25. William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin, 2006).
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32. Ibid.
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Migration and Tourism: People on the Move

As noted in Chapter 1, international political economy (IPE) is not just about states and markets. Movements of people are every bit as controversial and important as flows of corporate bonds, auto parts, prescription medications, or arms. Indeed, their consequences shape how states, international organizations (IOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local communities perceive and negotiate their relationship to people inside and beyond national borders. Whether it is the global circulation of unskilled migrant laborers, technology industry professionals, political refugees, tourists, terrorists, or NGO activists, new patterns of human flows have been a central feature of IPE.
The United Nations estimates that about 214 million people, or almost 3.1 percent of the world’s population, are migrants living away from their native country. Their movement can be related to the collapse of governments, efforts to gain “guest worker” privileges in another country; the need to escape war, poverty, or natural disaster; or simply the search for freedom and prosperity. Unlike migrants, most tourists travel for reasons related to leisure and recreation. To many people, travel is merely an escape from the routines of everyday life. However, the tourist industry now plays a central role in both the domestic economy and global standing of many nations. Taken together, migration and tourism highlight both the opportunities and inequalities that shape regional development and undergird new global connections in the current context of economic uncertainty.

These different forms of global movement raise questions about some of the basic precepts of IPE. For example, what is the impact of transnational human flows on economic development in both home and host countries? What happens when people increasingly define their identities, communities, livelihoods, politics, and leisure activities in terms other than those related to the nation-state? And what effects do these movements have on the four structures of IPE (security, production and trade, knowledge and technology, and money and finance)?

In response to these questions, this chapter examines how migration and tourism shape the behavior and outcomes of international and national actors and policies. It highlights the inequalities and contradictions that continue to structure the direction and effect of global human flows. It also examines the new strategies employed to regulate human flows and protect individual rights as people increasingly live, work, and play in places other than their nations of birth.

**ON THE GLOBAL FAST TRACK:**

**THE IPE OF MIGRATION**

We frequently hear stories about how our globalized world has allowed mobile, enterprising migrants to access resources and opportunities unimaginable in their home country. This perspective chalks up immigrant success or failure, belonging or marginalization, to individual actions and values that are sometimes extended to an entire ethnic or national group. In this section of the chapter, we question the assumptions and implications of that perception. For example, which forces govern who migrates, how, and to where? How is the migration experience shaped by a person’s race, gender, education, or nationality? How do certain patterns of migration reproduce inequalities between regions and groups rather than transcend them? Although increased global migration seems to point to expanding opportunities for individual autonomy and mobility, immigrants’ experiences ask us to reconsider the ongoing structural inequalities that condition their movement and ultimate migration outcomes.

While human movement is a common feature of our world, the notion of migration can be something of a moving target. In its simplest sense, migration refers to movement from one place to another—to a nearby city, another region, or another country entirely. Migration may be temporary or permanent; there is nothing about the nature of migration itself that guarantees either the length of residence or the strength of the commitment to the migratory destination. The reasons for migration are diverse. People may not have permanent work or sufficient resources to sustain themselves in their home environment. They may wish to pursue advanced educational or professional opportunities. They may not be able to express their ideas or practice their religion in the way that they choose. They may face environmental devastation or threats to their personal safety. They may be separated from family members. Therefore, when we speak of migration, we are referring to a wide variety of circumstances, motives, and experiences, each with different implications for individuals, states, and the international community as a whole.

Migration has long been an integral force in shaping both individual nation-states and their relationships to one another within the global landscape. Internal migration—movement from rural to urban areas or from one area of the country to another—has been a central feature of IPE theories of development (see Chapter 11). In these theories, migration within the nation has often been seen as a crucial step toward modernization (see “China: Bringing Development Home”).

**CHINA: BRINGING DEVELOPMENT HOME**

China’s road to modernization can be charted through its citizens’ changing migration paths over the past two decades. Domestically, the introduction of the market economy and the shift from collective to household production systems made many Chinese rural farmers “surplus” labor. In response to these changes, and the growing economic opportunities in the cities, many rural residents have taken part in a large-scale exodus from the countryside. By 2003, China’s rural-urban migrants, known as the “floating population,” were estimated to have reached 140 million. In the cities, successful rural migrants have started informal businesses such as those found in Beijing’s growing pavement industry. More commonly, they have filled the ranks of the urban workforce whose low wages underwrite the success of China’s exports in the global market. Migrants’ contributions to China’s national development were made especially visible in the 2008 Beijing Olympics, where venues were constructed in large part by former farmers, who represent 70 percent of the construction industry.

Globally, China has produced a large number of professional migrants who are contributing to national development in a very different way. In 2006, Chinese immigrants constituted 4.1 percent of immigrants to the United States. Overall, these Chinese immigrants were more likely to be working in science and engineering occupations, with one quarter of the men working in management, business, finance, or informational technology. Because of their high education level, these migrants have played a central role in economic and job growth in the U.S. technology industry (Chapter 10). However, instead of constituting a drain on Chinese human resources, they have increasingly become a source of human and economic capital gain for their nation of origin as well. In a 2009 study titled “America’s Loss Is The World’s Gain,” 72 percent of the U.S.-based, professional

(continued)
Chinese migrants interviewed indicated that they thought professional opportunities were now better in China than in the United States. In the context of the global economic recession, many Chinese professionals were thus returning home to job and capital markets that were still growing, rather than shrinking. Validating this perception, many return migrants reported faster movement up the management ladder, better compensation, and more professional recognition in China. Therefore, while the current economic downturn has been global in scope, for China’s mobile professionals, migration to the United States has increasingly served as more of a career detour than a destination, with the road to prosperity leading home.

References

Global migration rose to unprecedented numbers at the end of the nineteenth century; however, it has been in the latter part of the twenty-first century that the volume, reach, and pace of global migration have taken on their current intensity. Whether we are talking about unskilled labor or highly educated professionals, transnational migration describes the now-frequent process by which people cross state borders in search of temporary work or for other reasons. Breakthroughs in technology and travel have allowed a broad array of people to move across borders and time zones as part of (or to ensure) their daily lives. Both men and women have blazed new migration trails and contributed to the construction of vibrant multicultural communities that extend across the globe. In the countries with the highest share of migrants in the total population, migrants constituted 22.4 percent in New Zealand, 40.7 percent in Singapore, and 86.5 percent in Qatar.

The increased scale and frequency of transnational migration of the last four decades has been accompanied by new patterns of movement. Whereas previous travel routes were characterized by journeys east and west, or colonial forays south, current migration is characterized by more south-north or even south-south migration. One-third of international migrants moved from developing to developed countries (often from former colonies), while another third moved from developing to other developing countries. Nearly six of every ten international migrants now live in high-income countries that include developing countries such as Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, and Saudi Arabia. And since 2008, many migrants from developing countries like India, Mexico, and China have returned home.

