three imperatives of modernization that provide a backdrop against which parties in Algeria operate: economic reform, social transformation, and democratization. These imperatives are a set of goals and modalities of change that the FIS has at times accepted and at other times challenged. Yet the context that the FIS responds to is not simply a product of external pressures. Rather, it is a domestic context as shaped by the international political economy. In other words, local institutions and policies interact with global norms and processes to produce a complex environment of constraints and opportunities.

The Imperatives of Modernization in Algeria

Since the early 1980s, economic reform has been a key challenge facing Algeria. The hegemonic impulse of neoliberalism, consolidation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), pressure from the European Union (EU) for Mediterranean regional integration, and variable oil and gas prices are among the many external constraints that compelled structural adjustment. Algeria's attempt to deal with these pressures, as well as with mounting debt and contradictions in state-interventionist policies, has wreaked havoc on the economy. From 1990 to 1999, the average annual growth rate of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was -0.5 percent. Despite recent, modest economic growth due to higher international oil prices, production in the public industrial sector has dropped almost every year since 1985.

Little privatization has occurred, and the inefficient public banks still control 95 percent of the country's banking system assets. While debt rescheduling in 1994 and 1995 eased constraints on the government budget, hydrocarbons still account for 97 percent of all exports. What reform that has occurred has failed to transform the domestic economy structurally or improve Algeria's position in the international economy.

There is significant external pressure for social transformation based upon norms of secularism, equal opportunity, and gender equality. Although these norms have offered new ideological references to Algerians, they have also conflicted with social development policies. Class relations have deteriorated since the mid-1980s with the growth of income inequality, the collapse of the middle class, and severe unemployment. Far from gaining greater rights and freedoms, women have been relegated to second-class status by the conservative Family Code of 1984 and have faced harassment, kidnapping, and rape due to relentless civil violence since 1992. Instead of identity convergence, Algeria has witnessed increasing conflict over language. Berbers have mobilized on a mass scale since April 2001 to demand recognition of Tamazight as a national language. Battles over the Arabization of education and the role of French in public affairs show no signs of abating. Social crisis, not social progress, is the local context that all political actors face in Algeria.

In addition to socioeconomic pressures, waves of democratization in Latin America and the former Soviet bloc created a tremendous impetus for expansion of political participation and pluralism in a country that had experienced one-party rule since independence in 1962. The rapid democratization from 1988 to 1991 was halted by a coup, plunging the country back into violence and authoritarianism. Despite unfair elections, demands for accountability, political inclusion, and liberty remain strong from the many active political parties and groups in civil society.

Conceptualizing the FIS as a Political Movement

The triple imperatives of modernization, interacting with changing forces in the global political economy, have created an environment of constraints and opportunities to which Islamists must respond. How one understands the FIS has been the subject of contentious and conflicting theoretical claims. This chapter offers four major conceptual arguments about the FIS, based on detailed analysis.

First, the FIS is a nebulous, fractionalized party with views and policies that have evolved in response to political developments in Algeria. As Robert Mortimer (1996: 23) notes, "Many observers have likened the Islamist movement to a nebula because of its diffuse and indistinct nature,
the vagueness of its programs, and the diversity of its attitudes." Some analysts prefer to define the FIS in essentialist terms; that is, they impute to the FIS a set of religious, ideological, and political views that are relatively unchanging. They assume that the FIS, as an Islamist movement, has a particular set of motivating principles that guides its actions and policy pronouncements. Dispensing with nuance, analysts too often selectively cite pronouncements of FIS officials as definitive proof of their essential beliefs. To the extent that one can define the party’s worldview, one presumably can straightforwardly predict its behavior and interpret its responses to global change. However, defining the FIS in essentialist or quintessential terms ignores its multiple motivating principles and conflicting stances on key domestic issues. Not only is it difficult to specify the holistic outlook of the party; it is also difficult to establish the continuity of such an outlook. To underestimate the divergence among FIS members and discontinuity in the positions of its elites is to risk misinterpreting the significance of the party.

What has characterized the party is factionalism among its elites and divisions in its social base. In effect, the FIS is a continuation of historic tendencies in Algerian politics rather than a completely new, essentialist, and fundamentalist movement. Algeria’s political and military elites since the war of liberation (1954–1962) have been divided by clan, region, and ideology (see Quandt 1969). Politics in the country has often been described as a lutte des clans (battle of clans). One of the many factional divisions in the FIS is between djaza’arisites, who espouse nationalist Islam, and salafistes, who advocate international Muslim solidarity. The party’s theocrats and technocrats also are divided by social origins and conflicting opinions on modernization and puritanical revolution (Labat 1995). In addition, there is a great deal of ambiguity in how FIS members conceptualize ideas like consensus and democracy. These differences alone have profound implications for how the factions respond to domestic ramifications of globalization.

Second, one cannot necessarily assert that Islam is the primary prism through which one must interpret the actions and policies of the party. It is less Islam that caused the FIS to emerge than “specific social dislocations, class frustrations and class strategies, cultural anxieties, ideological pulls, and global power relations” (Malley 1996: 233). As Fawaz Gerges (1999: 114–115) argues, “It is misleading to take Islamist rhetoric literally and interpret it in purely religious and ideological terms. Islamists are political realists who are as interested in exercising power as they are inspired by spiritual orthodoxy.” Like the leaders of many other contemporary Islamist parties, FIS leaders have produced remarkably few religious treatises, and few have a pedigree in religious scholarship. In fact, many leading members of the movement’s original maflis al-shura (consultative council) have secular training (see Entelis 2001). Abassi Madani, a nationalist jailed by the French from 1954 to 1962, earned a Ph.D. and taught educational psychology.1 The late Abdelkader Hachani was trained as a petrochemical engineer.2 Rabah Kébir was trained as a lawyer.3 Anwaar Haddam has an M.A. in nuclear physics.4 Ali Djeddé has a Ph.D. in mathematics from MIT.5 Ali Belhaj has a religious education, becoming a schoolteacher and imam.6 Most of these men can be seen as religious autodidacts who recognize Islam’s “efficacy as a language of radical insurgency” (Malley 1996: 234–235).

Third, in asserting that the FIS is best viewed as a political, not a religious, movement, an important task is to determine what kind of political movement it is. The FIS is often labeled as fundamentalist or intégriste because it appeals to Quranic principles, encourages the mixing of religion and governance, and instrumentalizes religion for political gain. In its early years, the party relied upon a network of mosques to mobilize militants. Despite the apparent importance of faith or religiosity for many FIS leaders and members, the concept of fundamentalist does not adequately describe the political characteristics of the FIS or differentiate it from other parties that appeal to religion. The FIS is merely one among multiple representations of political Islam in Algeria. To the extent that FIS members do rely on religious references, they often vary from one another in what their references are and the significance accorded to them (Labat 1994).

One can attribute much of the FIS’s moralism, exclusionary identity politics, and Manichean worldview to its adoption of the third worldist perspective of the FLN (the former ruling party) rather than to the FIS’s references to religious doctrine (Malley 1996). In other words, like the FLN, the FIS is largely a populist party appealing to traditional conceptions of Algerian nationalism, like Arab and Muslim identity, anticolonialism, and the struggle against oppression. By grafting religious discourse onto these traditional conceptions, the FIS appealed to disaffected individuals and relegitimized for younger Algerians popular values associated with the struggle for independence. The Islamist message, rooted in nationalism and the continual quest for identity, pandered to a large audience by using an ideology of protest mixed with religious conservatism. In this sense, the FIS can be seen as an amalgamation of Islamism, populism, nationalism, and traditionalism. Unlike terrorist movements such as Al-Qaeda and Algeria’s Groupes Isâmiques Armés (GIA, Armed Islamic Groups),7 the FIS is more akin to what Olivier Roy (2001) calls an “Islamo-nationalist” party. This type of party is a mainstream Islamist party concerned primarily with legal integration into political life and the promotion of conservative social behavior. Like its counterparts in Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey, the
FIS has become more pragmatic and conservative in the face of government pressure. According to Roy (2001), as these Islamist movements have been subdued and nationalized, they have shifted to an emphasis on nonviolence, political opening, electoral alliances, and, in the case of the FIS, pluralism. In this understanding, the nationalist Islam and populism of the FIS is now a far cry from the chauvinistic religious fundamentalism of the 1970s and 1980s and the violent neofundamentalism of today’s Osama bin Ladens.

Finally, in light of the major arguments made above, it is important to interpret the Islamic Salvation Front as a party that responds to global pressures, though it is a party that is not necessarily antiglobal. All too frequently, the FIS is portrayed in Manichean terms as the opposite of the globalizing impulse: barbaric, antidemocratic, intolerant, violent, and anti-systemic (see Mimouni 1995). It is the jihadist reaction to McWorld, inspired by the Iranian revolution, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and the spread of Muslim Brotherhood ideology. It is also seen as a product of the collapse of the Afghan state, funding from conservatives in the Gulf States, and popular reaction to the 1991 Gulf War.

From this viewpoint, the FIS is the internalization of global trends and transnational Islamist developments. However, the FIS has questioned and challenged some processes of globalization while it has simultaneously accepted and promoted many international norms. For example, while condemning the mismanagement of hydrocarbon-based development, the FIS has promoted a set of domestic economic reforms consistent with the neoliberal agenda of Western governments and international financial institutions. While attacking cultural Westernization and the individual rights of women, the FIS has also emphasized values such as entrepreneurship, social justice, and a rule of law that are widely deemed important by the international community. And while despising the secular norm of strict separation of religion and state, the FIS has often stressed the importance of fair elections, civilian rule, and protection of human rights.

Thus, the party is primarily concerned with reshaping the domestic scene, not confronting the international system. Its acceptance of openness to the global economy and international sociopolitical values is selective, shaped by the conflicting pressures of its conservative social policies, a desire for popular legitimacy, and disgust at what it perceives to be the hypocrisy of the West. Based upon the above conceptualization of the FIS, I next will examine how the party has responded to socioeconomic and political crises in the context of external pressures. On balance, the FIS’s contingent and constrained reaction to the tragic consequences of Algeria’s experience with the global political economy has been rooted in Islamo-nationalism and political opportunism.