People were once presumed to migrate in order to take up permanent residence in their destinations; this kind of movement into a new country for the purpose of settling and becoming a resident of that country is called immigration. Contemporary migration, however, is now less unidirectional, and often more fluid in terms of its duration. Circular migration refers to the process by which migrants’ movement shifts back and forth between home and work communities in response to different economic opportunities, employment conditions, and family responsibilities. For example, every September, thousands of young men from Mali and Niger travel to the Cote d’Ivoire and other West African countries to seek wage-labor opportunities along the coast. They remain in these jobs until the spring, when they return home to attend to their crops. Similarly, women from the Philippines and mainland China migrate to Hong Kong to work as domestic labor for wealthy, professional families. When their employment contract term is up, they must return home; however, they often solicit a new contract to revisit Hong Kong for another cycle of labor.

The scale and frequency of temporary labor migration is also encouraged by growing transnational networks of kin and neighbors on whom migrants can depend to find residence and work. This pattern of chain migration, whereby a migrant “links” up with social networks abroad, promotes the concentration of migrant communities in enclaves or gateway cities, which are oriented around immigrant culture and practical needs. In these enclaves, it is possible for a migrant to speak his or her native language, buy “home style” food, make quick wire transfers to people back home, and practice local customs.

For example, Roger Rouse studied the large numbers of Mexicans who moved between Aguillilla, Michoacan, and Redwood City, California. The concentration of migrants moving between one small town in Michoacan and Redwood City had become so marked by the mid-1990s that many people began referring to parts of Redwood City itself as Aguillilla. Indeed, most men in the community spent a portion of their lives moving back and forth across the border between what were, in essence, the two communities of Aguillilla. Community members were able to draw on a deeply embedded transnational network to facilitate ongoing transfers of people, money, and resources.

Migrating toward Development
Transnational migration circuits and the social networks on which they are built are an essential part of the changing economic conditions and political relations associated with globalization. As global capitalist production becomes more mobile, migrant workers tend to move to labor markets where there is high demand and low domestic supply. For this reason, migrants often fill jobs at both ends of the labor market. Engineers and scientists take highly specialized professional positions within the technology or aerospace industries. Unskilled workers fill labor and service jobs that few native workers will do—for example, in the food service and garment industries, meatpacking, domestic labor, or agriculture. Furthermore, domestic population growth in countries like Japan and in much of the European Union (EU), including Germany, Italy, Austria, and France, has increased the need for workers in general, thus making them a prime destination for foreign labor
migrants. From Saudi Arabia to Spain to the United States, changing economic and demographic conditions have required most developed countries to make some accommodations for migration. Two regional groups that have worked to protect migrants and facilitate their remittances in Latin America. In Asia, the Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour ("Colombo Process") has sought to promote legal migration and intergovernmental cooperation. While these initiatives have created regional standards and promoted collaboration on migration, it is often still at the level of bilateral diplomacy that the concerns of specific national origin migrant groups are addressed. Therefore, when U.S. President Obama met with Mexican President Felipe Calderón and Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper at the "three amigos" summit in Mexico in 2009, the question of how to regulate the flow of migrants, trucks, and epidemics constituted the main focus of conversation.

On the other end of the labor spectrum, educated professionals are often highly coveted by both sending and receiving states alike. Indeed, many developing nations have lamented the loss of their most talented citizens through transnational migration. Brain drain—a process by which educated members of a society migrate to more developed nations where there are higher salaries and more employment opportunities—has been responsible for reducing the human resources necessary for many states' own development. In response to a grave shortage of domestic nurses in 2006, U.S. lawmakers decided not to place limits on the number of visas allotted for foreign nurses. The move, however, frustrated residents in the Philippines and Fiji, who feared that their most valuable health care resources would be wrenched away. As a result of conflicts like these, some developing countries have instituted sanctions to keep their professionals at home or to ensure their return from education abroad in order to guarantee the repatriation of valuable knowledge and technology.

Perhaps the biggest reason why migration can be attractive to both migrants and sending states is the opportunity for remittances—income earned abroad that is sent back to the home country. Global remittances reached $351 billion by 2011, up 8 percent from 2010, to represent the first rise in remittance flows to all developing regions since the global financial crisis began. Of those flows, the largest remittances went to India ($38 billion), China ($37 billion), and Mexico ($24 billion). At the macrolevel, remittances shore up a nation's creditworthiness and provide foreign currency to prevent balance of payment crises. At the microlevel, remittances are used to supplement individual household incomes, but they are also important for offsetting the cost of education and health care. Furthermore, in some cases, hometown associations—formed by migrants from a single community—have consolidated their remittances to finance infrastructure and development projects in their home communities. For these reasons, even IOs such as the United Nations and the World Bank have promoted "mainstreaming" migration as a central feature of global development efforts.

Some states have developed diverse legal and financial incentives to keep their mobile populations invested in economic and political processes at home. Mexico and Guatemala are among a growing number of states that have instituted dual citizenship designations in order to maintain allegiance among their citizens abroad. India created a new citizenship category altogether for its emigrant
citizens—non-resident Indian (NRI). To further encourage capital flows from residents abroad, some states have enabled foreign currency holdings and enacted “matching funds” programs that reward migrants for investing at home. The Mexican government in particular has collaborated with Wells Fargo and Bank of America to allow its citizens to open U.S. bank accounts with a Mexican national identification card that it grants through its consular agencies in the United States. The Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador authorized Salvadoran Banks with branches in the United States to serve as remittance agencies.

The recent global economic recession has illustrated the risks involved in relying on remigrant remittance income as a central source of local, national, and regional development efforts. States like Japan, South Korea, Spain, and Dubai—recipients of large migrant labor flows—have begun instituting programs that encourage guest workers to return to their home countries. In what some economists have called the “biggest turnaround in migration flows since the Great Depression,” some migrants themselves are choosing to forego emigration or, if already abroad, to return home (see “China: Bringing Development Home”).

Non-resident Indians and other one-time migrants now see new industries and high economic growth in India as powerful incentives to return home rather than stay abroad. Mexico, the largest source of migrants to the United States, is a case in point. Mexican census data released in 2009 documented a 25 percent decline in the number of Mexicans migrating to the United States compared to the previous year. Furthermore, the recession that wracked the U.S. economy beginning in 2007 contributed to a 25 percent decline in remittances to Mexico by the end of 2009. Remittances remained flat in 2010, only recovering in the last three quarters of 2011. Clearly, the new opportunities brought by migration can also breed new challenges for states that have grown dependent on remittance income.

Transnational migration has clearly become a defining quality of global capitalism. The economic benefits it offers to individual migrants, sending states, and receiving nations have generated new and different patterns of human flows across the globe. Nonetheless, as described earlier, the global fast tracks to economic development are often built along lines of global inequality in terms of who can move, who benefits from that movement, and how sustainable those benefits might be. Therefore, it’s important to explore the social and political dimensions of transnational migration to understand what other forces shape the nature and consequences of global human flows.

Citizenship and the Politics of Belonging

Can a person be a citizen in more than one country and, if so, how does he negotiate multiple political allegiances? What role do cultural and social differences play in shaping the conditions for citizenship? A closer look at global flows forces us to question the assumption that national identity, politics, or even development is rooted within the boundaries of the nation-state. With the help of new information technologies and a highly mobile population, national identity politics may be enacted across the globe. Furthermore, transnational communities formed around beliefs, identities, or politics that are not tied to a particular state reflect new kinds of human connections that raise new challenges for both the states that contain them and the international political economy in general. The U.S. and European states have centered on the social and political implications of migrants. Given that one of the chief functions of the modern state is to control its borders and protect its citizens’ rights, some see unauthorized migrants as a threat to the political sovereignty and security of the nation. Rather than getting the necessary work permits before entering the country, irregular migrants enter a country without visas or stay on after their work visas have expired and thus lack the necessary documentation to remain in the country legally. Senegalese and other sub-Saharan migrants have been entering Spain in large numbers over the past few years through the Canary Islands (a Spanish territory just off West Africa) or Malta. In 2006, their large numbers caused a humanitarian crisis in the Canary Islands and also protest from native Spanish residents who saw them as a threat to economic stability and national security. In the United States, anti-immigrant legislation in southern states such as Arizona and Alabama illustrates how economic pressures have resulted in new efforts to regulate migrant flows and assert tighter control over national borders.

The EU has grappled with this issue as it has extended membership to some post-Soviet states and now contemplates Turkey’s admission. With the inclusion of poorer Eastern European members in 2004, many of the original EU members imposed migration limits to mitigate the prospective flood of migrants that they feared would move westward. Indeed, anti-immigrant campaigns invoked the “Polish plumber” as a symbol of the cheap migrant labor they claimed would take over local jobs. While studies show that Eastern European migrant numbers did increase substantially, their employment fueled growth and did not depress wages, as feared. What is more, non-EU nationals outnumbered migrants from new to old EU countries. Therefore, one of the main points of opposition to Turkey’s inclusion has been the ongoing fear of waves of cheap labor from Asia and the Middle East. These fears grow in part out of the fact that Turkey, like Spain, is no longer defined by outmigration of its citizens but rather by immigration—in this case, of migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, and Iran, as well as former Soviet states. These irregular migrants often move to transit states such as Turkey, as a first step toward greater economic opportunities in more affluent countries of the EU. In the context of increasing regional migration, the migration policies of individual EU member states thus come to matter greatly.

Citizenship is a legal category that entitles a person to full and equal rights within a given state, perhaps most importantly including the right to vote. However, states have various means of assigning that status. Citizenship may be granted based on birth, ethnicity, or naturalization. Anyone born on U.S. soil is eligible to apply for citizenship. Furthermore, once immigrants to the United States obtain a “green card,” they can eventually earn the chance to be naturalized as citizens. Because they provide immigrants the opportunity to become permanent residents, countries such as the United States or Australia are known as settler states. By contrast, people born on German soil do not necessarily receive citizenship. Instead, German citizenship is granted through one’s parent’s: One must have a German mother or father, or a parent with established permanent residence,
to become a German national. Restrictive migration policies in countries such as Japan and Saudi Arabia make it even harder for migrants to become citizens of those countries.

Another way that people can make a claim for permanent residence in a country that is not their own is through refugee status or asylum. Indeed, refugees currently account for approximately 16 percent of all international migrants in the less developed countries (LDCs). Refugees are displaced people who are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin because of fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. A Sudanese victim of factional violence who has moved to a temporary camp in Chad could be considered a refugee. Often the UN High Commission on Refugees may be responsible for negotiating a permanent resettlement destination—either in Chad or in another country—for this Sudanese refugee. In 2010, Afghan refugees constituted the largest group of refugees—29 percent of the global population—followed by Iraqis. By the end of that year, developing countries hosted 8.5 million refugees or 80 percent of the global refugee population. Pakistani alone hosted 1.9 million refugees—the highest number.

People who seek asylum are also permanently displaced people who face persecution in their home countries. These immigrants, however, often make their claims for protection to a court within the nation in which they hope to reside, usually from within that nation’s territory. Although over 850,000 individuals filed for asylum in 2010, that number constituted a 10 percent decline in petitions from the prior year. South Africa was the largest recipient of individual asylum applications.

Citizenship and asylum are more than just legal categories; they are also the highly politicized subject of geopolitics. A recent legal study showed that the U.S. government has granted political asylum to 80 percent of Cuban asylum applicants, but only 10 percent of Haitian applicants. This discrepancy in asylum rates reflects the U.S. government’s policy of recognizing Cubans as political refugees fleeing an authoritarian, communist regime, while Haitians tend to be seen as economic migrants rather than refugees.

Even when foreigners acquire legal residence or citizenship in their adopted countries, states often struggle with integrating them into the social fabric of their new homes. One reason for this struggle is that instead of following a process of assimilation—whereby an immigrant takes on the values and customs of the new prevailing culture—immigrants may retain a strong connection to their culture or nation of origin. Diaspora refers to communities that have retained a common identification with their homeland, despite being displaced and dispersed. The Jews’ expulsion from Babylon in the fifth century B.C. and the transatlantic African slave trade during the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries established the Jewish and African diasporas as the original diasporic communities. In both of these cases, peoples’ forcible displacement from their homeland produced transnational communities that continued to identify with a common history and identity even though they might speak different languages and be citizens of other states.

Today, the concept of diaspora has expanded to refer to a much broader array of transnational communities. We can talk of the Indian, Iranian, Filipino, Chinese, or Haitian diasporas as communities created through an intense process of migration and global dispersion. Diasporic communities may be linked to a specific nation-state—such as the case of the Irish diaspora—or may be a stateless nation—such as the Kurds. Regardless of type, diasporas are increasingly significant both for the new kinds of social, political, and economic organizations they represent and also for the effects they have had on political and economic processes in their home countries. For instance, Haitian migrants in New York see their long-term residence and labors abroad as part of a concerted campaign to improve and support their homeland, something Nina Glick-Schiller and Georges Fouquant have called “long-distance nationalism.” In this formulation, the Haitian community is defined not by its residence on Haitian soil but rather by its common Haitian blood and obligation to the homeland.

New information technology has played an important role in supporting diasporic communities. Now, even when immigrants cannot easily or frequently travel between origin and adoptive countries, they can keep abreast of local news through online media, participate in virtual chatroom conversations with other diaspora members, and manage individual and group finances through Internet banking. Many local communities have created Web pages to keep residents living abroad informed about local needs and goings-on, as well as to stimulate outside investment and participation in local events. The global expansion of cellular phone service to rural areas, as well as Internet conferencing services, has facilitated real-time communication between immigrants and their kin in historically remote areas. All of these technologies allow people to maintain social connections across borders, preserving community language, identity, and politics at any distance.