Responding to Economic Deterioration and the Challenge of Restructuring

From 1985 to 2001, economic globalization played havoc with Algeria. In the 1970s, the country seemed to have a promising future ahead of it, following President Houari Boumediene’s development strategy based on industrializing industries and capital-intensive investments in hydrocarbons. In the early 1980s, President Chadli Bendjedid broke up large state enterprises and reduced capital spending as a means of accelerating growth and raising household incomes. Yet his approach, like that of his predecessor, ultimately relied upon rents from the export of oil and gas. Beginning in 1985, the rentier state and the patronage networks it had developed entered a prolonged crisis as world hydrocarbon prices plummeted. Not until 1999 would these prices recover and breathe new life into a top-down development model. Deprived of expected revenues, the country was forced into costly borrowing, debt rescheduling, and structural adjustment under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although by 1996 economic stabilization policies had significantly reduced inflation and lowered the budget deficit and debt-service ratio, the cost was deindustrialization, high unemployment, and large-scale impoverishment.

Although it is clear that the FIS emerged at a time when Algeria’s economic strategy had entered a crisis mode, it would be incorrect to suggest that the party promoted an antiglobalization agenda or that it could easily benefit from economic difficulties. In fact, it supported many neoliberal economic reforms. Moreover, the chaotic transition to a market-oriented economy left the FIS a relative loser vis-à-vis the regime. The way in which the FIS responded to the economic crisis has much to do with the structural characteristics of Algeria’s economy. The contradictory effects of economic adjustment on the fortunes of the party can be attributed to the strategic choices of government policymakers and international actors. Economic change provided an opportunity to the party to mobilize losers, but the process also foiled the party’s efforts to bring down the regime or, at a minimum, foiled its efforts to gain reintegration into political life after 1992.

Algeria’s Insertion into the Global Economy

The way in which Algeria is integrated into the international economy created many of the economic problems on the basis of which the FIS was able to mobilize supporters. Exports of oil and gas constitute the quasi-totality of exports and contribute to well more than half of government rev-
enues. Algeria is similar to other petro-states in that its reliance on the
export of a single commodity limits state capacity and hinders institutional
development (Karl 1997). Petro-states face unstable prices, extreme capital
intensity, and low employment. Their insertion into the global economy
shapes development trajectories that are very difficult to change. Oil
exporting, or petroization, creates a set of distinct organized interests within
the state, business, labor, and the middle class that are rent-seeking. As
Terry Lynn Karl (1997: 57–58) observes,

The exploitation of oil eventually can encourage a type of oil-based social
contract among organized interests, but it does so at high cost… Regime
stability is based on a predatory relationship with the state and the perpetuation
of oil dependence, which pressures from civil society are unlikely
to change as long as oil revenues are continuous and relatively incremen-
tal. Restructuring of the development mode, if and when it occurs, must
be linked to a disruption in those revenues or to some special capacity of
the state.

Oil booms characterized by a high average rate of growth of government
expenditures create a set of problems known as Dutch disease: waste,
inequities, debt, budget deficits, low investment absorption, and a tendency
toward import substitution industrialization (Karl 1997). Absent a strong
base of domestic taxation, civil society finds its autonomy weakened, and
rent-seeking becomes the economic norm. The transition to a competitive
economy by sowing the seed of petroleum (i.e., adapting to globalization)
is less likely than economic deterioration and political decay. In Algeria,
the boom effect produced a policy stalemate and an inability to manage
the public sector coherently, while the petroleum boom after 1985 led to rioting,
unemployment, bureaucratic incoherence, and severe struggles over patronage.

Algeria’s structural economic problems are not solely due to petro-
ization but also to a disconnection between its bunker regime and the private
established a set of state-society relations and financial characteristics
that have been reinforced by postindependence elites. Algeria lacks a strong
private sector and autonomous civil society that can temper the aspirations
of power holders or support reformers seeking to adapt to the dialectics
of globalization. As is the case in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, “Having castrated
their private sectors and civil societies, the bunkers lack the cover of non-
governmental intermediaries serving to cushion processes of economic
integration and develop mutual interests” (Henry and Springborg 2001: 133).
The effect is massive capital flight, with military-backed regimes like
Algeria’s turning into gunships for the IMF, intent on crushing emergent
social movements rather than adapting successfully to the imperatives of
the Washington Consensus on economic reform (Henry and Springborg

Algeria has suffered from these structural characteristics, which has
made the process of economic readjustment problematic. Successive prime
ministers since 1988 have been unable to reverse long-term economic
decline. Mouloud Hamrouche (1989–1991) and Sid Ahmed Ghozali
(1991–1992) instituted a series of market reforms that met resistance from
the FLN, state enterprises, and the main trade union. Belaid Abdeslam’s
war economy interlude from 1992 to 1993 reversed many of these reforms
at a time when the debt-service ratio reached well over 70 percent. The sub-
sequent governments of Redha Malek (1993–1994), Mokdad Sifi
that pulverized the poor and middle classes, lending credence to FIS claims
that the government was fostering inequality, impoverishing the nation,
and wasting precious resources. Unemployment reached an official high of 30
percent, swelling the ranks of those whose grievances might be channeled
into support for Islamists.

The FIS Perspective on the Economy

The bust cycle that began in the late 1980s, compounded by civil war and
poorly implemented economic reforms in the 1990s, created fertile ground
for the FIS among large segments of the population. However, it would be
a mistake to rely solely on an economic-deterministic explanation of the
FIS or of Algeria’s political developments since the late 1980s. If a bad
economy in the 1980s gave rise to the FIS, then an even worse economy in
the late 1990s should have expanded the FIS’s support, which it did not.
While the FIS clearly capitalized on an array of economic grievances, it
more importantly capitalized on what Roberts (1992: 436) has defined as
“public exasperation with arbitrary government, and the concomitant
demand for a form of government based on the rule of law.” By focusing on
state mismanagement rather than attacking the global economy, the FIS
crafted a political explanation for economic decline that resonated with
many segments of the population. In related fashion, the FIS capitalized on
economic deterioration less by critiquing neoliberal economic norms than
by condemning Algerian leaders for failing to generate prosperity within
the recognized constraints of Algeria’s reliance upon hydrocarbons. These
Islamists were not unlike most Algerian political elites in taking for granted
that the key to long-term development was the appropriate valorization
of oil and gas. In this sense, the FIS was not challenging Algeria’s position
within the global economy; rather, it was advocating a better and more equitable adaptation to international market forces through appropriate government policies.

The 1989 FIS program, the only unified, comprehensive statement of the movement's political and socioeconomic policies, contains seeds of a defensive and protectionist approach to foreign economic policy. The party criticized excessive dependence on foreign experts and advocated less reliance on the outside world. This economic nationalism/populism has a long history in Algerian political discourse, deriving more from a postcolonial reaction to French dominance of economic exchange than from a desire for autarchy or for decoupling from the world. During the 1989–1991 reformist period, a number of former government officials had publicly detailed how foreign experts had been involved in huge state investment failures and how government officials had conspired with foreign companies offering kickbacks to drain resources from the economy (e.g., Brahimi 1991). The contempt was focused on state officials and only secondarily on foreign companies. Driving a better bargain with external actors was a popular position for the FIS as well as for the FLN and secular opposition parties.

The often vague 1989 FIS program and the party's reaction to the 1989–1991 reforms of Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche are evidence of a general acceptance of some neoliberal ideals. By default if not by design, the FIS supported the economic reform program of Hamrouche. There was a similarity of interests with the reformists under President Chadli in altering existing patronage networks and responding to the crisis of Algeria's development model. Although the FIS position could be seen as based on Islamic principles of support for property rights, it was predicated on attacking power holders and rewarding constituents of the party within the private sector and the informal sector. For example, de facto privatization and import liberalization benefited a significant number of FIS sympathizers in the private sector.

The party's 1989 program stressed the need for entrepreneurship, productivity, and rapid development of the private sector. To promote small- and medium-sized enterprises, the party advocated lower taxes, deregulation, and financial incentives for investment. It also proposed reductions in military spending, demanded an end to state monopolies on trade, and advocated a new system of industrial relations giving enterprises more responsibility over their own affairs. This domestic neoliberalism was accompanied by a call for an intermediate opening to the global economy through elimination of customs barriers within the Maghreb and establishment of a free trade zone among Arab and Islamic countries (Zoubir 1995). International financial institutions like the IMF were hardly the focal point of criticism. Regarding the early FIS attitude, John Kentellis (1995: 68)

argues, "Its program is largely driven by domestic interests and is not part of an international Islamist movement. In fact, the party platform... called for international cooperation with the West to explore and expand Algeria's natural resources and export potential." Although the FIS did not advocate wholesale elimination of tariffs and protectionist barriers, it sought increased interaction with international actors predicated on the removal of state-fostered corruption and unfair restrictions on domestic actors.

This perspective on economic relations persisted even after the 1992 coup. The technocratic wing of the FIS vigorously opposed attacks by the radical GIA on France and against foreigners in Algeria in 1994 and 1995. Anticipating that it had a good possibility of coming to power, the FIS hoped to preserve good commercial relations with France, Italy, Germany, Japan, and the United States. Rabah Kebir, head of the German-based FIS Executive Committee Abroad (L'instante executivo del FIS à l'étranger), went so far as to cultivate relations with European industrialists who had an interest in investing in Algeria (Labat 1995). At least until 1996, the FIS wanted political support from Europe and the United States and stressed that when the party came to power its foreign economic policy would reward those who had helped the FIS. Moreover, the movement's pragmatism in commercial relations with the West stemmed from a recognition that, once in power, the party would have trouble implementing its economic ideal of redistribution without substantial aid and financial relief. This pragmatism, grounded in political rationality and calculations of global ramifications, is also evident in the fact that the FIS favored the internationalizing its conflict by engaging in terrorism outside Algeria.