Many receiving states have had to contend with the complex political implications of diasporas. In February 2006, when a Danish newspaper published a cartoon satirizing the Prophet Muhammad, a group of Denmark’s fundamentalist Muslim clerics lobbied the embassies of eleven “mostly Muslim” countries to demand a meeting with Denmark’s prime minister. The Danish prime minister’s refusal provoked a boycott of Danish goods across the Middle East, as well as violent protests against European offices, media, and tourists throughout the region. This example demonstrates how a transnational community can be mobilized not simply on the basis of a common national identity but also on the basis of a common religious identity. With Islam as Europe’s fastest-growing religion, the social and political implications of an increasingly active Muslim diaspora have become the source of much debate across the continent.

While some migrants actively embrace their new host society, discrimination and inequality can deprive migrants of everyday privileges afforded to native residents. Often this marginalization coincides with perceived differences in language, customs, and cultural values. In some cases, higher population growth rates among immigrant families have meant that the immigrant population is growing faster than the native-born population, leading nativist constituencies to worry about becoming a minority in their own country. Consequently, immigrant struggles for social recognition and political inclusion have fueled some of the major social and political conflicts in recent years. The term cultural citizenship effectively describes immigrants’ demands within these conflicts—that is, they seek a sense of social belonging that is not contingent on assimilation, but rather is built on a respect for diversity.
Two weeks of rioting by youth in Paris suburbs during 2005 illustrate this point. The clashes between youth and the French police were attributed largely to the extreme social marginalization and impoverishment experienced by North African immigrants and their descendants, despite their official French citizenship. This contradiction prompted a *New York Times* article to raise the important question, "What makes someone French?" Because the French have always insisted on a secular national identity, they have glossed over racial and cultural distinctions rather than try to address their social and political effects. The French government’s 2004 ban on the wearing of head scarves or other religious paraphernalia in public schools illustrates just such an attempt to suppress the visibility of cultural differences. Nonetheless, many of France’s European counterparts are trying to find a way to recognize diversity, both to create a more multicultural society and to defuse the move by disenfranchised immigrant youth toward radical or fundamentalist organizations.

As the French case makes clear, the increasingly multicultural societies created by transnational migration require new ways of thinking about what makes someone an authentic citizen of the nation and thus bring into focus contradictions in the definition of the nation itself. Porous state borders and fluid patterns of human movement challenge the assumption that the modern nation is defined not only by a sovereign state but also by a singular, common history and culture. This challenge is true in the United States as well, although immigration is a central feature of U.S. national identity. For example, in 2006 a musical collaboration produced the first Spanish-language version of the U.S. national anthem ("The Star-Spangled Banner"). "Nuestro Himno," as the track is called, emerged as a moment of intense national debate over the immigration question. It called attention to what many view as the increasingly diverse and politicized reality of U.S. national culture. However, it also perturbed many pundits who saw the song as an attack not only on the United States' primary language—English—but also on the Anglo values and identity that they claimed defined U.S. history.

Both the French and the U.S. immigration debates highlight the importance not simply of cultural values, but also of race, in defining the terms of national identity and citizenship. To explain the marginalization of immigrant groups, many scholars of U.S. immigration history have compared the experience of early twentieth-century immigrants from Europe with the experience of post-1965 immigrants from Asia and Latin America. Although earlier immigrants were originally identified as distinct races—Irish, Italian, Jewish—their "racial" difference largely disappeared as they assimilated to Anglo values and became upwardly mobile. Consequently, these European immigrants have increasingly been seen as "white." By contrast, later immigrants with darker skin or other phenotypical differences have been unable to shed their racial identities even when they assume "American" values, speak English, and acquire middle-class status.28 In these cases, it is the perceived racial difference, as much as or more than cultural difference, that explains a specific group's lack of cultural citizenship.

While new patterns of international human flows are often celebrated as evidence of the emancipatory potential of globalization, a closer look at the contours of those flows demonstrates how racial, gender, class, and national differences (among others) continue to exert a strong influence over individual and group mobility and the outcome of that movement. In other words, does the fact that Dominicans emigrate in high numbers and remit large amounts of money to the Dominican Republic evidence growing individual freedom and a globalized form of national development or ongoing dependency and underdevelopment? Certainly many individual Dominicans and even the Dominican national economy as a whole have benefited greatly from migrant labor in the United States. Nonetheless, the lack of domestic jobs in the Dominican Republic and the nation’s reliance on the United States for its development accentuate the ongoing inequalities that shape transnational migration. These are the contradictions inherent in the new forms of human movement and connections emerging through globalization.

The IPE of Transnational Human Flows

Clearly, then, new global migration and settlement patterns present many opportunities and challenges. Politicians, policy analysts, academics, and community members often debate these trade-offs in terms that invoke IPE theories. For example, orthodox economic liberals (OELs) argue that migrant labor is a natural part of the free-market system and therefore should be allowed to flow freely. From this viewpoint, foreign labor supports economic growth in industries in which domestic labor is too expensive or unavailable. Even if immigrant labor displaces small numbers of native labor, depresses wages, or requires benefits, neoliberal perspectives highlight these facts as economic trade-offs that are outweighed by the lower prices enjoyed by consumers, the higher profits enjoyed by employers, and the general levels of economic growth that result from immigrant labor. Supporting this view, a recent study estimated that legalizing the more than twelve million irregular migrants in the United States would cost approximately $34 billion in benefits between 2007 and 2016; however, those costs would be offset by $66 billion of new revenue that immigrant workers would add to the Treasury through income and payroll taxes, Social Security withholding, and fines and fees required by law.29

Heterodox interventionists liberals (HILs) also tend to support migration on the basis of their belief in the individual’s right to freedom of movement as part of a bundle of basic human rights. This view is especially prevalent in cases of migrants fleeing repression or violence in their home country because, according to liberal political philosopher, our obligations as humans extend beyond national borders. What many HILs call for, then, is simply more effective ways of regulating the flow of immigrants across borders. The work of the ILO and the UN’s High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development are two examples of efforts to formulate these regulations and global standards.

Some of the most strident opposition to migration these days comes from economic national-realists who claim that migrants pose a threat to national security in the form of lost domestic jobs and lower wages, especially for low-skilled native workers. Many critics claim that immigrants place a heavy toll on health care, schools, and other state services.29 This perspective has fueled vigilante groups such as the Minutemen in Texas and Arizona, who claim that their efforts to patrol and actively deter immigration along the U.S.-Mexico border are born of a sense of patriotism and defense of U.S. sovereignty.29 Similarly in
Europe, conservative politicians in Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Britain have made nativist politics and opposition to immigration a central feature of recent elections. This perspective is mercantilist because of its economic nationalism sentiment and use of comparative advantage to justify limits on the mobility of labor. In its current ideological manifestation, mercantilist positions also tend to equate domestic political security with economic security, worrying that migrants represent serious breaches to both.