The Impact of Economic Liberalization on the FIS

However, the way in which Algerian policymakers adopted to domestic and international economic constraints in the 1990s had contradictory effects on the FIS. The transition toward a market economy (assuming that is what happened in Algeria in the 1990s), although favored by the party, did not necessarily help it. The 1994 structural adjustment policies supported by the IMF and subsequent debt rescheduling through the Paris and London Clubs amounted to a windfall for the military regime, which the United States and the European Union feared was on the verge of collapsing. A dramatically reduced debt-service ratio in 1993 and 1996 freed up resources to finance the war against Islamists and to bolster patronage to strategic segments of society. In the war economy after 1992, privatization, liberalization, and protection rackets created lucrative opportunities for military elites, government officials, entrepreneurs, and "emirs" of radical Islamist groups (Dilliman 2000a; Martinez 2000; Tlemçani 1999). In this
reconfiguration of patronage networks, the FIS was a relative loser vis-à-vis a newly consolidated "mafia politico-financière" made up of army officers, government officials, and businessmen (Hadjaj 1999). With many of its elites in jail or in exile, the FIS simply had a harder time getting a piece of the pie, and its political power declined. Moreover, the austerity-liberalization policies of Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, by "confering ownership rights over privatized enterprises," addressed the demands of petit bourgeois backers of the outlawed FIS and by so doing detached some leading entrepreneurs from loyalty to the party (Martinez 2000: 147). The chaotic market transition encouraged some previous FIS business sympathizers to defect from the party, enriched radical emirs in the GIA and other groups that outbid the FIS's armed wing, the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS), in violence and territorial implantation, and saved the military regime. The economic carpet was pulled from under the FIS, and it had no ideological or material alternative to offer to the bulk of the population hurt by price liberalization, devaluation, layoffs, and privatization.

The FIS also suffered from the way in which the Algerian economy was internationalized after 1992. The civil war and the actions of the FIS did not fundamentally change the strategies of international oil companies, which continued to invest, or international financial institutions, which reduced the debt-service burden. International oil companies and IMF helped restore state control by providing resources that staved off near collapse of the rentier state system. By 2000, Algeria had dramatically increased foreign investment by oil companies and, having completed a major pipeline to Spain through Morocco, became a major gas supplier to Europe (see Aissiou 2001). A significant rise in international oil prices since 1999 has bolstered Algeria's foreign exchange reserves and allowed Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who was elected president in April 1999, to implement a program of massive government spending and investment. Although the government still faces the challenges of price instability, deregulation of European gas markets, and resistance to privatization of Sonatrach (the state hydrocarbons company), the continued interest of international oil companies will likely ensure that Algeria remains a rentier economy, able to service its external debt and distribute patronage to regime leaders and their cronies in the public and private sectors.

In a broader sense, the FIS lost because it never managed to get the European Union or the United States to recognize the legitimacy of its campaign against the government. EU governments and investors have "globalized" Algeria since 1995 within the framework of the Barcelona Process, also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Launched in 1995, the Barcelona Process promised substantial development aid to southern Mediterranean countries, security cooperation, and cultural dialogue. Although the Barcelona framework included EU pledges to promote democratization and human rights protection, the EU and its southern partners have essentially defined security as "preserving existing regimes and weakening the appeal of political Islam." Predominant in the EMP are the goals of creating a Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone by 2010, expanding EU aid for structural adjustment, and encouraging European private investment. In early 2002, Algeria signed an association agreement with the European Union that will progressively lower Algerian tariffs against European goods and accelerate the flow of EU grants and low-cost loans from the European Investment Bank. To date, the EMP has bolstered existing political and economic elites in the southern Mediterranean and produced only partial and inequitable economic reforms (see Dillman 2002; Hibou and Martinez 1998).

Similarly, since 1998 the United States has promoted a U.S.-North African Economic Initiative, focused on privatization, free trade, and Maghrebi trade integration. By 2002, the Export-Import Bank of the United States had an exposure in Algeria of more than $2 billion in export-objet credits, one of its highest exposures in the world. Along with U.S. corporate investments in hydrocarbons, pharmaceuticals, and power generation (all in partnership with public enterprises), the initiative seems destined to favor the existing mafia politico-financière and marginalize Islamist-leaning businessmen, while doing little to encourage political reform or enhance the welfare of the population (Dillman 2001a, 2001b). In effect, the European Union and the United States have championed neoliberal reforms that have been marginally implemented by incumbents while excluding Islamists from any involvement in their initiatives. This is ironic, considering the argument (see Henry and Springborg 2001: 225) that in the Middle East and North African region "the political movement of moralizers culturally most distant from the West, that of Islamism, is the one that is also among the most committed to implementing the Washington Consensus" on economic reform.

**Capitalizing on Social Crisis and Succumbing to It**

While the economic imperatives of modernization have evoked a variety of responses from the FIS, so, too, have the challenges stemming from rapid social change. As elsewhere in the Middle East, social disintegration and cultural adaptation have provided fertile ground for the rise of Islamist social movements like the FIS (see Dekmezian 1995). Although the domestic social environment shaped by global change can be measured relatively easily with demographic, housing, and employment figures, it is much harder to identify a one-dimensional reaction by the FIS to social issues. The social vision of the party elites has been ambiguous and flexible, if not
opportunist. Many detractors define the FIS as reactionary and obscurantist, citing its social-puritanist vision, restrictions on women, authoritarian religiosity, and antiparliamentary (see Mimouni 1992). It is also portrayed as affirming a Wahhabist social vision alien to traditional Algerian beliefs and anathema to global liberalism. Along with other Islamist groups, it has supposedly “reterritorialized” Algerian culture, created a “new counterculture that thrives on nihilism,” and pursued the establishment of a mythic society (Lazreg 2000: 149, 162). This essentialist portrayal of the FIS reaction to social issues fails to acknowledge the complex pushes and pulls shaping the Islamists’ social project.

**The Depths of Algeria’s Social Crisis**

It is clear that deterioration in social conditions, tied closely to the failure of Algerian economic development strategy, has profoundly shaped the opinions of FIS supporters and FIS policy strategists. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, President Houari Boumediene had fostered considerable social progress as measured by low unemployment, expanded educational opportunities, and more comprehensive social services. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, social inequality began to rise. The fall in oil prices in 1985 accelerated this trend. The 1990s witnessed enrichment of the few, the collapse of the middle class, and a rapid increase in the number of people living in poverty. By the end of the 1990s, 23 percent of Algerians lived below the official poverty line, and an estimated 40 percent of Algerians lived on less than $2 per day. Declining per capita income for the decade of 1986–1995, inflation, and frequently negative growth of GDP have taken a heavy toll on the majority of Algerians.

One significant measure of dire social conditions is the condition of housing. In 1992, the Ministry of Health and Population estimated that there were an average of 3.2 people per bedroom in the country. Figures from the 1998 census released by the National Office of Statistics reveal that the average household has 6.5 people and the average number of people in an apartment is 7.15. With one of the worst housing crises in the world, Algerians have faced terrible overcrowding, disruption in family relations, and forced postponement of marriages. Women have also suffered setbacks since the 1980s. To placate religious conservatives, President Chadli had passed the Family Status Code of 1984 that imposed enormous restrictions on women’s rights within the family. Few women have reached positions of influence within political institutions and businesses. Although the percentage of Algerian women working outside the home has increased to some 13 percent by 1996, this rate was one of the lowest in the world (FIDH 2001). Since 1992, women have faced significantly higher threats to their personal security in the form of assaults, kidnappings, and rapes.

Trends in education and health care also provided a window on the dire social conditions in Algeria. While from 1985 to 1987 spending on public education was equal to about 10 percent of gross national product (GNP), from 1995 to 1997 it had fallen to only 5 percent of GNP. The failure of public education can be seen in the fact that only 3 percent of Algerians have a bachelor’s degree, and, on average, 95 percent of students who start elementary school will not go on to complete a bachelor’s degree (FIDH 2001). Equally alarming, Algeria’s gains in public health during the 1970s and early 1980s were lost during the 1990s due to declining per capita health expenditures and skyrocketing prices for medicine (FIDH 2001).


How did the FIS respond to these social conditions? What kind of explanations did it provide for constituents for their problems? What alternative sense of social identity and practices did it offer? How did it try to meet the social needs of distinct social segments? Ideologically and materially, the FIS had something to offer to a wide variety of social forces in the first several years of its existence. After 1992, however, the popular appeal of its social vision unraveled in the face of massive violence and the radicalization of society.

From 1988 to 1992, the FIS strove to be a successful mass-based party. This strategy was rooted as much in political necessity as it was in a devotion to some grand, Islam-inspired social vision. In other words, the manner in which it pursued social policy was significantly influenced by political imperatives to garner electoral support and to satisfy competing constituencies. As regime policies changed those political constraints, a more competitive market for social visions emerged, so to speak, and the FIS had to fine-tune its social policies. In order to keep its diverse factions together and stave off the wrath of the state during early democratization, the FIS was deliberately vague in its social agenda. As Yahia Zoubir (1995) contends, the FIS lacked a clear “societal project” in its 1989 program. The assertion of a radical vision of Islamization would have quickly split the Islamist movement, alienated a number of key social forces, and scared the army. Even a cursory look at the different and often changing opinions of Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj shows that the FIS had a contradictory social vision. This is not to assert that the movement was without clear opinions on issues such as the proper role of women in a Muslim society, but rather simply that it was not a unitary religious movement, unrespon-
sive to constraints and opportunities in the sociopolitical context in which it operated.