Structuralists may also oppose some dimensions of migration, but for radically different reasons than their mercantilist counterparts. They view increasing migration as a result of the underdevelopment produced by global inequality. From this standpoint, the global division of labor is responsible for creating impoverished nations whose citizens have no choice but to migrate in order to support their families. Free-trade zones flood local markets with foreign goods, destroying local production and local enterprises so that workers must migrate to find new labor opportunities. Furthermore, structuralists often criticize the exploitation of these unskilled migrants within the richer countries as further evidence of the need to restructure the terms of global capitalist production and trade (see Chapters 4 and 6).

Constructivist theory (see Chapter 5) would also point to multilocalism and citizenship as elements in the political and economic debates on immigration. North American society has struggled to assimilate its large numbers of Latino and Asian immigrants—a task that some claim has been made easier by the shared faith between immigrants and natives, as well as the active role that churches play in integrating new arrivals. In Europe, large numbers of Muslim immigrants from Northern Africa and the Middle East have made cultural assimilation more difficult and, in a post-9/11 world, the stakes higher. In both places, states and citizens are grappling with how to reconcile democracy's values with changing demographics and cultural politics. In today's highly mobile landscape, global migration is clearly an important subject for IPE. As the aforementioned debates evidence, the question is rarely whether or not global migration should happen, but under what conditions and with what ends. Both individuals and states can benefit from transnational human flows, but they raise the questions such as Does transnational movement represent growing freedom or ominous challenges to security? Who bears responsibility for migrants—the sending or receiving states? What new forms of global governance would be effective in regulating migrant movement and rights? Resolving the cultural politics that emerge from the increasingly diverse constituencies that transnational flows produce and the economic challenges that arise from economic downturn highlight the double-edged sword of these human dimensions of globalization.

GOING MOBILE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TOURISM

Like migration, tourism refers to the movement of individuals from one location to another, but unlike temporary and permanent migrants, most tourists travel for reasons related to leisure and recreation. Voluntary travel across international borders produces the single largest transnational flow of human beings in the world. According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), international tourist arrivals grew from 25 million in 1950 to 980 million in 2011. The growing transnational flow of tourists stems from the same technologies and institutional arrangements associated with the global flow of goods, ideas, and money. To a large degree, discrepancies in wealth and power between individuals and countries, and interactions between states and markets, determine the distribution of benefits and costs of tourism. Further, many economic liberals portray tourism as a path to development, political legitimacy, and peace, while structuralists see tourism as a destructive force. Mercantilists meanwhile eschew the moral debate and instead focus on how to promote national security while at the same time attracting more tourists and tourism revenues than other states. As political economists like to point out, tourism involves unavoidable trade-offs that benefit some while hurting others. Tourism generates revenues, but comes with a price. When faced with the choice of whether or not to participate in tourism, all but the most isolationist states in the world accept certain trade-offs as a worthy price to pay. Despite the slowdown in the growth of international tourism caused by the late 2000s global economic recession, the flow of tourists crisscrossing the globe is in the long term almost certain to continue.

Engine of Economic Growth or Tool of Exploitation?

In the decades following World War II, the reconstruction of war-torn Europe, the growing prosperity of the North American and Western European middle class, and the implementation of policies aimed at encouraging economic growth led to the rapid expansion of international tourism. In the early days of the modern tourism boom, economic liberals argued that countries should use their comparative advantage in cultural traditions, historical sites, or attractive natural landscapes in order to attract tourists and the money that they bring. Few questions were asked about the potential harmful consequences of tourism, particularly because the economic benefits of tourism promotion seemed so significant and lasting. There is no doubt that tourism produces tangible economic benefits. The most obvious and attractive to governments around the world is the creation of direct revenues that flow from tourist spending both before and during their trip, as well as from tourist payments of taxes while traveling in the host country. International tourism receipts, defined by the World Trade Organization (WTO) as all payments made by international tourists for goods and services (such as food, drink, accommodation, airfares, souvenirs, and entertainment), stood at $891 billion worldwide in 2010. As direct revenues circulate and are re-spent in the local and national economy, backward linkages to other sectors of the economy, such as transportation, construction, and agriculture, also take place as tourists stimulate demand for certain goods and services.

Tourism is an important source of revenue for governments of tourist-receiving countries. Globally, the travel and tourism industry generates roughly 3 percent of total GDP. When tourism's indirect impact on economic activities is included, this figure rises to 9 percent. For many LDCs that depend on just one or two primary commodities for the bulk of their export earnings, tourism represents
an opportunity to diversify the economy. Moreover, for economies heavily burdened by external debt, tourism provides a valuable source of foreign exchange by producing direct revenues for businesses and various levels of government. The ILO points out that tourism ranks as a top three export for thirty LDCs and is the leading services export in LDCs, accounting for one-third of all LDC exports. The creation of employment is an important and highly visible economic benefit of tourism. It is estimated that roughly 100 million people work in the travel and tourism industry around the world. The travel and tourism industry accounts for roughly 3 percent of total world employment. Although most employment in the travel and tourism industry is concentrated in hotels, tour operators, airlines, and travel agencies, tourists also stimulate indirect employment in other sectors that meet the needs of tourists, but that are not dependent on tourism alone. For instance, since hotels require many goods and services, including marketing, security, and catering, companies that offer these services are induced to hire workers, thereby creating more employment.

As a result of its association with the economic benefits discussed earlier, tourism is seen by the vast majority of governments, organizations, and tourists themselves as an economic panacea and "smokeless industry," providing income and employment without requiring the construction of polluting factories. This represents the liberal view of tourism as a progressive force; communities and countries take advantage of their natural or cultural comparative advantage and contribute to a positive-sum game whereby tourism provides benefits for tourists and hosts alike. The OEL perspective asserts that states should take a laissez-faire approach to tourism and allow the travel and tourism industry to develop naturally since doing so will most likely maximize the inevitable economic benefits produced by participation in international tourism. In many ways, this approach to tourism reflects the wider economic liberal assertion that globalization offers enhanced financial opportunities for poor individuals and countries.

The economic liberal view on tourism is today still common in the marketing activities of travel and tourism businesses and government "tourist boards," as well as in promotional organizations such as the UNWTO and the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC). Those who espouse an OEL perspective also support the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a WTO agreement that establishes rules governing trade in services, including the "Tourism and Travel-Related Services" cluster. GATS requires that members of the WTO grant foreign-owned companies free access to domestic markets in services and avoid giving preferential treatment to domestic companies over foreign-owned services firms.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the economic liberal approach to tourism was challenged by critics who began depicting tourism as a destructive force that promises many benefits, but in practice creates more problems than it solves. While some proponents of the critical perspective on tourism are HILS wishing to use government intervention to minimize some of the costs created by natural market activities in tourism, most are structuralists who believe that the exploitation and inequality inherent to capitalism and global economic relations poison tourism, particularly for developing countries. Structuralists point out that the direct revenue so touted by boosters of tourism growth is offset not only by direct expenditures such as advertising but also by revenue leakages which result in tourism receipts being leaked out of an economy as repatriated profits to foreign-owned multinational tourism corporations. Revenue leakages are also caused by payments for imported goods and services required by the tourism industry (such as bathroom fixtures in hotels) or tourists themselves (such as luxury food items not grown locally). Most estimates of revenue leakages suggest that over half of all tourist-related spending leaks out of, or never even makes it to, destinations in the developing world. Further, the majority of economic benefits associated with tourism are concentrated in the hands of the economic and political elites who have the capital and political connections to utilize the opportunities afforded by investment by tourism multinationals.