The broad social appeal of the FIS is clearly correlated with the fact that so many segments of society have faced downward mobility since the 1980s. As an enterprising political movement seeking mass electoral appeal, the FIS offered an explanation for downward mobility, some policies to alleviate social conditions, and a general sense of hope for change. Collectively, the metaphorical hizb Fransa (party of France) served as a convenient scapegoat for Islamists who placed in this category anyone deemed to be an agent of social inequality, the personification of cultural Westernization, or a link between a colonial and a globalizing dialectic. The Francophile middle class and communists were portrayed as having usurped power in 1962 to prevent the true ideals of the revolution, such as construction of an Arab-Islamic umma (community of believers), from being achieved. These groups in power presumably caused social immobility, and the fruits of their machinations were the so-called ichi-ichi (youth with a penchant for ostentatious displays of wealth), who were despised as representatives of inequality and unfairness in society. In addition, lack of social advancement was blamed on le pouvoir (the state), which was painted as an embodier, thief, predator, and taghouit (tyrant). The diverse components of the FIS offered a resolution of personal identity problems and government incompetence in social policy through a new sense of purpose, a pseudo-authentic turn, and an emphasis on justice rooted in Islamic principles.

The ideological appeal of the FIS was also enhanced by its expropriation of traditional themes of the FLN, prompting many to dub it the jils (son) of the FLN.10 It granted an Islamist discourse onto the nationalism, populism, and third-worldism of the decaying FLN. In other words, it was the familiarity of its social vision, rooted in postindependence Algerian political culture, that appealed to the population, as much as its novelty.11 That the FIS was able to fill a large swath of the ideological space was largely due to the fact that President Benjedid had pitched to society a new set of values, images, and "organizational principles," centered around crisis, deregulation, consumerism, and anti-Self-rating that were unpopular with the masses as well as with the FLN rank and file (Malley 1996). Although these values and images were validated by international economic actors and Algeria's main trading partners, they amounted to an abandonment of the compelling mix of third-worldism, nationalism, and Islamism that had grown out of the anticolonial struggle. By equating Islamism with third-worldism and inequality with cultural Westernization, the FIS produced a potent ideology to explain destructive social phenomena such as trabendo (the black market) and marginalization of urban dwellers (Malley 1996).

To capitalize on this overarching sociopolitical message, the FIS tai-

lored its discourse to the specific ideological and material concerns of diverse social strata. The party had a sociopolitical vision in which each group could find what it wanted to hear. For example, urban poor could find comfort in Ali Belhadj's radical discourse, whereas retailers and military entrepreneurs could find reassurance in Abassi Madani's piety and moderation (Kepel 2000). With its bifurcated leadership, the FIS created a potent coalition of urban youth and the pious bourgeoisie, through the intermediary of an Islamist intelligensia with a mobilizing ideology (Kepel 2000). Specific groups that constituted the FIS's primary base of support included hittistes (young, urban, unemployed males), Arab teachers and diploma holders, engineers, some former FLN militants, and merchants and shopkeepers. Many of these groups faced downward social mobility or were frustrated in their attempts to reach the social status they thought they deserved (Amrouche 1998). However, it is important to note that many of these groups did not necessarily want full Islamization of politics, nor could they be characterized as antiglobal or antimodernist. Many in the intelligensia, the pietist bourgeoisie, and the middle strata who gravitated to Islamism were primarily reacting to the manner in which state officials had internationalized the domestic economy. They wanted more opportunity and easier entry into a restricted political and economic class.

One of the main strata to which the FIS appealed was the urban lumpenproletariat, which, collectively, included the poor, the young, and the traditionally pious. Mobilization through a convincing sociopolitical message was reinforced and validated by the social activism of the FIS from 1998 to 1992. The party gained support among this stratum by dispensing free medicine, providing educational services, organizing festivals, setting up cooperatives, and subsidizing food during Ramadan (Burgat 1997). The provision of private social services and, briefly, the provision of public social services when the party ran many communal governments created a new political legitimacy, or a Gramscian "counterhegemonic organization" that challenged the state's monopoly on associational and mobilizational activities (Encelis 1995). Some of the communal-level policies the FIS partially implemented were relatively popular with the urban poor included shutting down establishments that sold alcohol or rented videos, removing garbage regularly, and encouraging women to wear the hijab (head covering). Through these types of policies, the FIS met some of the symbolic and material needs of distinct social strata.

Another important stratum to which the FIS appealed was petty traders like butchers, bakers, jewelers, and grocers who were fed up with price controls and the constant need to beg for goods from state manufacturers and distributors. They desired to "restore a code of honor in social relationships" by eliminating economic subordination and restrictions on domestic trade (Martinez 2000: 30–31). Their critique was of an unfair state headed
by officials who were predatory and monopolistic. Many wanted a leaner state under which their economic potential and capacity to produce would be unleashed, enhancing their social and material status (Martínez 2000). Among the common demands on FIS communal officials made by the petty bourgeoisie was easier, predictable access to land and utility hookups. To the extent that the FIS promised a fairer, more minimalist state, merchants and traders had an interest in supporting the movement. While hardly unbridled supporters of external liberalization and lower tariffs, small retailers and traders and their supporters in the FIS had a common interest in promoting freer domestic markets through liberalization. Even “military entrepreneurs” (former officers of the Armée de Libération Nationale who owned small businesses) flirted with the FIS as a way of hedging their bets should the FIS win national power and patronage prerogatives (Martínez 2000).

Although some social strata were attracted to the FIS primarily out of material interest or in response to economic deterioration, it is clear that the FIS’s vision appealed to a large number of devout activists who genuinely wanted an Islamic state, introduction of sharia (Islamic law), and social relations based on Islamic principles. These devotees were part of a broad stratum of society made up of the young, educated, and Arabized. The formation of this class of young religious believers and ideologues owes much to government policies in the 1980s that pandered to traditional religious conservatism. For example, in 1982, President Chadli persuaded an eminent Egyptian theologian, Sheikh Mohamed el-Ghazali, to head a new Islamic university in Constantine. He stayed until 1989; although courted politically by the government, el-Ghazali preached a very conservative social vision of Islam that was influential among religiously inclined Algerians (see Tehani n.d.). Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Algerian government had funded the construction of mosques and expanded religious instruction.

Many of these pious followers were also deeply influenced by the spread of transnational Muslim Brotherhood ideology via radical imams in the hundreds of unofficial mosques that sprouted up during the 1970s and 1980s. They found a voice among radical FIS leaders like Ali Belhadj, who railed against the “globalization of cultural exchange” manifest in Western dress and the ubiquitous, rooftop satellite dishes beaming in European TV programs (Martínez 2000: 38). Islam was a compelling ideology, a totalizing vision of society more appealing than the discredited secular ideologies of Marxism, Arab socialism, and liberalism. The dense network of unofficial mosques in garages, vacant buildings, and workplaces mainstreamed conservative Islamic ideas and dress. Moreover, the mosques became a locus of daily activity and social intercourse, making religiosity itself fashionable. In the absence of a free realm for social or cultural activity, the protected areas of mosques became an alternative center of civil society that the FIS utilized to spread its sociopolitical program and to mobilize supporters. By capitalizing on the network of unofficial mosques, the FIS had important political tools that were less accessible to its political competitors: a financial base, an egalitarian ideology, a large group of educated recruits, and a space protected from government repression.

The last major social stratum targeted by the FIS was youth whose education was in Arabic. Presidents Boumediene and Chadli had pursued an Arabization program in schools since the 1970s. By 1989, education from kindergarten through high school was entirely in Arabic.13 Thousands of schoolteachers had been recruited from Egypt and other Arab countries, often bringing with them a Muslim Brotherhood ideology that profoundly shaped the ideas of a generation of young Algerians. Based on dozens of interviews and a written questionnaire distributed to more than 2,000 students on two Algerian university campuses in 1987 and 1990, James Kaufman found that students who had received most of their education in Arabic were much more likely than French-educated students or less-Arabized students to hold Islamist beliefs. Having an attachment to “Islamic precepts, values, attitudes, and behaviors” was more highly correlated with having studied in Arabic than with a student’s gender, socioeconomic background, ethnicity, geographic origin, or field of study. Kaufman (1995) concludes.

The Arabization of education has direct effects on individuals’ cultural orientation. Arabic’s Islamic references imbue it with powerful religious symbolism that has important political connotations. When Arabization leads to a weakening of French, a dramatic shift in cultural orientations results.

The FIS capitalized on the fact that young Arabized Algerians found the “symbols, linguistic style, and cultural references” of the FIS “more familiar and persuasive” than those of other sociopolitical groups (Kaufman 1995). It should be noted, however, that the attraction to the FIS and other Islamist groups was not solely based on identity issues or a desire for Islamization. The FIS also capitalized on the specific social aspirations of Arabized students (Labat 1995). Those schooled in Arabic found that the job market was dominated by French-schooled students. The ticket to a prestigious job was facility in French, and Arabized students (whose quality of instruction was often poor) faced great job insecurity and second-class social status. A well-mobilized, Arabized, young population was a stratum that the FIS could easily cater to. These youths had a social and material interest in the establishment of more rewarding job prospects for Arabic-trained students and in basing employment on legally defined, merit-based criteria.
Loss of Social Vision in a Culture of Violence

The distinctive social vision discussed above, which was tailored to a broad set of social classes and reinforced by social activism, unraveled after the coup of 1992. FIS ideology and policies in the social domain underwent a significant transformation as leaders divided, the government repressed, and supporters abandoned the party. The contradictions in the party’s social base came to a head in the changed social and political environments. In a sense, the FIS succumbed to the social crisis that had given birth to the party and that it had unsuccessfully sought to resolve through inspiration in Islam, conservatism, and populism.

The seeds of failure for the FIS’s social coalition had already been planted in the period from June 1990 to April 1992 when the FIS ran municipal councils. A number of Algerians were dismayed at the heavy-handedness with which the FIS closed shops, discouraged rai music, and tried to ban “indecent” clothes. Increasing verbal attacks on French-speakers worried many in the urban middle class. And there was a fear among secularists, the middle class, and property owners of the potential unleashing of the rage of hitristes (Kepel 2000). More concretely, the dissolution of municipal councils in April 1992 brought an end to the FIS’s eighteen-month experience in local government, depriving the party of patronage resources and infrastructure through which to implement social policies. The decapitation of the party and imprisonment of a large number of leaders and cadres fragmented the movement, making it impossible to present a coherent social project. A radicalization of ideology occurred, with many former FIS activists setting up or joining armed gangs bent on violence and destruction of the social fabric. Local emirs within the GIA replaced former FIS leaders, and social groups began to defect, as was the case for members of the petite bourgeoisie who gravitated to two legal, moderate, Islamist parties, Sheikh Mahfoud Naahaa’s Hamas and Abdallah Djaballah’s an-Nahda (Islamic Renaissance Movement). The FIS rapidly faced the breakup of its “monopoly of symbolic management of the Islamist resistance” (Martinez 2000: 234).