Structuralists argue that the jobs made available by tourism are low skilled, are often dangerous, and feature little room for advancement because of poor pay and few benefits. Structuralists also complain that tourism is a notoriously fickle industry. Small changes in tourist tastes, or more significant events within the destination itself such as political instability or natural disasters, can severely damage a country's tourism industry. Coupled with the seasonal, casual, and part-time nature of much tourism in most destinations, the vulnerability of tourism to changes in demand often weakens the potential of tourism as a development strategy.

Structuralists also liken modern international tourism to neocolonialism, whereby formally independent states still suffer from unfair relationships associated with colonialism. Dependency theory links the development of the industrial, wealthy core countries of the world to the exploitation and underdevelopment of the poor, weak, and dependent former colonies in the periphery of the world system (see Chapter 4). Based on a dependency approach, structuralists point out that tourist destinations in the developing world serve as the pleasure peripheries for core countries. For North American tourists looking for a cheap sunshine holiday, the islands of the Caribbean region serve the role of a pleasure periphery. Similarly, Southeast Asia and the Mediterranean basin (southern Europe and North Africa) provide pleasure peripheries for Japan/Australia and Northern Europe, respectively.

Economic liberals argue that travel is directly linked to economic prosperity. In particular, affluence leads to higher levels of discretionary household income. As the number of individuals with discretionary income grows, demand for travel services also grows. A clear indication of the connection between economic prosperity and travel is the recent explosion in domestic and international tourism in and from China. China’s rapid economic growth since the 1980s has resulted in a dramatic growth in domestic tourism, as well as a surge in outbound tourism. By 2020, China is projected to be the fourth largest source of international tourists in the world. Improved infrastructure, government policies that encourage openness to the outside world, and economic growth in neighboring countries have also made China a major tourism destination. In 2010, China was the third most popular tourism destination in the world (36 million international arrivals), surpassed only by France (77 million) and the United States (60 million). China is set to become the world’s number-one tourism destination in terms of arrivals by 2020. The global economic recession of the late 2000s temporarily halted the virtually uninterrupted growth in international travel and tourism that the world had
Seen since the 1950s. Just as travel always increases as societies grow more productive and wealthy, people always cut down on travel in difficult or uncertain economic times. As a result of the recession’s impact, international tourism arrivals declined by nearly 4 percent between 2008 and 2009. By 2010, however, the number of international arrivals quickly bounced back, growing by 7 percent over 2009 levels to reach 940 million. Although many destinations around the world saw a dramatic decline in 2009 in international tourism demand because of the erosion of consumer confidence, the quick return to normal patterns of rapid growth demonstrates the resiliency of tourism in the face of barriers to its growth. At a broader level, the questioning of market fundamentalism that the financial crisis has prompted has been largely absent in discussions of tourism: States affected by a reduction in tourism continue to hold a free-market perspective on tourism and show no signs of challenging the “more-is-better” philosophy underpinning state tourism policies.

State Management and Promotion of Tourism

Though popular tourist destinations are usually positioned naturally to attract visitors because of unusual geographical landscapes or exotic cultural attributes, tourism destinations are in fact created, not born. In other words, it takes both states and markets—and specifically states acting to influence market forces—in order for a location to become attractive and accessible. One such case is Cancun, the famous sunspot destination located on the northeast coast of the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico. In 1967, the Mexican government identified Cancun as a growth pole, a deliberately chosen location meant to serve as an engine of economic growth in the surrounding region. This growth pole strategy quickly transformed Cancun from a sparsely populated coconut plantation and site of small Mayan ruins into a globally renowned beach resort destination with almost half a million permanent residents, hundreds of hotels, and three million visitors per year.

With few exceptions, governments around the world prefer policies that promote tourism growth, placing top priority on maximizing tourist arrivals and expenditures despite the negative costs associated with hasty tourism development. States, therefore, often intervene directly in the economy to create financial, regulatory, and social environments conducive to rapid tourism growth. The exception to this growth-at-all-costs pattern is the Himalayan mountain kingdom of Bhutan, which, unlike the overwhelming majority of destinations, particularly those in the developing world, heavily restricts the growth of tourism through policies that exclude all but the wealthiest tourists. The Bhutanese government demands that every tourist pay daily tariffs, surcharges, and expenditures totaling a minimum of $220 per night, and issues visas only to those on expensive organized group tours. By tailoring tourism toward a wealthy clientele, Bhutanese tourism authorities are able to generate greater per-tourist revenues while at the same time limiting the social, cultural, and environmental impact of tourism in Bhutan.

For states that promote tourism, there is a risk of becoming too popular as a destination. Without state management and regulation of tourism growth, destinations tend to become loved to death by eager tourists. The very natural attractions that draw tourists in the first place often become threatened as visitors quickly exceed the destination’s carrying capacity. During the 1980s, governments, tourists, and tourism businesses responded to concerns about the negative tourism impacts by shifting toward alternative tourism, a form of tourism that provides alternatives to mass tourism experiences based on the standard “sun, sea, and sand” formula. The most popular example of alternative tourism is ecotourism, defined by the International Ecotourism Society as “responsible travel to natural areas that conserves the environment and improves the well-being of local people.”

In addition to drafting appropriate laws, and enforcing existing ones, in order to minimize the environment impact of tourism, states can promote ecotourism by restricting the number of tourists in sensitive areas. States can also create national parks and wildlife reserves that provide the locations for many ecotourism activities. Unfortunately, with few exceptions, governments having to choose between rising tourist arrivals, and therefore profits, and environmental protection almost always pick the former.

The mercantilist approach to tourism is important when one considers other ways states limit access to travel within their borders. States determine which nationals are allowed entry and under which conditions (permissible length of stay, for example). Countries that enjoy a close relationship, usually reflected in high cross-border traffic among its citizens, allow each other’s visitors to enter easily. Until 2009, Canadians wishing to visit the United States required only a valid driver’s license. On the other hand, some states forbid or heavily restrict the entry of the nationals of particular countries. Several countries—including Algeria, Brunei, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Sudan, among others—refuse to recognize passports from Israel, thereby precluding travel to those countries by Israeli citizens. On the whole, tourist access to other countries varies widely. Citizens of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden can enter 173 countries and territories without needing a visa, but tourists from Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon, Nepal, and Pakistan enjoy this privilege in fewer than forty countries.

Perhaps the most important role played by states insofar as tourism is concerned is the management of a country’s international image. Changing tastes and preferences among international tourists makes it difficult for tourism planners to predict whether a destination will remain popular in the future. Tourist demand depends heavily on prevailing perceptions of a destination. Thus, anything that alters perceptions in a negative manner carries enormous implications for the travel and tourism industry in host societies. Natural disasters, political stability, and terrorism are all examples of forces that can dramatically shift demand away from a destination. States therefore often focus a great deal of energy and resources on countering the negative impacts of such events.

Natural disasters make popular headlines in newspapers and television news reports. As a result, despite how geographically limited the impact of a natural disaster may be, the average person with a limited knowledge of the affected country naturally forms a negative mental association with that country and becomes much less inclined to travel there. The damage unleashed by the natural disaster is then compounded by the loss of income created by a drop in tourist demand. For example, the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 that killed over 200,000 people resulted in extensive damage to the infrastructure of several tourist-dependent economies, including the Maldives, Sri Lanka, southern Thailand,
and India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The immediate drop in tourism to these regions only made things worse, as tourism revenues rendered even more necessary by the tsunami evacuation. More recently, the March 11, 2011, Daiichi nuclear disaster, caused by a massive earthquake and tsunami off the coast of Japan, led to a 60 percent plunge in tourist arrivals following the month; for 2011 as a whole, tourists arrivals dropped 28 percent compared to the previous year.44

The means by which tourists are able to travel from one country to another are also employed by individuals intending to commit acts of terrorism. In addition to combating terrorist organizations that target their citizens, states also attempt to counter the damage done by terrorist to their tourism industries. Terrorists favor tourists as targets for several reasons: some tourists travel to remote, dangerous locations that serve as the base of terrorist groups; tourists are much “softer” targets than heavily defended military or political sites; the killing of tourists generates extensive international media coverage; and terrorism disrupts economies dependent on tourism revenues, thereby helping to cripple unpopular regimes.45 Since the late 1990s, tourists have become especially popular targets for terrorist organizations. In 1997, terrorists killed close to sixty foreign tourists at Luxor in Egypt. In 1999, seventeen tourists visiting Uganda’s Bwindi Impenetrable National Park were kidnapped (and eight later killed) by Hutu extremists from Rwanda. In 2011, a suicide bomber killed eleven tourists in a popular tourist cafe in Marrakech, Morocco. In the decade following September 11, 2001, terrorists have continued to carry out attacks against tourists in many countries, including Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

States that experience terrorism within their borders usually react immediately to restore their international image in order to lure back tourists. The United States after September 11, 2001, stands as an exception. Because the majority of the nineteen hijackers who carried out the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, entered the United States on tourist visas, concerns were raised that freedoms given to tourists to visit the country were being abused by individuals who intended to participate in terrorist acts against Americans. As a result of domestic political pressure, the U.S. government implemented several measures aimed at better screening and monitoring of visitors to the United States: This includes, since 2004, the requirement that all visitors with a visa entering the United States at air and sea ports have fingerprints and photographs taken. Due to deteriorating global perceptions of the United States, and the more stringent entry requirements imposed by the U.S. government on visitors, the number of international tourists visiting the United States fell by 20 percent between 2000 and 2003; it took six full years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, for the number of international tourists visiting the United States to reach pre-9/11 levels.46

Economic liberals are quick to point out that quick action on the parts of business and government can reverse the initial losses associated with tragic events, such as natural disasters, outbreaks of disease, and acts of terrorism; the evidence seems to confirm this view. Despite suffering a 23 percent drop in tourist arrivals in the year following a devastating terrorist attack that left 161 foreign tourists dead in 2002, the island of Bali in Indonesia quickly returned to pre-bombing levels and, by 2004, exceeded the number of international tourists in 2002 by 13 percent.47 Further, following a subsequent (but far less deadly) terrorist attack in 2005, tourist arrivals in Bali initially dropped, but by 2008, arrivals had exceeded 2005 levels by 42 percent.48 By 2010, just five years after the second terrorist attack, nearly 2.5 million international tourists visited Bali—an 80 percent increase over 2005 levels.49 The persistent growth in global tourism praised by economic liberals is so assured, it seems, that even fear of death at the hands of terrorists is not enough to thwart our desire to travel.

Social and Cultural Dimensions of Travel and Tourism

Social status has long underpinned motivations for travel, from the 1840s, when Thomas Cook first took English industrial workers to seaside resort towns, to contemporary travelers who seek out locations off the beaten track as markers of superior taste and style. Social class also determines who can afford to travel in the first place. Culture is also a crucial component of travel to many destinations for two reasons. First, throughout history, tourists have been motivated to visit cultures perceived to be exotic and unfamiliar. A desire for cultural authenticity has long characterized tourism, and some scholars have even argued that modern tourism is premised on the search for authenticity. As the global proliferation of Western material goods seemingly erases cultural differences, tourists strive to experience a level of cultural authenticity that lies beyond the superficial, and supposedly inauthentic, “front stage” where hosts perform mostly for tourist consumption. Second, despite the role played by cultural “otherness” in luring foreign tourists, the majority of international tourists visit countries with similar cultural traits, particularly in language or religion. Cultural affinity is the reason that the British are the second largest inbound tourist market in Australia, and why U.S. residents made over 11.4 million trips to Canada in 2011.50

Tourist demand stimulates both the rejuvenation of cultural traditions and the rehabilitation of historical architectural monuments. Funds that are collected as entry fees and donations at historical sites can be put to use on the site itself, but more importantly, the interest shown in historical sites by tourists motivates governments to allocate resources to the rehabilitation and maintenance of such sites. Without the incentives created by tourism revenues, historical sites such as Angkor Wat in Cambodia, Machu Picchu in Peru, and the ancient city of Timbuktu in Mali would likely have remained crumbling ruins, or at least would have received far less attention and funding. In many cases, governments wishing to restore an historical site for tourism or other purposes succeed in acquiring funds from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which maintains a World Heritage list of cultural and natural properties deemed essential components of global heritage.

Critics of the unregulated nature of global tourism argue that the presence of highly conspicuous tourists in local communities increases criminal activity, especially in destinations whose residents are much poorer than the tourists visiting them. Several factors make tourists good targets of criminal activity: They are likely to mistakenly stray into unsafe areas or become lost; tourists are more likely...
than locals to be taken advantage of due to their lack of familiarity with local norms or procedures; a holiday mentality makes tourists more trusting and less alert; and tourists are apt to display objects of value such as money, jewelry, and cameras openly and without caution.

Another cost associated with the interaction of rich tourists and poor locals is the way in which tourism tends to have a demonstration effect, whereby some locals, especially youth, come to desire the material objects—and emulate the values, lifestyles, and behavior—of wealthier foreign tourists. As youth who interact with tourists adopt foreign, usually more modern, cultural values, social tension can occur between older members of the community who worry about the loss of traditional values and those who interact directly with tourists and wish to reject or modify traditional cultural practices. Aside from possibly fostering a sense of inferiority due to creating a desire for, but inability to purchase, expensive material objects possessed by tourists, the demonstration effect is especially a concern when locals interact with tourists who exhibit sexual promiscuity or the open use of drugs and alcohol.