Moreover, secular political rivals fine-tuned their social policies in line with changing preoccupations of the population and gained greater attention from the government. The most significant example of this is seen in the Berber community, which in early 2001 mobilized on a large scale following demonstrations and riots in which the police and security forces committed numerous abuses. The two main Berber parties, the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS) and the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD), have sought to capitalize on a rapidly growing, grassroots movement in Berber areas focused on participation, civic rights, linguistic rights, and creation of a rule of law. This non-Islamic social move-

ment, spearheaded by village committees, has already succeeded in placing its demands at the top of the country’s sociopolitical agenda. Moreover, organized labor and war veterans (anciens combattants) strengthened their organizations and mobilizational appeal, placing greater resource demands on the military-backed government in exchange for loyalty against Islamists.

The civil war after 1992 privatized violence, leading to private accumulation of economic goods and social status. What emerged, according to Luis Martinez (2000), was a “war-oriented imaginaire,” a belief that violence was an effective instrument of social advancement. Islamists used violence instrumentally as a response to military repression in order to achieve wealth, prestige, and power. The struggle by Islamists, including many in the FIS and defectors from it, was reduced to a socioeconomic operation instead of a religious conflict grounded in a historically recurring Islamic imaginaire in which protagonists sought to recreate a pure Islamic state governed by sharia (Martinez 2000).

The result is that terrorism and violence have become deeply entrenched in Algeria. More than 150,000 people have died since 1992, some 20,000 have disappeared, and tens of thousands bear physical and psychological wounds. Rape, kidnapping, torture, and massacre have become routine, although somewhat diminished since 1999. According to an Algerian government study, from 1995 to 2001, there were more than 9,000 bombings across the country. Terrorism and violence are not perceived by Algerians as solely associated with religiously inspired groups or the security forces. As Michael Humphrey (2000) notes, “Violence does not fall along some imaginary front-line between the state and Islamists but is found everywhere. All the spaces of normal life—street, office, bazaar, home—have been invaded and overturned by violence.” Through its own mistakes of elite fragmentation and support (or justification) of violence, the FIS squandered much of its social capital. Its social vision, if not its religious vision, became associated in the minds of many Algerians with a culture of violence. Its participation via its armed wing, the AIS, in murders, extortion, lawlessness, destruction of infrastructure, and arbitrary cruelty undermined its earlier claim to be a promoter of equality, social equity, and a rule-based society. So, too, did its guilt by association with the most violent Islamist groups. Although it still appears for the poor, youths, retailers, and devout students, thanks to a vision of social relations based on Islamic law, it seems unlikely that it can mobilize a wide social coalition through its newfound emphasis on democracy and social pluralism. Although the FIS has done much to discredit itself, it is equally the ubiquitousness of terror, whether committed by the GIA, local communal guards, or the military, that has undermined the FIS.
Democratization, Interrupted Democratization, and the Challenge of Reintegration into Political Life

Democratization is the third main imperative of modernization that Algeria faces. In other words, the country is struggling to resolve a participation dilemma inherent in the process of nation-building. Waves of democratization in the third world, along with the collapse of mobilizational regimes in the former Soviet bloc, have brought to center stage in Algeria the issue of political change through free and fair elections. FIS perspectives regarding popular political participation have been pliant and contradictory, and the constraints and opportunities the movement has faced since 1988 have fluctuated significantly. Over time, the FIS has pursued a variety of political strategies, including democratization, general strike, insurrection, civic acts, terrorism, and, most recently, negotiated reintegration into political life. As such, it is hazardous to state definitively that a fragmented and heterogeneous movement like the FIS either believes or does not believe in democracy. What is more productive is to trace its basic political calculations since 1988. In so doing, one can see plasticity, reactiveness, and strategic constraints as much as its presumed Islamic essentialism on political matters. The constraints imposed on the Islamist movement by the Algerian government and the Western powers have had a profound effect on its political calculations and actions.

Constraints and Opportunities During Democratization

In the aftermath of the October 1988 riots, the Chadli government decided to legalize the FIS in September 1989, after which the party rapidly became the only major oppositional rival to the FLN. Until 1992, Algeria experienced a period of rapid democratization that shaped the ideology and practices of the FIS. Islamists drew upon traditional Algerian populism and nationalism and filled an ideological vacuum created by authoritarianism’s undermining of the secular opposition (Layachi 2000). Like many observers, Azzedine Layachi (2000: 27) interprets the movement as pseudo-nationalist, in that it seemed to be anchored in a “transnational feeling that asserts uniqueness on the basis of religion” and shared with Islamists elsewhere a rejection of Western values and influence. In this conceptualization, the FIS, to the extent that it called for democratization, was simply paying lip service to the West, when in reality it had little interest in democracy. John Entelis rejects this characterization of the FIS as fundamentally antidemocratic or antimodernist. Many leaders of the party were well-educated administrators and mobilizers who could be seen as representing a new middle-class reaction to political exclusion. After all, they did play the democracy game through 1991. Entelis (1995: 71) also argues that had the FIS taken power in 1992, it “would have been prepared to form coalitions and other political alliances, along with moderating some of its rigid theocratic beliefs and taking into consideration the interests of other groups—such as the military, business community, and foreign investors—in order to satisfy desired public policy objectives.” In other words, the continued presence of political competitors and the imperatives of engaging in normal politics might well have compelled the party to behave democratically. As it turned out, the way the FIS developed had less to do with any inherent incompatibility between Islam and democracy than with how the Algerian junta treated (or mistreated) the party (Entelis 1995). As Hugh Roberts (1994a) and Pierre Dévoluy and Mireille Duteil (1994) stress, the FIS was manipulated in a variety of ways by Chadli’s cohorts, Chadli’s opponents, and high-ranking military officers.

The contradictions in FIS pronouncements on political strategy stemmed in part from efforts to sustain a broad coalition of Islamists. There was a division of labor between Madani and Belhadj—a sort of yin-and-yang relationship—with Madani emphasizing legalism and Belhadj emphasizing radicalism. This division between djaza’aris (those who had a relatively moderate, nationalist perspective) and salafistes (who had a violent, transnational vision) remained throughout the 1990s; the mirror image on the government side is the division between réconciliateurs (who recognize the need to negotiate) and eradicateurs (who want to physically wipe out radical Islamists). In other countries undergoing democratization, one finds a similar pattern of regime hardliners versus regime liberalizers and opposition moderates versus opposition radicals. In Algeria, as in other transition countries, it is often not clear whether any of the four basic factions have electoral democracy as their first political preference.

In the June 1990 local and regional elections, the FIS won 54 percent of all votes cast, giving it control of 55 percent of communal government seats and 32 of 48 wilaya (provincial) seats. These stunning elections set the stage for a major struggle over the 1991 parliamentary elections. In May 1991, Madani protested the gerrymandering of electoral constituencies and called for a general strike. The government declared a state of siege and arrested Madani and Belhadj in June 1991, allegedly for conspiring against the security of the state. Abdelkader Hachani took over as head of the party’s Political Affairs Commission and managed to commit a deeply divided party to an electoralist strategy. In December’s first round of parliamentary elections, the FIS garnered 47 percent of the popular vote and won 188 of 231 seats decided in the first round. Had a second round taken place, the FIS would likely have won more than two-thirds of the seats in the National Popular Assembly—enough to rewrite the constitution.

FIS strategy in 1991 emerged from a series of calculations about the
intentions of the military and estimations of electoral success. The quasi-
surrender in May and June 1991 was a strategic mistake, in that the FIS
underestimated the commitment of the military to legalism and maintaining
public order (Zoubir 1995). Still, the party did succeed in bringing down
the government of Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche in June 1991 and
then forced the new prime minister, Sid Ahmed Ghozali, to revise the elec-
toral code in a way that allowed Hachani to drag the FIS into participating
in the elections. Martinez (2000) contends that the FIS did not call for vio-
ience until some months following the 1992 coup in the expectation that,
should the party come to power democratically, the military could be a
potential partner. In contrast, Yahia Zoubir (1995: 125) contends that the
FIS engaged in "deliberately provocative" behavior toward the army.
Whichever the case, it is clear that the military, the FLN, and other opposi-
tion parties profoundly underestimated the voting strength of the FIS in
1991. Based on shoddy polling and wishful thinking, they expected that
the FIS would get one-third of the popular vote and end up as a minority in the
new assembly (Mortimer 1996). Then a second stunning election occurred.
The military and secular opposition would later downplay the FIS’s claim
to majority representation by noting that the FIS’s share of the popular vote
fell from 54 percent in 1990 to 47 percent in 1991 and that, considering low
turnout and spoiled ballots, only 24 percent of registered voters actually
voted for the FIS in 1991 (Mortimer 1996).

These unexpected results led the military to believe that its dominant
role in politics and its position as an autonomous, secular institution were
threatened (Mortimer 1996). Hard-line officers suspected that the FIS and
President Chadli had reached a secret deal on cohabitation in late 1991 that
included discussions on removing a number of high-ranking military of-
cicers (Zoubir 1995). The military had failed to get its ideal: "a tame, com-
pliant FIS, capable of acting as a safety valve for popular anti-regime pres-
sures but unable to mount any serious challenge to the ruling order" (Willis
2000: 75). This led to the triumph of a security logic by èradicateurs in the

Repression and the Fragmentation of the FIS, 1992–1995

By turning on the FIS, the military completely changed the political envi-
ronment in Algeria and, thereby, the approach of the FIS to the pursuit of
power. From 1991 onward, the army radicalized the Islamist movement and
closed off further electoral opportunities for the party. Mass arrests in 1992
and 1993 decapitated the movement with devastating effects. The fraction-
alization of the party was aggravated by the fact that its governing institu-
tion, the mafat al-shura, could no longer meet. Replacing the FIS officials
who served as political intermediaries and orchestrators of social control
and crime prevention were young radicals and local mujahideen (freedom
fighters) bent on violence and criminality (Martinez 2000). The salafist
leaders and activists in the party who had been contained before June 1991
came to the forefront with their advocacy of violence in the face of "proof"
that the electoral strategy had always been a doomed enterprise (Hafez
2000).