Tourist demand for cultural artifacts and traditions perceived to be exotic transforms certain aspects of host cultures into commodities to be bought and sold. The commodification of culture initiated by tourism ultimately strips the original meaning and purpose from cultural objects, customs, and festivals as locals respond to commercial pressures and induce critical relations. In this regard, cultural commodification decry the production of “airport art,” bastardized versions of traditional arts and crafts sold as cheap tourist trinkets in airports and shopping malls. Rather than being allowed to evolve naturally, according to indigenous needs, cultural performances change in substance, timing, or length in response to the entertainment demands and short attention spans of most package tourists.

Most structuralists disagree with the rose view that tourism promotes peace, security, and tolerance. The reason is that the vast majority of tourists receive information from enormous multinational tourism companies that are concerned more with profit than accurate or balanced representations of host cultures. Though states can change perceptions abroad through their actions, governments are limited in their ability to change tourists’ deep-seated cultural preconceptions because stereotypes are created or at least maintained by tour operators and travel agents that reduce complex cultures to a few recognizable, palatable nuggets for tourist consumption.

Though economic liberals agree that tourists may have inaccurate or simplistic ideas about the cultures of their hosts, the interactions between tourist and host that travel permits nevertheless help to foster better cross-cultural understanding. Again, structuralists would suggest that this may be possible under the right circumstances, but in practice, tourists and their hosts are positioned unequally in wealth and power, especially when tourists from wealthy countries visit destinations in developing countries. Tourism is a service industry and thus demands a certain level of servility. Since tourism centers on pleasure and recreation, there is even greater pressure for employees to ensure that the customer is satisfied. Moreover, tourists tend to travel in an “environmental bubble” where encounters with locals outside the tourism industry are rare, fleeting, and predictable. Instead of challenging servile and demeaning views of their people, states and local tourism operators often perpetuate the problem by reassuring tourists in brochures and other advertisements that locals will cater to their every whim.

The most visible social cost of tourism in many destinations is prostitution. Several factors help to explain the connection between tourism and prostitution. People on vacation tend to spend money much less cautiously than when at home. A holiday frame of mind, characterized by inversions of normal routines and patterns of behavior, also encourages some tourists to engage in activities, such as paying for sex, that are normally avoided at home. Irregular patterns of spending and behavior, combined with the spatial concentration of tourists in conspicuous locations of consumption and hedonism, create a market for local sexual services. It is therefore no surprise that in virtually all popular destinations, especially in poor countries, sex is easily available for purchase by tourists. Even in strictly controlled societies such as Cuba and Burma, the sex trade is supported partly by certain segments of tourists.

An insidious side of the tourism–prostitution relationship is the sexual exploitation of children by tourists. Though some tourists who purchase the sexual services of locals may be unaware of the young age of the sex worker, most tourists who engage in such activities with minors are fully aware of what they are doing. A lack of alternative means of survival, sexual abuse, and the collusion of corrupt government officials and police officers help to sustain this trade.

In response to the moral condemnation generated by images of tall male Western foreigners walking hand in hand with young Cambodian, Costa Rican, or South African girls (or boys), countries such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand have begun to enforce laws that allow them to prosecute citizens who travel abroad to purchase sex from minors.

In sum, to those who are fortunate enough to afford it, travel is an escape from the routines of everyday life, but tourism should, in addition to providing pleasure, receive serious academic and policy consideration due to its widespread and growing global significance. Tourism is fundamentally an IPE issue, with political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental implications. Patterns and trends in the global travel and tourism industry closely mirror, and in some cases magnify, such features of the world system as global integration, inequality, and the clash between traditional and modern culture. In short, tourism is the perfect embodiment of the interconnections, tensions, and benefits associated with globalization.

**CONCLUSION**

Migration and tourism represent two of the most significant forms of contemporary human flows, each with important consequences for IPE. These forms of movement are shaped by different motives, ranging from the migrant’s drive for economic gain, the refugee’s flight from persecution, and the tourist’s desire for recreation and exploration. Each also denotes different temporalities, such that while a tourist’s travels are temporary, a migrant’s sojourns may extend out for several years or even a lifetime. For all their differences, however, the two phenomena are related. It is no coincidence that poor laborers often leave the very places that wealthy Northern tourists seek out as exotic tourist escapes, while the migrants seek jobs in the industrialized countries.
that wealthy tourists flee in search of recreation. Therefore, global flows crystallize many of the inequalities inherent in globalization. Both forms of movement are structured by national security considerations, global markets, emerging technologies, and capital flows. Consequently, they draw our attention to the changing sources of labor and resources in a shifting landscape of production and distribution. Both have the potential to serve as powerful sources of economic development, yet they also demand new strategies for governance that can facilitate economic flows and protect vulnerable constituencies across borders. Taken together, both provide us with a clear sense of how human flows intersect with IPE structures to create new opportunities and challenges for a variety of international actors.

IPE theories are useful for making sense of the stakes of these global human flows. Economic liberals might see merit in the unfettered movement of both migrants and tourists across the globe because of the important roles that they play in the global marketplace and for the freedoms that their movement embodies. Structuralists, on the other hand, often criticize both of these forms of human movement because of the way they reflect and reproduce global economic inequalities. Mercantilists would evaluate the impact of migration and tourism in relation to the state’s political economic interests. In either case, highlighting the interaction between human flows and political economic forces allows us to discern how the same global connections that bring economic prosperity can also be tenuous and potentially unsustainable forces for long-term economic development. More importantly, they allow us to appreciate the implications of these flows not just for states and international institutions, but for the very people who are on the move in this age of uncertainty.

**KEY TERMS**
- migration 406
- internal migration 407
- transnational migration 408
- immigration 409
- circular migration 409
- chain migration 409
- guest worker 410
- brain drain 411
- remittances 411
- irregular migrants 414
- citizenship 413
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- cultural citizenship 415
- revenue leakages 421
- pleasure periphery 421
- growth pole 421
- alternative tourism 423
- ecotourism 423
- demonstration effect 426
- commodification 426

**DISCUSSION QUESTIONS**
1. What is the difference between a migrant and an immigrant? Under what circumstances is that distinction useful?
2. What trade-offs are involved in “mainstreaming migration” as a national development strategy? Explore the different stakes of such a strategy for countries such as the Philippines, Senegal, India, or El Salvador.
3. Compare a female Cambodian refugee living in Wisconsin with a male irregular migrant from the Dominican Republic living in New York City. What similarities and differences might characterize their (a) reasons for coming to the United States, (b) their economic opportunities within the United States, and (c) their experience of cultural citizenship within the United States?
4. What makes tourism an attractive option for the state? How does tourism create risks for the state? Why is it necessary for destination states to be concerned about making tourism environmentally sustainable?
5. What are the rewards and risks of tourism according to liberals, mercantilists, and structuralists?
6. Why are the political, economic, and social trade-offs associated with tourism?

**SUGGESTED READINGS**

**Migration**

**NOTES**
4. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 17.