On top of constraints created by the state, the FIS was outbid by the
violence of other Islamist groups. The FIS initially had condemned the
coup and focused its efforts on reaching a political solution. Then in early
1993 it launched military operations. By 1994, when the FIS formed its
armed wing, the AIS, rival violent Islamist groups such as the GIA had
already established a strong presence in the interior of the country. As
Martinez (2000: 204–205) states,

Having held hegemony between 1989 and 1991, the ex-FIS became just
one actor among others after the fall of the elections. While the Greater
Algeria communism under the influence of that party were ravaged by the
formation of Islamist armed bands and groups of criminals acting with
complete impunity, the idea of an Islamic state ceased to mobilize sup-
port, and the population took refuge in survival strategies.

The FIS thus found itself a prisoner of the generalization of violence
and trapped by the extreme polarization between radical armed groups and
dominant èradicateurs in the regime, such as Major-General Khalid Nezzar
(minister of defense), General Larbi Belkheir (minister of the interior), and
Major-General Muhammad Lamlam (chief of staff).

The task of finding a viable political strategy was complicated by the
fractionalization of the FIS. Rabah Kébir, head of the German-based FIS
Executive Committee Abroad, had rejected the tactics of the GIA in 1993.
In 1994, unauthorized representatives of a rival FIS grouping, the FIS
Provisional National Executive, met with the GIA and declared a unifica-
tion of armed groups under the GIA banner. Madani Mezrag, who by this
time had organized the AIS in several parts of the country, pledged his
fidelity to Madani and Belhadj, although it has always been unclear as to
what extent he was accountable to the FIS national leadership. The AIS
sought to distinguish itself from terrorist groups, such as the GIA and the
Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC, Salafist Group
for Preaching/Call and Combat), by emphasizing political rather than ide-
ological goals. It rejected killing foreigners and civilians, attacking
women, and sabotaging schools, preferring a strategy of jihad that could
be clearly perceived as legitimate (Hafez 2000). Beginning in 1995, the
AIS became a target of the GIA, whose violence served to discredit all
Islamists.
In 1994 and 1995, the FIS pursued a strategy of military struggle and coordination with legal opposition parties and engaged in a series of intermittent negotiations with the regime. In the summer of 1994, the newly appointed president, retired General Liamine Zéroual, and General Moktar Belhadj, FIS representatives, held secret direct negotiations with Madani and Belhadj. These negotiations were designed to re-establish a dialogue between the two sides, and to de-escalate the conflict. In November 1994 and January 1995, the FIS took major steps to modify its militant rhetoric and to re-establish its claim to represent democracy. With the backing of Madani and Belhadj, FIS representatives benefited from the support of the US government, particularly through the efforts of the US delegation to the FIS.  

First, the FIS national leadership made a fundamental miscalculation of the balance of forces in 1994 and 1995. Madani and his associates expected many disgruntled conscripts to desert and the corrupt military to fail in its modernization effort (International Crisis Group 2001). Instead, the regime used force and massive repression by the National Popular Army and secret services, backed up by material assistance from the West, allowed the regime to hold out against Islamist terrorism and popular revulsion. Although officers and their civilian allies in government were forced into the bunker, the regime managed to hold on to most of the territory and secure oil and gas production. The rescheduling of debt in 1994 and 1995 and the associated drop in the debt-service ratio released resources for matériel and patronage, some of which financed the proliferation of armed village guards loyal to the state.  

At the same time, the infrastructure of the FIS was shredded. Whether from exile or jail, some of the best political leaders of the FIS had gone into hiding or were under surveillance. The FIS was quickly outpaced by violent armed groups, many of whom welcomed the more radical former FIS members. The regime also initiated a concerted effort to co-opt moderate Islamists from within the FIS. By one account, six of the original thirty-four members of the 1989 FIS majlis al-shura had in one way or another by 1998 switched to the side of the pouvoir (power) (Charef 1998).  

Second, the regime also sought to bolster the legitimacy of legal, Islamist-oriented parties that had been rivals of the FIS since 1989. The two main parties instrumentalized by the regime were Mokhtar Naâmah’s Movement pour la Société de Paix (MSP, Movement for a Peaceful Society) and Abdallah Djabbalah’s an-Nahda. Naâmah countered the FIS’s claim to a monopoly over Islamist discourse and, like his Muslim Brotherhood counterparts elsewhere in the Middle East, emphasized a steady Islamization of society from the bottom up instead of through the seizure of political power. In conjunction with its efforts to co-opt moderate Islamists, the government adopted some social policies that the FIS had emphasized, such as job creation and private housing. After 1994, the regime quickly built a new alliance among the army, private sector, and the MSP (Martinez 2000). Trade liberalization, an end to price controls, and greater access to foreign exchange satisfied the petty bourgeoisie with Islamist tendencies (Martinez 2000). By meeting some of the demands of the Islamist bourgeoisie, economic adjustment accompanied by international assistance worked fairly well to integrate some Islamists into the political system and consolidate the regime (Martinez 2000).  

The third factor that constrained the FIS was the reaction of the United States and the European Union to the Algerian drama. The United States
had begun a flirtatious, low-level dialogue with the FIS in late 1993, when it seemed that an Iranian scenario was in the making (see Dillman 2001b). The U.S. administration of President Bill Clinton urged military leaders to reintegrate nonviolent Islamists into politics and held new elections. The U.S. strategy seemed to be paying off when Anwar Haddad, one of the administration's U.S.-based interlocutors, participated in Sant' Egidio. Nevertheless, by the end of 1995, the United States abandoned its dialogue with the FIS. This shift seemed to be a reaction to several factors, including a spate of bombings by Islamists in the Paris metro; complaints by Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco; the Algerian regime's success on the ground; and Zéroual's 1995 election. In late 1996, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (since renamed) arrested Haddad and threatened him with deportation. No longer could the FIS expect any sympathy from the United States.

The European Union had a significantly more important impact than the United States. It had failed to voice much concern with the coup of 1992 or the banning of the FIS. While calling on the regime to open a political dialogue with the opposition, European governments gave qualified support to Algeria's rulers while stressing the importance of economic reform. France, the driving force in Europe's policy toward Algeria, had a complicated foreign policy. "Realists" saw the Algerian military as a necessary evil, given the Islamist threat, whereas "morals" felt the coup had undermined principles of democracy and human rights (see Duguzan 2002). The schizophrenic French policy focused on support for Algiers but included pressure on Zéroual to speed up democratic reforms and economic readjustment. In 1994 and 1995, when France was struck with several terrorist attacks by the GIA, the French government cracked down on Islamists in France and swung strong support to the Algerian government, especially through lobbying for international debt rescheduling.

Although the European Parliament was frequently critical of Algeria's military leaders, democracy promotion and human rights protection never ranked as significant policies of most EU institutions. By 1995, EU efforts were centered on the Barcelona Process, which was designed to create the EMP, bolster security cooperation with southern regimes, expand European aid for economic development, and increase cultural exchange. In effect, the Barcelona Process left no place for Islamists like the FIS. Afraid of political breakdown and an influx of migrants from the global south, the EU in 1995 essentially chose to support authoritarianism. The attacks by the GIA in France and the horrific attacks by radical Islamists from 1993 to 1995 on foreigners, women, and intellectuals in Algeria deeply tarnished the image of the FIS.

By the end of 1995, as the European Union and the United States began to believe that the regime would survive, the FIS had few places to turn for international support. One exception was international civil society. At Sant' Egidio, the FIS attempted to ally with Algerian political parties and nonstate actors in Europe to influence transnational political processes. Yet, in 1995 and later, the FIS was unable to capitalize on European civil society networks of NGOs and human rights groups that mobilized after the launching of the Barcelona Process, partly because these networks were much more likely to cooperate with European partners who had secular (i.e., Western-influenced) "education and socialization" (Jenemann 2002: 93). The concern of European civic groups to condemn authoritarianism in the global South and to promote democratization did not necessarily translate into direct support for Islamists. It did not help matters when European policymakers undermined transnational political cooperation by turning their backs on Algeria's civil society and opposition political parties and shifting to a state-to-state dialogue within the Barcelona framework. The FIS itself bore much of the blame for its failure to cultivate political support in European civil society because of its virulent denunciations of France, religious chauvinism, and weak commitment to democracy and women's rights.

The Search for Reintegration into Political Life After 1995

In 1996, President Zéroual amended the constitution to strengthen executive power and carried out a dialogue with legal opposition parties. In June 1997, he held parliamentary elections in which his newly created party, the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND, Democratic National Rally), gained 156 of the 380 seats in the National People's Assembly. The MSP and an-Nahda together won 103 seats, and the FIS won only 20. The FLN, which won 62 seats, formed a coalition cabinet with the RND; several MSP and an-Nahda members also joined the government.

Thus, by mid-1997, the FIS was more marginalized than ever and without a coherent political vision. Abdessi Madani represented a moderate, nationalist face of the party, whereas Ali Belhadj appealed to the more radical, salafist elements. Also still in Algeria was the number-three man in the party, Abdelkader Hackini, who appealed to multiple factions. The FIS's armed wing, the AIS, was headed by Madani Mezrag, who ran a relatively autonomous military group that professed allegiance to Madani and Belhadj, both of whom remained incarcerated. In exile were three rival FIS structures. The German-based Rabah Kebir, who headed the FIS Executive Committee Abroad, seemed close to Madani, expressing a comparatively moderate position, mindful that the conflation of Islamism with terrorism served regime interests. Anwar Haddad, who was jailed in the United States, ran the Parliamentary Delegation Abroad. He had flirted with rad-
cals in the GIA in 1994, supported Sant’Egidio in 1995, and then began to emphasize the democratic side of the FIS while falling out with Kébir. In addition, Ahmed Zaoui headed a Belgian-based, radical, breakaway faction of the FIS called the Coordination Council of the FIS Abroad (ccFIS) that professed loyalty to Madani and Belhadj while adopting a hard line toward the Algerian regime. With cross-cutting allegiances and rivalries, these factions of the FIS pursued different agendas. Meanwhile, the FIS as a whole was riddled by two sadistic Islamist terrorist groups, the GIA and GSPC, which directed most of the savage attacks on civilians and military recruits in the countryside.

In the face of these internal and international constraints, the FIS began to grope for a new political strategy. Moving beyond the Platform of Rome, some in the FIS sought a means to reintegrate into the political system by displaying moderation and emphasizing democratic credentials. After the 1995 elections, Kébir sent a conciliatory letter to Zéroual calling for national dialogue. By 1997, Kébir’s Executive Committee claimed that the FIS wanted a civil state instead of a religious state. Yet, rivalries among FIS camps abroad escalated. In the United States, Haddam condemned Kébir as a traitor, yet another sign that FIS exiled leaders could not agree on strategy regarding negotiations and the purpose of violence (Willis 2000). In the summer of 1997, the army chief of staff, General Ismail Lamari, started negotiations with AIS chief Mezrag that excluded the FIS political leadership. The AIS agreed to a unilateral, unconditional truce and then began to help the army against the GIA. From 1997 until at least 1999, the military seemed to be trying to strengthen the Mezrag-Kébir axis within the FIS; this ploy provoked the condemnation of Hachani and the Zaoui’s breakaway group, the ccFIS.

An uprising in massacres in 1997 and 1998 brought the international spotlight to Algeria, with grumblings for international peacekeepers and international investigations. But in the end, the United Nations and the European Union could do no more than send innocuous fact-finding missions. The European Union by 1998 had moved to a policy of calculated patronizing of Algiers, backed up with EU financial support and negotiations for an association agreement (Roberts 2002: 126). Algeria’s military leaders had by 1998 achieved many of their key goals: getting the AIS to lay down its weapons, splitting the FIS, co-opting the MSP and an-Nahda, turning public opinion against Islamists, and deflecting international condemnation. Massive human rights violations by the regime and Islamists forced the population to choose sides, and the FIS was the relative loser.

Yet it was in this context that Zéroual announced that he would schedule new presidential elections in April 1999. The ccFIS argued against FIS participation, proposing instead an end to the state of emergency, release of Madani and Belhadj, and a fair election under international supervision. However, Madani, Kébir, and Mezrag viewed the elections as an opportunity for reconciliation and a comprehensive political settlement. They more or less accepted the political rules offered by Zéroual, cognizant that establishment of an Islamic republic was no longer a viable goal. Another important reason was that Zéroual allowed Taleb Ahmed Ibrahim to run as an independent candidate in the election. Kébir encouraged the former FIS constituency to vote for Ibrahim, whose father had been a leading figure in the Algerian nationalist movement, in the hope that a strong showing would allow this independent to set up an independent party reinvigorating the FIS. Moreover, the 1999 election represented an opportunity to reanimate the spirit of the Platform of Rome. Candidates from the MSP, FTS, Parti du Travail, and Islah, along with Ibrahim and former prime minister Mouloud Hamouche, signed an electoral charter calling for free elections, international election monitors, and dialogue with the FIS.

The FIS had more to gain than lose by encouraging its supporters to vote for Ibrahim. With the AIS dissolved, the FIS was left with only a political strategy. A pact-based transition predicated on a government-granted amnesty made political sense in these conditions. The RND, FLN, an-Nahda, and MSP eventually called on their supporters to vote for the military-backed candidate, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and six opposition candidates withdrew on the eve of the election. Official figures registered a turnout of 61 percent and gave Ibrahim only 12.5 percent of the vote to Bouteflika’s 74.4 percent. Although the United States and France expressed disappointment over the elections, the FIS did not disavow with Bouteflika. In June 1999, Madani and Mezrag sent supportive letters to Bouteflika. Madani explicitly called for an end to the fighting against the regime. Kébir’s group also issued a communiqué calling for support of Bouteflika’s policies of national reconciliation. The FIS seemed to view Bouteflika as a relative moderate compared to the military’s !’adikators. Bouteflika promulgated the Law of Civil Concord in July 1999, offering amnesty to members of the AIS. The new president put the law to referendum in September 1999. Madani supported the referendum that received (officially) 94.5 percent approval in January 2000. Bouteflika signed an official amnesty decree for the AIS, and Mezrag announced its dissolution. At the same time, Kébir praised Bouteflika for pardoning AIS members and called for dialogue with the government.

However, the honeymoon was short-lived, and the FIS moved from support of Bouteflika to complete rejection of his policies. What explains the shift? The FIS never really trusted Bouteflika, given that he lacked a party or any organized support for policies subjected to enormous resistance from the army (International Crisis Group 2001). In November 1999, Bouteflika ruled out any form of reprisals against the FIS, while indicating he might pardon its leaders if they atomized for their past and abandoned their
pursuit of an Islamic state. The Law of Civil Concord was issued without any negotiation with the FIS, whose national leaders viewed it as a mechanism for surrender rather than a framework to start the rehabilitation of their party. Following the November 1999 assassination of Hachani (who had been released from prison in 1998), Madani issued a letter withdrawing support from the government. Even Ibrahim’s request for legalization of a new Islamist-nationalist party, called the Movement for Fidelity and Justice (Wafa), was rejected.

By 2000, the FIS strategy of gaining rehabilitation in exchange for abandonment of armed struggle had clearly failed. It was left seeking a political role and free elections but without any political capacity to achieve those aims. Bouteflika’s scheduling of May 2002 parliamentary elections in which the FIS could not participate did little to bolster the fortunes of FIS leaders like Madani and Kébir, who sought genuine dialogue. Radical splinter groups of the FIS, such as the ccFIS, bitterly opposed Kébir’s efforts to reconcile with the regime. In early 2002, the ccFIS and Anwar Haddad’s group allegedly held a minicongress in Saudi Arabia with Algerian-based FIS activists who opposed any conciliation toward the regime. At the same time, Mezrag’s AIS group pressed Bouteflika for better rehabilitation of amnestied AIS fighters.

In August 2002, some leading FIS exiles held a major party conference in Belgium, where a letter from Madani was read. Conference members formally dissolved Haddad’s Parliamentary Delegation Abroad, Kébir’s Executive Committee Abroad, and Ahmed Zouaï’s ccFIS. They created the new National Executive Bureau as the only legitimate body to represent the party; Mourad Dhiina—a nuclear physicist—was later appointed head of this Geneva-based group. Although Haddad and Zouaï supported the conference, Kébir, along with three FIS leaders in Algeria—Ali Djiddi, Kamel Guemazi, and Abdelkader Bouhmanhka—condemned the Belgian conference as not representing the FIS as a whole.

Dhiina’s effort to overcome fractionalization reached its limits when Madani and Belhadj, having completed their twelve-year sentences, were released from prison in July 2003. Although barred by the government from engaging in political activities, both tried to reconstitute the party’s constituency as Algeria approached presidential elections in April 2004. Their apparently independent efforts revealed further divisions in the FIS and left the party scrambling to present a coherent challenge to President Bouteflika, who ran for reelection despite a bitter fight with a faction of the FLN led by former prime minister Ali Benflis.

Madani went to Malaysia for medical treatment, ending up in Doha, Qatar, where he announced in January 2004 a “nonpartisan” plan to restore peace in Algeria. He called for a postponement of the presidential elections and the formation of a sovereign constituent assembly to draft a new constitution that would be put to a national referendum. He also called for a general amnesty and a state based on Islamic principles that would protect human rights, the separation of powers, and party pluralism. Madani’s resurrection of the Santi’ Egidio agenda was apparently an individual effort not coordinated with other leaders of the party. Anwar Haddad called the plan “courageous” but denied that it had been blessed by Mourad Dhiina’s National Executive Bureau.

On the heels of Madani’s peace initiative, five other FIS leaders—Djiddi, Guemazi, Bouhmanhka, Kébir, and Omar Abdelkader—issued a communiqué outlining policies for bringing peace to Algeria and calling for the lifting of all restrictions on Belhadj. The five stressed that they would not support any official candidates for president and emphasized the need for national reconciliation. Dhiina immediately condemned the five for not consulting his National Executive Bureau, which he claimed was the only official structure with the right to speak for the whole party. Separately, Madani Mezrag, former leader of the AIS, argued that the FIS should not show a preference for any political parties participating in the elections. For his part, Belhadj sought to bring FIS leaders under his wing, but faced constant surveillance by the government. In February 2004, he notified the Interior Ministry that he intended to present himself as a presidential candidate, but his request for authorization was promptly rejected.

As Algeria prepared for presidential elections in April 2004, the FIS was as divided and marginalized as it had been during the 1999 presidential elections. Its leaders could not agree on a coherent election strategy or a peace initiative that would curry some favor with government elites. Without legal status, a clear policy agenda, or unified leadership in Algeria, it had little ability to mobilize urban youth in a way that would significantly affect the election outcome. By March 2004, Bouteflika was well-positioned to win reelection, having secured backing from the RND, part of the FLN, and the late Sheikh Nahnah’s Islamist-leaning MSP. Abdullah Djaballah, leader of the Islamist-leaning National Reform Movement, was poised to mount the biggest challenge to Bouteflika by garnering many votes from FIS supporters. Ahmed Taleb Idrabhi, leader of the unauthorized Wafa party, also announced his intention to compete again, a move that would draw support from some Islamist voters. The political relevancy of the FIS was increasingly in doubt as it struggled to reconstitute the broad base of support that had propelled it to national prominence in 1990.

Conclusion

The domestic challenges from globalization and modernization have left the FIS between a rock and a hard place. The Islamist movement now has a
vaguely liberal and outdated economic strategy, a confused social vision, and little hope of participating in normal politics. Having moved from a strategy of creating an Islamic state by strike (May 1991), by the ballot box (December 1991), by insurrection (1992), and by terror (Youni 1995), the party's plasticity has been as much its Achilles' heel as its key to survival. Although some leaders have now apparently abandoned the pursuit of an Islamic state by shifting to dialogue and reconciliation, the party is bereft of policy and purpose. Neither an electoralist strategy nor the maghreb are alternatives for advancement of the movement's political interests.

As Oliver Roy (1999) observes, Islamism has become banalized. Large Islamist parties throughout the Middle East have become more like ordinary parties, interiorizing the rules of the political game and expressing a sort of Islam-nationalism rather than a realizable vision of a transnational umma. They are reduced to calling for the sharia, while many of their arguments for anti-imperialism, armed revolution, and social transformation have become increasingly hackneyed. Yet their sociocultural offerings based on conservative interdictions and limits on society seem to be incompatible with the demands of modern, urban, and global social interaction. At the political level they are blocked, unable to achieve their route to an Islamic state because of the triple pressures of state repression, Western insinuence, and the violent activities of radical Islamists. In Algeria, the coalition of hizbat— the pious bourgeoisie—and Islamist intelligentsia uniting around a populist, Islamo-nationalist ideology has fallen apart. As Luis Martinez (2000) notes, "The Islamist passion... seemed to fade as the war became routine."

Perhaps there is some way out for Islamist social movements like the FIS if it is possible to have a pact-based transition to democracy that results from a period of confrontation and bargaining (see Waterbury 1994). Before 1992, the FIS was not habituated to "apprenticeship as a minority participant" for a variety of reasons, not least of which was the manner in which elections were conducted (Waterbury 1994: 36). The restoration of state authority may create the context for a domesticated Islamist movement to participate in a controlled process of political liberalization and social reconstruction. The challenge for Islamist oppositional movements like the FIS is to resolve their moral crisis and overcome the legacy of violence in the 1990s by seeking recognition as Muslim democrats respecting human rights and free expression in a way that appeals to the secular middle class and other social forces (Kepel 2000). For this to occur, Islamists have to accept certain rules, most important being the primacy of a constitutional, secular order. The possibility for a pact-based transition may be better now, after years of conflict, to the extent that the FIS has relativized Islamic doctrine out of political expediency, moderated its winner-take-all mentalit}

dy due to regime-imposed marginalization, and fragmented in a way that regime moderates can capitalize upon.

However, global economic change and geopolitical developments may ultimately make the transformative task of the FIS very difficult. Throughout its struggle, the FIS has failed to gain recognition from Europe, the United States, and Arab governments of the legitimacy of its political role and of its conception of social relations. Since the events of September 11, the international community has even less interest in a political reconciliation in which Islamists like the FIS participate, given the globalization of the battle against terrorism. The United States has bolstered political support for Bouteflika's war on terrorism, beefed up cooperation with military leaders, and encouraged U.S. investment and sales in Algeria. The European Union signed an association agreement with Algerian authorities in early 2002 and cracked down on Islamists throughout Europe. Thus, the FIS can expect nothing from the European Union and the United States, even if it does succeed in reshaping itself into a more unified, democratic, and mainstream party. Algeria's experience with the global political economy, in conjunction with the repression by its military leaders, has ravaged the Islamists as much as it has the country's citizens. To recover from its nightmare, Algeria will need not only a less Islamist FIS but also less hypocritical secular democrats, more civic-minded Berber parties, and a military willing to retreat to the barracks for the first time since independence.

Notes

1. Madani is generally considered to be the main leader of the moderate, nationalist wing of the party. He was in jail or under house arrest from June 1991 until the completion of his sentence in June 2003.

2. Following the jailing in June 1991 of Abbas Madani and Ali Belhadj, the two leading FIS figures, Hachani directed the party's electoral campaign leading up to the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991. Following the January 1992 coup d'état, this technocratic, number three in the FIS was jailed and later released in 1997. While allegedly favoring a dialogue with the government and other political forces, Hachani was assassinated in December 1999.

3. Kebir became prominent in the FIS after 1992 when he took up leadership of the FIS Executive Committee Abroad, an important, German-based faction of the outlawed FIS.

4. After the 1992 coup, Haddad headed an FIS faction in the United States called the FIS Parliamentary Delegation Abroad. After fracturing with a violent Islamist group in 1984 and 1995, he had a falling-out with Kebir. He was arrested and incarcerated in the United States in late 1996, only to be released in December 2000.

5. Djeddi was one of a number of second-level FIS officials below Madani, Belhadj, and Hachani. Although arrested after the coup, he was released in early

6. Belhadj, a fiery, young orator, is deputy leader of the FIS and a supporter of radical policies. He was imprisoned from June 1991 until his release in June 2003.

7. The GIA emerged in 1993 as one of the most violent Islamist organizations in Algeria. It is committed to the overthrow of the Algerian regime and establishment of an Islamic state. By 1995 it had become a virulent opponent of the FIS as well as the FIS’s armed wing, the Arme de la Salvatation Islamiq (AIS, Islamic Salvation Army). Made up of a group of a former Afghan, disaffected youth, and criminals, the GIA has regularly resorted to assassination of foreigners and intellectuals, kidnapping and rape of women, massacres in villages, destruction of public schools, and terrorism in France. In early 2002, its leader, Astar Zouabri, was killed by the Algerian army.

8. The AIS, officially formed in 1994, was the outgrowth of an armed movement known as the Mouvement Islamique Armé (MIA). It was headed by Madani Mezrag, who was not under the tight control of the AIS’s civilian leadership. Although committing a number of assassinations and attacks on infrastructure, the AIS was not considered as violent as the GIA; nor did it have as many recruits and as broad a territorial base as the GIA.

9. One of the motivations for the Barcelona Process was the fact that the European Union had in the late 1980s and early 1990s neglected the Mediterranean as it shifted massive financial resources and attention to Eastern Europe.

10. The intended aim in French derives from the fact that “FIS” and “fils” are pronounced the same way.

11. For example, Abassi Madani was particularly intent on recuperating much of the stock of legitimacy of the FLN by appealing to its bigoted, arabo-phobic base (Kepel 2000).

12. For example, unemployment among males in the 15–24 age range was at least 45 percent in 1990, rising to more than 60 percent by 1998.

13. In 1990, the National Popular Assembly passed a law that would make Arabie the official language of Algeria after 1997 and fine private companies or political parties that used either French or Berber.

14. Mahioud Nahah, who died in June 2003, was a moderate Islamist who advocated gradual Islamization of society and rejected violence as a political instrument. His Fl나 party, later renamed the Mouvement pour une Société de Faux (MSP), participated in the 1991 parliamentary elections. Nahah also ran as a candidate against Lamine Zeroual in the 1991 presidential election. In 1997, MSP participated in parliamentary elections, winning 69 of 380 seats, and subsequently joined a coalition cabinet along with members of the FLN and Zeroual’s party, the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND). Like Nahah, Abdallah Djeballah is a generally moderate Islamist willing to cooperate with Algeria’s authoritarian regime. His an-Nahda party won 34 out of 380 seats in the 1997 parliamentary elections. Djeballah split from his an-Nahda in 1999 to form a new party called the Mouvement de la Réforme Nationale (MRN). He was a candidate in the 1991 presidential election in which Nahah was barred from running.

15. The FIS is headed by Hocine Ait Ahmed, a historic figure in the war of independence who has emphasized secularism, pluralism, protection of human rights, and promotion of Berber rights. The RCD is headed by Said Saidi, a strident secularist and anti-islamist who supported the 1992 coup.

16. Responding to Berber unrest, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in late 2001 had the constitution amended to make Tamazight, the main Berber language, an officially recognized national language.

17. During the Algerian war of liberation from 1954 to 1962, Franz Fanon was an influential writer on the subject of anticolonial violence. In his analysis of Algeria’s deep-rooted, war-oriented insurrectionnaire, Fanon (1967) argued that the horrific violence and social destruction experienced during the war would be a cathartic process, producing a new, more unified Algerian identity and national purpose. Arguably, his predictions were not borne out following independence and, in light of the effects of the most recent decade of violence, seem even more ludicrous.

18. For two recent accounts that implicate the Algerian military and security services in some of the country’s violent acts, see Habib Souaidi (2001) and Naoualou Yous (2000).

19. In addition to the GIA, another violent and criminal Islamist group is the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat headed by Hassan Butane.

20. From early 1992 through December 1993, Algeria was governed by a self-appointed, five-member collective executive called the High Council of State (HCS). It was initially chaired by Muhammed Boudiaf, a respected figure from the war of liberation who had returned from a long, self-imposed exile in Morocco. Boudiaf was assassinated in June 1992. Following a failed effort to convince the main political parties to join a national dialogue conference in January 1994, the HCS named Zeroual head of state.

21. After the 1992 coup, the FLN redefined itself as an opposition party and argued that the HCS was unconstitutional. Although willing to enter into negotiations with the government, Abdelhamid Mehir, the FLN’s leader, opposed the government and called for a boycott of the 1993 presidential elections. In early 1996, Mehir was ousted as secretary-general by Boualem Benslama, who proceeded to ally the party with Zeroual.

22. Drawing a distinction between the FIS and violent Islamist groups was not common in France, which was shocked by GIA metro bombings and the GIA’s murder of seven French Trappist monks in Algeria in 1996. It can be argued that French society, like European society as a whole, though concerned by human rights abuses committed by the Algerian military, views Algerian Islamists collectively as a threat.


24. Shortly after the election, Le Monde cited a military official as indicating that turnout was only 73 percent and that Bouteflika won 28 percent of the votes to Brahimi’s 20 percent, Ait Ahmed’s 13 percent, Djebar’s 13 percent, and Hamouche’s 12 percent.